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
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THE

WORKS

OF

CHARLES FOLLEN,

WITH A

MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
On the Future State of Man	3
History	99
Inaugural Discourse	125
Funeral Oration on Gaspar Spurzheim .	153
Address to the People of the United States on the Subject of Slavery . . .	189
Franklin Lecture	228
Religion and the Church	254
Peace and War	314

MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS.

ON THE

FUTURE STATE OF MAN.*

THERE is no subject of human thought, that calls so earnestly for the most strenuous exertion of our minds, and for the most ardent aspirations after light from on High, as the state of man after death, and that judgment, without appeal, which shall assign to each human being his place and standing in the world of spirits. It is true, that, in this life, nothing is certain except its end; and every temporal interest, however great, must vanish in the prospect of eternity. The consideration of that inevitable event, to which we are hastening, could not fail to excite in us the strongest desire to obtain the clearest possible conception of it, though we could do no more towards it than meet it as passive gainers or sufferers by the unalterable judgment of God. Who would refuse a grateful welcome to the most distant star that sheds a feeble ray upon the night of death? But this natural desire after light on this great subject becomes a sacred duty to those who believe that the final judgment is to be founded on our own conduct. As common prudence instructs us to guard against

* From the "Christian Examiner," Vol. VII. for 1829, and Vol. VIII. for 1830.

the destructive cold of the approaching winter, or to secure the rich profits of autumn by laying out our industry in spring, so the voice of heavenly prudence calls upon our souls, and all that is within us, to prepare for the great harvest of life and of death, in the land of promise and of retribution, beyond the grave.

The thought of the final account we shall have to render of all we have done, or left undone, in this life, should be deeply impressed on our minds on all occasions, and particularly when we think and speak of that solemn event itself. We should be careful not to leave any opportunity unimproved, but faithfully to exert all our faculties to obtain, in regard to our future condition, the most perfect views we are capable of conceiving. The prospect of the life and judgment to come should make us anxious and importunate in the pursuit of truth, but fearless as to the result of our faithful inquiries.

The opinions of men, concerning the future state, are divided in various ways ; and it is easy to account for this fact. The life to come could not be conceived of in any other mode than as a continuation of the present. It was natural, therefore, that the various views of human life and happiness should be transferred to the future state. Accordingly, while some men were looking forward to a world of perfect justice, wisdom, and love, others were led to anticipate a paradise of all their appetites and passions. This source of controversy, concerning the future state, has been made more abundant by the vague use of language on all sides. Men did not understand each other, and complained of misconstruction

of their views, because they did not understand, or distinctly express themselves. Still more, the language of that record, from which the most important views of man's immortality were to be derived, ceased to be a living tongue before it became the object of a truly learned and sound interpretation. Yet such an interpretation was the only means whereby that part of its contents, which was calculated to remain the common property of all reflecting minds, could be freed from the idiom in style and thought, by which it was peculiarly suited to those to whom it was immediately addressed.

If these circumstances are calculated to multiply religious controversy on this subject, these differences themselves are perpetuated by the unwillingness of most men to search the Scriptures and their own nature for themselves. They would rather enlist in the service of one of the pretenders to infallibility in religious matters. Thus, controversies are multiplied in number as they diminish in real importance, while men are differing, not so much about the teachings of nature and Scripture, as about what some commentator of note has said, or is said to have said. Any objection, raised against such standard creeds, is apt to be felt as an insult offered to all who wear, and think themselves bound to defend, the same religious uniform.

Under these circumstances, it seems to be the fairest and safest mode of proceeding, first, to give a sketch of the most important views, which have been and are entertained on the future state of man,

without ascribing either of them to any individual or sect, and then simply to state the writer's own opinion.

All nations, civilized and savage, that we have any exact knowledge of, agree with us in the belief, that the present life of man is not the whole, but only the beginning of his existence. The immortality of the soul is, and has been at all times, a fundamental article of the general creed of mankind. Even before the daybreak of divine truth in the gospel of Christ, there were forereaching minds, that read, in the sunset of this earthly life, presages of a glorious resurrection of light, and who taught their fellow-men to free themselves of the fear of death by extending their desire of life beyond it. But those, who believe in a life to come, differ in many of their views of the future state. Their opinions disagree, first, in regard to the *condition* itself, in which men may be placed after death; and, secondly, concerning the *grounds*, on which any particular condition will be actually assigned to an individual.

In the first place, the *condition* itself, in which men may possibly be placed hereafter, differs, according to the views of different sects, in its *kind*, *degree*, and *duration*.

If you ask some persons what *kind* of condition will be assigned to a human being after death, they will answer, that all men will be made happy, whatever be their conduct in this life; while others are of opinion, that only a portion of the human race will be blessed, while others will be made to suffer, or be annihilated.

If you inquire further about the *degree* of human happiness or unhappiness, some persons will tell you, that there will be only one degree of joy for the blessed, and one degree of misery for those who are doomed to suffer; that the former will be perfectly happy, and the latter completely miserable. Others, on the contrary, suppose, that there will be various degrees of joy and of pain in the future, as well as in the present condition of man.

If you ask, in the third place, what will be the *duration* of the condition which may be assigned to any individual, many persons will answer, that, whatever condition, and whatever degree of happiness or unhappines may be conferred upon an individual on his entering the future state, be it immediately after his death or after the final judgment, it will remain the same throughout eternity. Other persons, on the contrary, are persuaded, that there will, or may, be changes in the condition of men, even after the divine judgment. Among those, whose belief admits of such changes, there are many who think that some men will be condemned to suffer for a time, or pass through a purgatory, before they are admitted to a state of unchangeable bliss. There is room for still another opinion; namely, that in the future life, as well as in this, it will be in the power of each individual to change his condition for the worse or for the better, by his own conduct.

I have mentioned the principal differences in opinion, with respect to the condition itself, in which men may possibly be placed after death; and I

now proceed to mention the most important views concerning the *grounds* on which either of those conditions will be actually assigned to each individual.

All believers in a future state agree in maintaining, that, whatever be the condition of an individual, it is conferred upon him by the law or judgment of God. But the principal difference consists in this, that some think God will bestow happiness or unhappiness on each person in proportion to his own good or ill desert, while others believe in a distribution of joy or suffering by the absolute decree of God, without any reference to the relative merit or demerit of the individual.

Those, who suppose the future condition of men to be founded on the mere and unconditional will of God, either deny altogether the existence of a free will in man, all his actions and intentions being predestined with absolute necessity by God; or they believe that the choice, the good or ill desert of the individual, has no influence upon the divine judgment.

On the other side, those, who hold that the future state of man will depend on his own desert, generally suppose, that his conduct in this life alone, will be the ground of his future condition; while there is room also for believing, that, in the future state, as well as in the present, the happiness or unhappiness of each human being will depend on his conduct, his own good or ill desert.

I have stated the principal views of the future condition of man, and of the grounds on which it is sup-

posed to depend. With respect to all these different opinions, I am persuaded, that either of them, however erroneous in itself, may be embraced with a sincere conviction of its truth, and that he, who thus receives it, is right in rejoicing against the day of judgment. On the other hand, I verily believe, that no view, however true in itself, can lead to peace and happiness, unless it be adopted on free and full conviction. Seeing, then, that we have such hope, I shall use great plainness of speech. I would not be understood as attributing either of the views I shall have to examine, to any one denomination of Christians; and still less as censuring the believer for what I suppose to be erroneous in his faith, sincerely convinced, that human judgment is fallible, and that we shall be judged, not according to the talents we have received, nor according to the fruits they have yielded, but according to the faithful or unfaithful use we have made of the advantages we enjoy.

The views I intend to offer, I shall endeavour to prove by such observations of human nature as every person is able to make on himself, and by the simplest declarations of Scripture; so that, whatever there may be of truth or error in the following remarks, may be easily perceived by all.

All believers in a life to come, heathens as well as Christians, agree in this great principle, that the future state will be an ultimate exhibition and complete vindication of divine justice. From the earliest times, among all nations, we find doctrines, like those of the ancient Greeks and Romans, of Orcus and

Elysium and the three incorruptible judges in the world below. There are many, I know, who would proudly reject these and all the early religious traditions of heathen nations, relative to a future state of retributive justice, as mere fables. But he, who delights in studying the gradual progress of the human mind in religious knowledge, will not be ashamed of the childish essays of his race. Nay, he will hail them as prophetic dreams, that have shadowed forth what the Gospel of Christ has brought to light, that "the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."

I have said that all who look forward in faith to a life to come, agree that the future state will be a confirmation, or at least not a refutation of our trust in divine justice. All unite in professing and magnifying the perfect justice of God; but not all understand what they extol. Otherwise their views of the future condition of man could not be essentially opposed to each other. In asserting that God is just, we ascribe to him a quality which constitutes part of the moral character of man. What we consider essential to human excellence, we attribute in its perfection to the Author of our moral nature. Justice, human and divine, though different in degree, must be the same in kind. In what then does it consist? Some will say, justice consists in the strict and impartial execution of the laws. God, accordingly, is just, because

he will faithfully judge each one according to the laws he has given and made known to all. Now it is true that justice demands the execution of the laws; yet this alone is not justice, otherwise any law, however partial and absurd, would be justified by its strict and impartial application. How can we say that justice rules over a country or the whole universe, if the laws, however faithfully administered, are in themselves unjust? Would you indeed maintain, that it becomes a loyal subject of the Most High to profess that all things are just with him, because with him all things are possible? Those who attempt to magnify the omnipotence of God at the expense of his justice, those who dread to offend against the divine majesty by trusting in his righteousness rather than his partial mercy, blaspheme the God they thus ignorantly worship. Knowledge and power, if they be added to injustice, are no longer perfections of the moral character, but, on the contrary, aggravate its immorality. However powerful, however wise, however merciful you may think him, and however privileged and exalted above the rest of mankind you may suppose yourself to be by his special favor; yet, if you consider God as a respecter of persons, as a generous but arbitrary disposer of his creatures and their destiny, — you may indeed fear him, and look up to him with admiration, even with grateful affection, yet you cannot, whatever dreadful consequences you may ascribe to this mode of thinking, you cannot truly respect him. You cannot with a concordant heart join in the sublime ascription with which the inspired

prophet of the one true God begins his immortal song;—"He is the rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are judgment; a God of truth and without iniquity; just and right is he."

There is in the mind of man a standard of right and wrong, by which he is enabled and commissioned to try, not only the actions and decisions of men, whether they be conformed to established laws, but also these laws themselves, whether they be sanctioned by eternal justice. And not only human actions and decisions are to be judged by this inborn principle of justice, but He himself who has endowed us with this divine attribute, does not disdain, nay, invites us to judge of his own actions, so far as we can comprehend them, and says, "O house of Israel, are not my ways equal?"

It is from the simple and clear decisions of our moral sense that we learn the true nature of justice, human and divine. Let us examine some of the plain decisions of reason and conscience. A father does justice to his children, if he educates them according to their natural capacities. Society is bound in justice to protect the natural rights of each of its members, to acknowledge and encourage every kind of merit, industry, talent, learning, and skill, and to discountenance every false pretence, and punish every crime. With regard to animals, we think it unjust to abuse instead of using them according to their nature and destination. Those in particular, which we have deprived of their natural freedom for our own advantage, seem to have a claim on us for shelter, food, and

protection. A refined sense of justice extends even to plants, pointing them out as objects of due care to him that raised them. Justice is due even to inanimate objects, to works of art, and literary productions, which require a just estimation of their nature and character. Justice, in the highest sense of the word, ought to characterize our ideas of the Author of all animate and inanimate existence.

In all these instances, the true character of justice cannot be mistaken. He alone can be called just, who adapts his actions and sentiments to the nature and character of every being. When we say, therefore, that God is just, we mean that his intentions and actions are adapted to the nature and character of all his creatures. Man trusts in the justice of God, when he believes that God adapts the course of events to the nature he has given him. He believes that the faithful Creator will supply the necessary means to unfold all the faculties and tendences he has implanted in human nature. This trust, therefore, implies the belief in a divine education, by which the human race, and each individual, is furthered and guided to the end for which he was created.

The importance of this doctrine of divine justice, with reference to the future state of man, is self-evident. If there be in human nature any thing that can be considered as implying a divine promise of an existence after death; if there be a germ of life which waits for the heavens' opening upon it that it may unfold in the sunshine of another world, we may rest assured that He who sowed the seed, will not with-

hold from it the light and the dew and a paradise to grow in for ever. God is just. He does, and will do justice, therefore, to the immortal capacities he has given us.

Believing, then, as we do, that the whole of man's existence is regulated by divine justice, we possess in the constitution of our own nature a revelation of the life to come. We are led to inquire what will be the future state of man, if justice be done to the nature and faculties he possesses; and our faith in divine justice assures us, that the result of the present inquiry, if the inferences drawn are correct, will be confirmed by future reality. The eternal stars of his destiny, which are hidden from the sight of man by the broad glare of the ruling interests of the day, he descries when he descends into the depths of his own mind. And to ascertain the length and the breadth, the depths and the shallows of the soul, there is no guide so sure as the Gospel of Christ, the recorded wisdom of him who knew all that was in man.

I have said, that in order to obtain correct views concerning the life to come, we must search our own being, since our belief in divine justice assures us, that the future state of man will be in accordance with his present nature. This view of divine justice, therefore, confirms and aids our reasoning from analogy, which rests on the self-evident supposition that the future life of man will resemble the present, if the former be really a continuation of the latter. Even independent of our previous view of divine justice, reason would prompt us to examine the actual state

of our being, in order to ascertain, from its nature, in what the future is likely to resemble the present. It is the same manner of reasoning which we apply to all other future events, with a degree of confidence proportioned to the time, the extent, and the accuracy of our observation of the previous state of things. Thus our knowledge of the capacities of the infant, enables us to form an idea of the possible and probable attainments of the man. The more his faculties unfold, so much the clearer is our preconception of his future stages of improvement. The longer and the more we know a person, so much the surer is our anticipation of his future conduct; though this preconception can never become certain foreknowledge. For the same reason, the idea we form of the future state of man from all the various stages he has to pass through in this life, is even more likely to be correct than the view we may form of the man from the character of the child. Still more, experience shows that general remarks concerning the faculties, wants, and propensities of mankind, derived from manifold experience and history, are more likely to be correct than our conception of the peculiar character of an individual. This circumstance cannot but strengthen our faith in the inferences we draw from the present to the future condition of man, the subject of our contemplation is not the future state of each or any individual in particular, but of men in general. Accordingly, in reasoning on the future state of man from analogy, we may safely and freely use all that history and experience teach us concerning his nature and character, in various parts and ages of the world, without being exposed to mistakes

arising from an imperfect knowledge of the peculiar nature and character of any individual.

The course of the present inquiry is pointed out by the preceding remarks. It is not my intention here to adduce all the reasons we have for believing in man's immortality. My object is to obtain some just conceptions of the future state, from what, by continued observation, we know to be the nature of man, its essential properties, faculties, and tendencies, to which we trust justice will be done, by Him who implanted them in man.

I mention, first, the deepest and most powerful of all the desires of man, his yearning after an endless continuation of his existence. Every being most intensely desires, not only that the human race, but that he himself, that his existence as an individual, should never end. This desire does not imply a wish to preserve unchanged *all* the properties and appurtenances of our present being. On the contrary, the principle of change belongs to the actual constitution of man, as much as that of stability. The innate longing of man after immortality, consists in the desire, that of the various endowments and attainments of the present life, so much at least may be preserved from destruction, as to enable him still to recognise himself as essentially the same being. I mention attainments together with endowments, as essential to the identity of our being, because it is evident that the man who has developed all the faculties with which he was endowed by nature, would no longer recognise himself as the same being, if, in a future state, merely the faculties themselves should be restored to him without

the attainments he had made. What then are, I ask, those powers and properties of man, which we consider indispensable to the identity of his being ?

It is manifest, in the first place, that the material part of our being, that is, all that may be perceived by the senses, our bodies, and all that properly belongs to them, cannot be considered as essential to the individuality of man. The body consists of various parts and material elements, into which it is divided and resolved by death. Indeed, its various organs, faculties, and desires, die away even before the close of our earthly life. And in the prime of physical health and strength we are conscious that our bodies are not ourselves, so that "it is indeed more difficult to comprehend how the mind can exist in the body, than without it." What man truly calls his own self, and the immortality of which he anticipates with the most intense desire, the direct object of his self-conscious reason, is a single and indivisible being. It is that principle within him, which thinks, feels, and wills, and is conscious of all its operations as various effects of the same permanent cause, which we call the human mind. Accordingly, it is not the body, but the mind, in which we must seek an answer to the question, what powers and attainments of man are likely to survive the death of the body, and form the basis of his future state.

But though it is necessarily the nature of the human mind, from which we must draw inferences concerning man's future being, yet there is one view in which his body too furnishes coincident information. Though

the material parts, the members and organs, be dissolved, yet the corporeal existence of man must be considered as an important starting point for the mind in its continual advancement. That it might be made acquainted, fully and intimately, with the material world, the mind of man, itself a living spirit, "was made flesh"; that is, assumed a corporeal frame which enabled it to enter into the inmost nature of every order of beings in the material universe. Man, being himself made to exist in a body, is able to comprehend, through his own experience, the coexistence of innumerable bodies. He was made, moreover, to grow like the plant, — to move, perceive, and feel like the animal, that he might assume and assimilate to himself every degree of perfection that exists, grows, and lives on this dark planet, before he ascends to brighter spheres of existence. For it seems to be a law of nature, that he who leaves his native land a stranger to its own peculiar condition and interests, is not fit to be naturalized in any other part of the world. In this point of view, then, the corporeal existence of man cannot be considered as a transitory state, which is to vanish at death. Although the material frames which we now possess, are to be destroyed by death, yet we know that those particles of matter of which the body at any time happens to consist, are not essential even to our corporeal existence. For our body is continually changing its materials; so that in a few years hence, not one particle of that frame which we now call our body, will be the same, while we still preserve the identity of our corporeal existence.

The dissolution of the body by death, then, is not a sufficient reason for believing that even our corporeal existence is confined to the present life. On the contrary, analogy leads me to suppose, that the capacity to live and move, to have a being also, in the material world, will not be destroyed, but perfected in another stage of our existence. The impressions we receive through our senses, such as light, sound, and resistance, will not, as some suppose, vanish as mere affections of our various organs, but be confirmed as perceptions of real qualities of material objects. This power of perception, as well as that of motion, will be increased. That each of these physical and organic powers of man is capable of indefinite improvement, is evident from the fact that they exist even now in different degrees of perfection in men and animals. There are birds, and other animals, which surpass us in various powers of motion and sensation, as much as there are plants which excel us in growth, and inanimate bodies, which possess a greater power of resistance and duration. From experience we know that all our senses, as well as other bodily powers, may be improved continually, particularly when they are made the instruments of the ever-extending operations of mind. In the service of the mind the bodily powers of man have sufficed to change the face of the earth, to make the sea an inexhaustible field of human enterprise and industry, and to explore the heavens. Of each of these various objects of pursuit it can still be said, as a celebrated astronomer said of his own science, that it is the result of bad eyes with a great

deal of curiosity. Is it reasonable to suppose that nature, which has given us this infinite thirst after knowledge, will not give us also vessels to draw with from the deep wells of creation; instruments more perfect than those with which human art supplies the weak eye and the feeble hand? But these contrivances of human art themselves, seem to point out the way in which nature will furnish us the means of accomplishing designs expressed in the constitution of our being. It is indeed highly probable, that we who stand here gazing at the portal of His temple, shall be admitted to the mysteries of the sanctuary, when the sabbath of eternal life shall open the temple gate. But it is not likely, according to the universal law of gradual progression in nature, that the mind of man will be enabled to penetrate the inmost being of the material world without any material organs. I suppose, therefore, that we shall be born again with an organization similar to our present, and suited to the moral and intellectual state in which we leave this world, with a "celestial body," adapted to the future, as much as this terrestrial frame is to our present existence.

But whatever may be thought of the resurrection of the flesh, the restoration of man's physical organization, it is certain that the elements of man's immortality do not lie in his body, but in his mind. The doctrine of the future state, therefore, must be founded chiefly on the nature of the human mind, its essential faculties, and most important attainments. To this, then, let us now direct our inquiry.

When we contemplate the human mind, the tree of life which God has planted within us, we see three branches striving upward to heaven, the Intellect, the Affections, and the Moral Power of man. We all perceive that whatever change we may experience by death, if it should deprive us of our intellect, our affections, and our moral power, such a change would be equal to an annihilation of our being. Without intelligence, the world would not exist to us, nor should we be conscious of our own existence ; without affections, the brightest perceptions of our intellect would be images reflected in a dead mirror ; and without the power of virtue, of moral exertion, man would rank with the brute, though possessed of the clearest views and the warmest affections. It is the tendency of these three powers after infinite expansion, which we have a right to consider as an earnest of our immortality. From the nature of these three immortal endowments of our being, I shall endeavour to draw inferences concerning the life to come.

I shall speak first of the Intellect of man, which may be defined as the power to form ideas. When we survey the immense variety of ideas which the mind is capable of conceiving, we observe one important difference in these productions of the intellect, which is characteristic of its nature, and essential to its progress. We perceive many things by our senses, which we call material objects ; such as sounds and colors. Others we perceive without the instrumentality of our senses, by our intellect alone ; such as thoughts, feelings, desires, and resolutions.

Our conceptions of material,* as well as of immaterial objects, agree in this respect, that they are accompanied with a belief that there are real objects corresponding to our ideas. Such ideas we call *perceptions*. But we form also ideas which are not accompanied with belief in their reality, which we term productions of the *imagination*. Of these conceptions of the imagination, there are some of which we know that there is no object corresponding to them; such as dreams and works of fiction. In regard to others, we do not know whether and how far they are true or fictitious; such as the supposition that the stars are inhabited by living and rational beings. Besides these two essential faculties of the intellect, Perception and Imagination, we possess the power of comparing our ideas, whether real or fictitious, with each other, and judging of the relations they bear to one another. It is this third power of the intellect, which we call Reason, by which we perceive the connexion between cause and effect, all the differences and resemblances of things and ideas in quantity and quality, as well as their relative probability.

When we contemplate the dawn of intellectual life in the child, we find the various mental capacities and energies wrapped up, as it were, in one all-absorbing tendency, the innate and ever active principle of curiosity. As the intellectual nature unfolds, by healthy exercise, the three powers of perception,

* Whenever the word *material* is used in this treatise, it means simply and exclusively all that we perceive by our five senses; which is indeed the only tenable definition of *matter*.

imagination, and reason, become prominent. The intellectual life of man consists in the vigorous and harmonious exercise of these three faculties, each of which is capable of infinite expansion. All that is, is an object of perception ; all that can be, all that is possible or conceivable, is an object of imagination. The extension of knowledge and of fiction being an inexhaustible source of new ideas, there is, consequently, an infinite field laid out for the exercise of reason, in judging of the relations they bear to each other. The intellectual progress of man receives its first and ever-increasing impulse from innate curiosity ; while it is continually insured by that mediatory and regulating power, which reason exercises with respect to perception and imagination. Before the fifteenth century, what we now call the old world, was the only object of knowledge to our European ancestors, while the continent, on which we live, existed only in the imagination of a few minds, exercising their reason to ascertain, from that part of the earth which they knew, the probability of the existence of one, which at last became an object of knowledge through perception. And thus, every great discovery in the world has it origin in the previous perception of certain objects, which formed a starting point for the imagination, roaming over the wide ocean of possibilities, and guided by reason, particularly reasoning from analogy, until the shore of a new continent of knowledge rises before the prospective mind. As soon as our boldest anticipations become realities by actual

perception, imagination wanders, and reason directs to higher regions of light.*

Thus the human mind has pressed onward from the simplest to the most wonderful discoveries of every kind. By the aid of philosophy, the eye of the observer has discovered thousands of living beings in one drop of water; while it has opened his mind to the contemplation of the universe, in which this earth, and the whole of our earthly knowledge, appear but as one drop in the unbounded ocean of existence and life. The human mind has travelled, and is still travelling on, in search of new worlds, and further, to the inexhaustible Source of all being. By the light of reason and divine revelation, "the spirit of man searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God."

Such is the nature of the human intellect. The mind of man yearns after truth, as the plant turns towards the sun. Every attainment in knowledge, instead of quenching, only increases the thirst after intellectual light. Our highest intellectual pleasure

* To those who are not unacquainted with the history of intellectual philosophy, the above view of the three principal functions of the intellect, will appear, I hope, not as any thing new, but as well understood and familiar. Those, to whom it may appear otherwise, will find the reason of its novelty, and of the failure of so many ingenious theories concerning the human intellect, from the time of the Greeks to the present, in the hopeless way in which the end was pursued, either by subtile expositions of terms, or by endeavours to explain the manner in which an affection of the organ, by a kind of transubstantiation, becomes a conception of the intellect.

arises, not so much from the knowledge we have at any time acquired, as from the prospect of infinite progress. We do not fully enjoy, we even feel dissatisfied with any degree of information, however great, unless we see in it the preparation for higher attainments, the promise of a still more plentiful harvest of light. If, therefore, as I believe, the future state will not be a subversion, but a continuation of our nature, a free and full developement of the faculties we already possess, what will be the condition of our intellect in the life to come?

We have seen, that it is the nature of the human intellect to expand by degrees, but without end, under the ever-increasing impulse of curiosity, and the co-operation of perception, imagination, and reason. It seems, therefore, most natural to suppose, that, in the life to come, we shall neither be confined to our present knowledge, nor be made omniscient; but that the power, the desire, and the opportunities of acquiring new ideas, will be increased indefinitely, in proportion to the attainments we are continually making. All the knowledge we have acquired, that in particular which is calculated to guide us into all truth, will abide with us for ever. Our knowledge of nature, of man, and of God, will grow in extent and in truth according to our own intellectual efforts. The fondest and boldest wishes which the soul sends forth from its earthly enclosure to the unknown regions of futurity, will there find a resting-place, where all desire of returning will vanish in the prospect of a new land of promise. As the boundaries of human

knowledge are extended, may it not be supposed, that a *new poetry*, the glorious offspring of the regenerated imagination, will spring up and rise beyond the realms of knowledge, as a prophetic vision of worlds to come, which yet exist only in the creative mind of God ?

I have spoken of the probable condition of the human intellect in the life to come, and shall next proceed to make some remarks on the immortality of the affections.

The affections or feelings, as I have before observed, form one of the three essential attributes of the soul ; the first of which, the intellect, I have already considered with a view to the future state of man. In treating of the affections and the moral powers, I shall pursue the same method of reasoning ; namely, to discover what will be the future state of the soul, by investigating its nature, as it is manifested in its present condition.

Man is made, not only to form ideas of the world and of himself, but also to be interested in what he perceives, thinks, and imagines. The objects, which, through the eye of the mind, the intellect, are brought into contact with ourselves, do not remain indifferent to us. We take a part in them, or rather make them part of ourselves. They affect the state of our being, as they give rise to pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, hope or fear, trust or distrust. All these various states of the soul we comprehend under the general name of affections. Through the self-conscious power of our intellect, we know, that

our affections or feelings are not the productions of our own free will or imagination. To say, that the pain we complain of is imaginary, or of our own choosing, is as much as to say that it is not real.* Our affections, though intimately connected with all other states of the mind, are not merely other names for ideas or resolutions, operations of the intellect and the will, — they are peculiar states of the mind distinct from all others. We can imagine a being endowed with the power of thinking and resolving, but incapable of pleasure and pain, love or dislike. If there were such a being, it would be as impossible for a *feeling* mind to give him any definite idea of its pleasant or painful emotions, as it is to convey ideas of sound and color to the deaf and the blind. The affections, then, are not merely synonymous terms for other operations of the mind, but they exist distinct from all others, as a matter of fact within us. Men, therefore, generally and justly, ascribe their affections to a constituent principle in the soul, as their common source and centre. It is the nature of this principle, which we call the heart, that we must search into, in order to form some adequate preconception of the future state of human affections.

This part of our investigation is attended with peculiar difficulty, since many of the most important operations of the heart, the true motives of actions, and

* Hooker says, "Affections, as joy, grief, fear, and anger, with such like, being, as it were, the sundry fashions and forms of appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things."

the beginnings of passions, are apt to pass unnoticed, even by the eye of the mind. This every one should consider, when he attempts to unroll the mysterious scroll of the heart, with a view to decipher the hieroglyphics of the soul. Impressed with the difficulty of this undertaking, I shall confine myself to the duties of a faithful historian of the soul. I shall mention such facts only, as lie within the consciousness of every individual, excluding all preconceived theories, that the soul herself may be her own interpreter and prophet.

The feelings or affections, in different men, and in the same individual, are infinitely various, and continually changing. They are, moreover, so frequently blended with other operations of the mind, with thoughts and actions, that, in order to know what is likely to be immortal in them, it is necessary to view them, if possible, separate from all other phenomena of the soul, and, by a philosophical analysis, trace them to their sources and elements. It would exceed the limits of this article, as well as the powers of the writer, to analyze all the various affections. It is necessary, and sufficient, to show by some examples, what appear to be the elementary feelings of man; leaving it to the reader to test the correctness of the results we come to, by subjecting any other emotion or affection to the same analysis.

In the first place, a person who fears an impending evil, and one who regrets the loss of a friend; one who suffers from sickness or poverty, and one who is ashamed of his ignorance or sins; one who

resents an injury he has received, and one who compassionates the sufferings of another; each one of these persons is subject to a particular affection. But there is one feeling mixed up with, or at the bottom of all these various affections of fear, regret, discomfort, shame, remorse, resentment, anger, indignation, hatred, envy, and compassion. This is the simple feeling of pain. Of this, there are many various degrees and modifications, which we denote by the words uneasiness, grief, unhappiness, or misery. But this feeling of pain itself is a simple and primitive emotion, which cannot be resolved into any other.

On the other hand, a person who is elated with hope, or confident of success; proud of possessing what he himself esteems, and vain of what is prized by others; one who respects, loves, and admires all that is praiseworthy, and the libertine, who triumphs in his freedom from all moral restraints; each of these persons is actuated by a different affection. But one elementary feeling is embraced in all these affections of hope, confidence, pride, vanity, esteem, love, admiration, joy, on account of the perfections or imperfections of others. This common element is the simple feeling of pleasure. Of this, there are also different degrees and modifications, such as gayety, joy, happiness, and bliss.

In the third place, one who relieves another's wants from charity, and one who does the same for the purpose of humbling him whom he assists; a person who reprehends another to insult, and one

who does the same in order to improve him ; he who is led by kindness, gratitude, humility, and courtesy, and he who is impelled by revenge, or avarice, or ambition, by moral or immoral, religious or irreligious zeal, indolence or curiosity ; all these persons are under the influence of different affections. But they are all characterized by the same primary feeling. This feeling we call desire, be it the desire of doing good or evil ; of spreading truth or falsehood ; the desire of wealth, power, or fame ; the willingness to recognise one's own imperfections, which is humility, or the desire of humbling others, which is haughtiness.

There are, then, in man, three feelings, pain, pleasure, and desire, which cannot be traced to any more simple operations of the soul, nor are they resolvable into one another. The relation of these three elementary feelings to each other may be learned from a few examples. The want of food, the want of information, and the want of merit, give rise to three kinds of pain, — animal, intellectual, and moral pain ; that is, to a feeling of dissatisfaction with our animal, intellectual, and moral state. This feeling of dissatisfaction gives rise to desire. The pain of starving gives rise to hunger and thirst ; the suffering from ignorance to curiosity, or desire of knowledge ; and the painful consciousness of moral imperfection to virtue, or exertion after excellence. All these animal, intellectual, and moral desires are evidently called forth by a feeling of dissatisfaction or pain. Desire is nothing more than a felt tendency

to change the unsatisfactory state we are in, for a more satisfactory condition. The true object of all desire, therefore, is satisfaction; that is, cessation of pain, and experience of pleasure. The real object of hunger is not the food that is used, nor the process of eating. Food and eating are not desired, except when they serve to remove the pain of fasting, or to gratify the palate. In the same manner, the ultimate object of curiosity is not information, but intellectual enjoyment, for which information is the necessary means; and the end of virtue is moral happiness, which can be attained only by the means of doing good, or performing our duties.* The immediate object of all desire is the cessation of pain;

* The limits of this article do not permit me to argue this contested point in ethics. But I wish those who are of a different opinion would ask themselves, whether virtue is not founded on the free desire of goodness or perfection, and whether the main object of all desire is not satisfaction, — satisfaction of the desire itself; and thirdly, whether a man can be said to be perfectly satisfied, unless he *feels* satisfied, that is, happy. Those who are not used to metaphysical speculation on this subject, will, do doubt, be persuaded, that he is the best man who finds his *happiness* in goodness; and that no one can be virtuous without *desiring* to be good. Impressed with the importance of a strict distinction between that which is *moral*, and that which is merely *profitable*, and not knowing in what this difference really consists, many have defined virtue and morality as something which has nothing to do with desire and happiness, as a necessary product of the clear and strong conception of duty. But an act produced by the mere conception of it, without a motive, that is, a desire, and, consequently, without a choice between different motives, — such an act deserves no more to be called an action, strictly speaking, than that of yawning or sighing under the impulse of imitation.

but this of itself is the beginning of pleasure or satistion. Hence we can say, the origin of all desire is pain, and its object is pleasure. Desire is the motive, and pleasure the end of all actions of man. Out of the heart, the centre and source of all desire, pain, and pleasure, are indeed the issues of life, — of animal, intellectual, and moral life. It is the pleasure, the happiness we find in any pursuit, which prompts us to choose it, or at least recommends it to our choice ; which to one makes gold more valuable than honor, and to another renders truth dearer than life.

If the common expressions of pleasure and pain give us a true idea of the feelings of the infant, it seems that pain is the firstborn emotion in man. This gives rise to desire, — be it the desire of air or food, motion or rest, — which directs all its movements, first unconsciously, then voluntarily, to its true end, the satisfaction of its wants, the cessation of pain, and the attainment of pleasure.

Experience shows, in regard to all the various sources of pleasure, what I have already observed with respect to man's intellectual life ; that those attainments which give full satisfaction for a time, soon again become a source of discontent. The enlargement of man's knowledge makes him conscious of its limits ; the advancement to a station in society which was once the highest mark of his ambition, creates the want of greater influence ; and moral greatness, attained, becomes small in the eye of the possessor, and wakes in his soul a " divine ambition "

after an unknown and unconceived-of state of power and glory. Thus, with the expression of dissatisfaction man enters upon life, and with the conviction of its insufficiency he leaves it.

What is the meaning of this constant succession of pain, desire, and pleasure in human life, which ends with a feeling that seems less like a termination than another beginning of life? The poet divined its true import, when he said,

> —— "Man's grief is grandeur in disguise,
> And discontent is immortality."

Nor can it be mistaken by the true student of human nature, who finds out the real meaning of this deep and mysterious author, not from the made-up theories of her various commentators, but from her own authentic works, and as it were in the language of the original; that is, from the spontaneous workings of the soul, ascertained by faithful self-observation. He cannot fail to find in that regular succession of emotions in his soul, a revelation of his present and future being. For if he inquires into the causes of pleasure, pain, and desire, he finds that pleasure is called forth in man by every thing that is, or seems to him conducive to his perfection; that is, favorable to the continuation of his being and the increase of his powers, — while every impression of an opposite nature causes pain. All that secures to an individual his own existence, be it the acquisition of a livelihood, or a satisfactory proof of the immortality of his soul, excites pleasure, while poverty and doubt are causes of pain. The same emotions are called forth by the real or imaginary increase or diminution

of his power, be it by increase of knowledge and moral excellence, or by acts of violence and oppression.

What is the cause and object of the third elementary feeling of man, his desire? I have shown that desire is called forth by pain, or the feeling of dissatisfaction which arises from imperfection; and that its object is satisfaction or happiness, which is founded on perfection. Desire, then, is, in fact, nothing but the tendency of human nature to pass from imperfection to perfection. Thus poverty, which endangers man's earthly existence, gives rise to industry to secure it; thus the pains of ignorance and doubt concerning the state of man after death, call forth intellectual exertion to establish the happy conviction of his immortality. In the same way, the transition from a supposed imperfection to an imaginary perfection, is induced by desire. The sufferings of honest poverty thus become temptations to exchange it for ill-gotten wealth; and the restraints which the laws and manners of society impose upon the passions, give rise to a criminal desire to surmount or to brave them.

The regular succession of pain, desire, and pleasure, takes place in animals, as well as in man; and for the same purpose; namely, the attainment of that degree of perfection for which they were fitted by their nature. But the nature and destiny of the animal is finite; accordingly the succession of its feelings is a continual round of the same pains, desires, and pleasures. The want of food causes pain and hunger; this, being satisfied, gives way to a feeling of weariness

and desire of rest, until rest becomes painful, and calls for exercise, which excites the appetite, and reproduces the same course of feelings. But man is differently constituted in this respect. In him there is a desire to continue and increase each pleasure he is enjoying, to infinity. This is true not only of the pleasures of the mind, the intellectual, moral, and religious enjoyments, but also of the gratification of the senses. The animal frame, indeed, is not sufficient to minister to the unnatural craving of the gross drunkard, or the refined epicurean; but the cravings of the sensualist, the miser, the ambitious, outreach his power to satisfy them, as well as the desires of the true philosopher and philanthropist. Whatever man has, be it gold, or honor, or knowledge, or virtue, it reminds of him of what he has not, and thus satisfaction itself breeds discontent, as the true and only way to more perfect happiness.

This important fact, that the summit to which our desires tend, however high, as soon as it is reached, becomes a starting point for a new ascent, only shows that the tendency to perfection, as it exists in man, is not like that of the animal or of the plant, which becomes at last what it was at first, to undergo the same changes. The germ of life which nature has implanted in man, unfolds gradually like that of the plant; but the fruits of human exertion should bear the seeds of another existence and a higher order of being. Human perfection consists in infinite growth. All the powers of the soul, the intellect, the will, and the affections, are capable of infinite expansion; and there

is a divine impulse at the very root of human existence, that prompts to the continual exercise of all its powers to the utmost of their extent, and requires a sphere of existence and action conformed to its faculties and attainments. The boy for whom the nursery was an ample field of action, information, and enjoyment, soon finds the play-ground and the schoolroom too confined for his views, and his desires go forth to compass land and sea, until he looks down upon this whole world as a nursery, and upon life as a primary school for eternity. The continual succession of pain, desire, and pleasure in man, whatever pursuit he engages in, is the surest evidence of his infinite destiny ; while it is at the same time the propelling force that speeds him onward in his course. It is a necessary consequence of his progressive and ever-growing nature, that the pleasure which accompanies every advancement of man beyond mere existence, should gradually give way to a feeling of discontent or pain, and excite a desire after a more complete satisfaction. Thus, with every step he takes forward in the journey of life, the horizon of his affections enlarges. The sun of joy that rises within him, again sets in darkness, which calls for another more perfect day.

The inference with respect to the *future* state of the affections, which I feel justified in drawing from these observations, is simply this. Believing, as I do, that man in the life to come will still be essentially the same being, I conclude that the nature of his feelings will remain the same for ever. Many causes of pleasure and of pain, and objects of desire,

will cease, or be changed. But man, that is, every individual, will still be susceptible of pleasure, pain, and desire. The most perfect employment of all his powers at any one time, will still be attended with entire satisfaction ; but as human nature will still retain its capacity for, and tendency towards, continual progress, a more complete exercise of them will alone satisfy the mind. The want of this higher satisfaction will still be indicated by pain, and excite a desire after happiness. The great and kind design, for which the susceptibility of pain was made a constituent part of human nature, is adapted to every stage of an infinite existence and progress. For why was man made liable to all kinds of want ; to hunger and thirst, sickness and death, ignorance and sin ? For no other purpose, certainly, than that food and health, life, truth, and virtue, might become objects of desire, sources of happiness. Even the present life is sufficient to teach us, that the true object of all pain is to fit us for pleasure, or the enjoyment of perfection ; and that the life to come will complete and fully reveal this great and kind appointment of Providence, that we sow in tears only to reap in joy.

In the foregoing remarks upon the nature and future state of what I consider the elements of feeling in man, I have barely touched upon the power of the will over the affections. In the observations I intend to make hereafter on the moral powers of man, I shall treat also of his ability to sustain and exalt, or to pervert and debase the natural state and tendency of his affections, and thus complete the view I have now

given, by pointing out the probable effects of the character of man upon the future state of his feelings.

I have thus far considered the immortality of what may be called the feeling nature of man, the susceptibility of pleasure, pain, and desire, with which he is born. The result of this inquiry concerning the elements, naturally leads to the consideration of what may be termed the *attainments* in feeling; that is, the interests and affections which men actually form in this life.

Every day's experience furnishes numberless examples of that wonderful power in man, the elements of which I have endeavoured to explain, — the power to interest himself in all that is going on without and within; that is, to be excited to pleasure or pain by objects perceived or imagined. It is one of the great prerogatives of the nature of man, that he can be interested in every thing he knows or imagines, while the animal cares only for those objects which lie within the narrow scope of its instinct. This power of man to interest himself, of which I have before spoken as the vital spring of intellectual growth, is the inexhaustible capital that is laid out and employed in every shape of human industry. That this power itself is immortal, is in fact synonymous with the assertion that the mind is immortal. That there are great objects of interest laid up for the mind in the future state, cannot well be doubted, when we consider that even in this life every generation of men looks back upon those who preceded them, as having lived and died as mere children in knowledge and skill; as if

mankind, to the present day, had only served their apprenticeship in learning and handling the great interests of the present life. It seems then unnecessary to take notice of, or to ask, the question, whether the capacity of man to be interested, will continue to exist, and find objects to exercise itself upon after death. But the question remains to be considered whether the offspring of that parent power in man, the interests and attachments which he actually forms in this life, are likely to outlast it. For this purpose we must examine in what manner and by what objects we are generally interested.

The objects by which we are surrounded, and which have an influence upon our lives and feelings, are so various, and the state of the mind itself is subject to so many changes, that we live in a continual alternation of agreeable and disagreeable impressions. The same objects not unfrequently give us at one time pleasure, and at another pain. Some, however, take such a powerful hold upon our feelings, that, whenever they recur to us in experience or in thought, they revive and confirm the first impression. Thus, different countries afford to the traveller manifold pleasures. But these are supplanted by others ; while there is one spot on earth, the thought of which has a home in his heart, even while he is far from it. There are many persons, too, whose kindness to us has at different times gladdened our hearts ; but there are some who found their happiness in the pains they endured for us, whose blessed memory fills us with truer delight than all our present enjoyments. There are

persons on the other hand, whose presence gives us pain, because it brings with it the remembrance that they have wronged us, that they have overcome our good with evil; but there is no one of our enemies whose wrongs give us such deep and lasting pain as our own. Thus, in the large company of thoughts and impressions in which we are constantly moving, we find some familiar friends and some decided enemies, whilst most of them pass in the crowd unnoticed, or are soon supplanted by others.

These facts naturally lead to the supposition, that the inborn capacity of the soul to be interested in objects and events, was not destined to remain in its infant state, a mere susceptibleness of pleasant or painful impressions. The pleasure, with which the savage sees a fine painting for the first time, is not less real than that of the connoisseur. The feelings of both originate in the same property of their common nature. But the sensibility of the enlightened lover of the fine arts has not remained in the state in which that of the savage still is. In the same manner, the constant enjoyment of good, or frequent exposure to bad society, not only leaves the soul sensible of the pleasures or pains arising from our intercourse with others, but creates a more or less decided taste or distaste, love or aversion. The frequent repetition, or the depth of the pleasant or painful impressions, has a lasting influence on the soul itself, modifying its native capacities and tendencies. Thus, mere sensibilities become habits or dispositions of the soul, and are then called affections, in the strictest sense of the

word. The sight of misery will excite an active sympathy in every person that is not destitute of moral sensibility. But the affectionate need not the presence of suffering to excite them to actions, the performance of which has become the habitual delight of their souls.

As by the frequent repetition, or the inherent force of agreeable impressions, habits of delight, or affections, are engendered in the soul, so impressions of an opposite character give rise to dispositions to be displeased with the cause of such feelings, — to disinclination, aversion, or hatred. Is it likely, then, I would ask, that the inclinations and disinclinations, which men form in the present state, will continue in the future ? I suppose the continuance of our affections after death will depend on the same circumstances, on which their existence depends in this life ; viz., in the first place, on the real depth of feeling, and, secondly, on the objects of our love and dislike. As I consider death but as one of the various events in the life of the mind, I do not think it will have a different, though perhaps a greater, effect upon our feelings than other changes in our circumstances before death.

Now there are some affections which hardly deserve the name, since they are rather the fruits of circumstances than of the mind, — our promiscuous tastes and fancies, the transient fashions of the soul. It is not probable, that these passing likes and dislikes will be proof against the change from life to death, since they are subject to the fluctuating cir-

cumstances of this life, being easily supplanted by other impressions. But there are other attachments formed in this life, for good or for evil, which are so deeply rooted in the soul, that no change of circumstances, nothing but a moral regeneration, can eradicate them. Thus, when the night of affliction comes upon the prosperous man, his day-friends all forsake him ; but true friendship commands the sun of happiness to stand still upon the afflicted, until the powers of misfortune are discomfited. Thus, on the other hand, the true miser, when his hour is come, shows, by the eagerness with which he clings to the last plank in the shipwreck of his fortune, that the love of millions still lives concentrated in the death-grasp of avarice.

These real affections and lasting interests of the soul can be changed in this life, only by a decided alteration in the character, through the moral power of man. Whether such a moral change be possible in the future state, is a question which I shall endeavour to answer in connexion with other remarks on the moral powers. In this place I shall confine myself to the question, whether those inclinations and disinclinations, which are proof against every change of circumstances in this life, must be considered as a part of that property which the soul is to carry hence into another state of existence. This question, I believe, is decided by the previous observations. Our real affections are the natural and steady growth of the heart. If, therefore, we believe in the immortality of the feeling nature of man, or the elements

of our affections, it would be inconsistent not to believe also, that our true attainments in feeling, the inclinations and disinclinations, which we form in this life, will enter with us into the future. If we should be born again merely with that susceptibility of pleasure, pain, and desire, which we brought into this world, without the habits of feeling we have formed, we should no more recognise ourselves as the same beings, than the full grown man if he were born again as an infant.

If it is true, as has been said, "know what a man loves or hates, and you know the man," — it is certainly true, that, if he knows himself at all, it is by his affections. It is the sight or thought of whatever he likes or dislikes, which reminds him most powerfully of himself in this life. Suppose a person to be transported to a far distant country, where the face of nature, as well as the inhabitants, their language and manners, is entirely unlike any thing that is familiar to him. He would feel a stranger, indeed, even to himself, if it were not for the recollection of what he loved in his native land. But should he unexpectedly find, if it were but a simple plant, or hear the familiar note of a bird, or still more, should he behold the face of one he has loved in his own country, the strange land would at once become a home to him. Thus, the consciousness of our inclinations, awakened by seeing those again who were dear to us, and who outran us in the course, will, in all probability, form the connecting link between the present state and the future, by reminding and convincing each one of the

identity of his own being. "The first to live, the last to die," affection will be also the first to awake again, after the last sleep, to eternal day.

The permanence of our affections, good or bad, rests on what has before been designated as the foundation of men's happiness, — the constant interest of each individual in his real or imaginary perfection, which consists in his own perpetual existence and progress. The affections, or habits of soul, as they make a part of himself, and on this ground are sources of satisfaction, remain so, even after the outward means of gratifying them have ceased. Thus, gratitude does not die in the affectionate soul, though he to whom it is due, and the means of showing it, have ceased to exist. Thus, party spirit, though its real sources be dried up, will sustain itself from artificial reservoirs. But, though there is an inherent satisfaction, not only in good, but also in evil affections, as parts of ourselves, we know that this pleasure is increased or diminished by the possession or want of adventitious means to sustain it, which become, on this account, objects of desire. Envy, for example, though it may still live and rankle in the soul after its object is dead, yields a full satisfaction only when it actually triumphs, while it becomes a source of pain if generosity put it to shame. It is the same with every other affection; and, on this account, it is an interesting question to every one, which of the various *objects* of human affection are likely to endure after death; and particularly which of the sources of happiness he has opened for himself here on earth, it may be hoped, will spring up into everlasting life.

I have shown, that the simple emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire, are the constituent elements of all our various affections. I have shown also, that desire is nothing but the felt tendency of the soul to pass from pain to pleasure. Now the most simple of those affections which are founded upon the feelings of pleasure and pain, we call *inclinations* and *disinclinations*. Inclination is the disposition of the soul to be pleased at the thought of something that has proved the cause of pleasure, be it a person, or a book, or any other object. Disinclination is the disposition to be displeased with something that has been known as the cause of pain. Inclination and disinclination are at the bottom of all those affections which are ultimately founded on pleasure and pain; such as hope and fear, pride and shame. Like and dislike, love and hatred, are only different degrees of inclination and disinclination. I believe when we speak strictly, we say we *like* a thing if we are disposed to be pleased at the thought of it, compared with what is either painful to us to think of, or indifferent; and we *love* a thing when at the thought of it we feel better pleased than with any other object of the same kind which we like.* The same differ-

* The frequency of a promiscuous use of these expressions, naturally arises from the circumstance, that we think and speak of the same thing, sometimes in comparison with unpleasant or indifferent objects, and sometimes in comparison with those which we like. But every one feels, that, in saying he loves another, he expresses a more entire satisfaction, than when he speaks of merely liking him, and that, in speaking of the Supreme Being, we can use only the one of these expressions, and not the other.

ence exists in regard to dislike and hatred. The above question, then, concerning the permanence of the objects of our various affections, may be reduced to this: What objects of inclination or disinclination are calculated to prove constant in themselves; and particularly which of them are likely to be permanent sources of satisfaction?

That our inclinations, though all founded on a previous experience of pleasure, and gratifying in themselves, may become sources of pain, is evident. Those, whose hope and trust are founded on wealth and the favor of men, while they are digging for happiness, are never secure against striking upon bitter springs of disappointment. On the other hand, we know that our disinclinations, though founded on the experience of pain, and in themselves productive of pain, may conduce to pleasure. Virtuous toil and godly sorrow open again to man the gates of paradise, which forbidden pleasures have shut against him. And if the previous general remarks are founded on correct observation of the real tendencies of human nature, they show that no pleasure can continue and be increased for ever without pain; and that the real object of pain is no other than, by giving rise to desire, to promote pleasure. Our present inquiry, therefore, after the sources of immortal happiness, would be vain, if we went in search of objects of human affections, calculated to exclude all pain for ever. I only wish to answer the question, what are the objects of affection, which, through the instrumentality of pain and desire, can lead us to ever-

increasing happiness, as the greatest felicity of which human nature is capable.

The question, thus stated, has already been answered, in a general manner, in treating of the sources of pleasure. Ever-growing perfection is the only sufficient foundation of ever-increasing happiness, and, consequently, the first permanent object of human affection, of inclination and love. The existence of a constant love of perfection in man, supposes that of a constant disinclination or aversion to imperfection. This aversion never allows him to be satisfied with any attainment in excellence, whenever it is in his power to rise beyond it. It is a necessary and constant incentive to the highest happiness of which he is capable.

The love of perfection, as it exists in every individual, has for its primary object the perfection of *himself*, the satisfaction of all his wants. Whatever is essential, or conducive to his own perfection, is an object of this affection. Human perfection consists, as I have observed, in perpetual existence and in a continual progress growing out of the most various and harmonious exercise of all our powers. The accomplishment of his destiny depends partly on man himself, and partly on the circumstances under which he is placed. Accordingly, I shall speak, first of the being, and then of the condition of man, as the two great objects of human interest and affection.

The immediate object of man's love is his own being. Man loves himself. The thought of his own

happiness is the constant cause of it; and if his idea of himself and his happiness is but perfectly just, his self-love is the foundation of all pure affection, and the most perfect of all motives. If he knows and loves himself in truth, he prizes those sources of pleasure which he has in common with the animal, so far and no further than as they are consistent with, and subservient to, the infinite powers and tendencies of his nature. He knows that the body, though it is of more worth than raiment, is itself only the raiment of the soul. His self-love is a source of ever-increasing happiness, when he loves himself as an immortal being invested with infinite capacities. He loves himself as an *intellectual* being, in the free exercise and constant improvement of his powers of perception, imagination, and reason, exploring himself, the world, and the Deity, and thus opening to himself an infinite range of thought, affection, and action. He loves himself as an *affectionate* being, interesting himself in all he knows, thinks, and imagines; impelled by motives which find their natural explanation only in the infinity of his being; capable of unbounded and unfathomable love. He loves himself as a *moral* being, working out his highest, his moral, happiness, by ascertaining and performing his duty. This is true self-love, an affection which man alone of all created beings is capable of conceiving, and which opens in himself a source of eternal happiness. His attainments in wisdom, excellence, and love, treasured up as they are in his memory, and in the conscious increase of his strength, are the first and lasting shoots

in the spring of his existence, by which the immortal plant raises itself above this earth, to mature its choicest fruits under the genial influences of its native heaven.

In the second place, the *condition* of man, the circumstances under the influence of which he lives, as they are necessary to the accomplishment of the great end of his existence, become objects of his interest and affection. His perfection, and, consequently, his happiness, depends on nature, man, and God. As the immediate object of man's affection is his own immortal self, he loves every thing beside in proportion as it contributes to his perfection. That which allows and calls forth the freest use of all his powers is the prime object of his affection.

As I have before observed, that it is through his intellect that man lays out the sphere of action for all his other faculties of body and mind, it follows that in all things he loves best that which calls for the fullest exercise of his intellectual powers; that is, perfection itself. Therefore what he loves best in nature and man, is not that which ministers to his animal wants. He loves the useless graces of the flowers which neither toil nor spin. He loves her who thought it no waste to pour the precious ointment, which might have been sold for more than three hundred pence, upon the feet of her Saviour. Man, when true to himself, loves in nature, in his fellow-beings, and in God, what he loves in himself, perfection. Therefore his heart grows, as his intellect expands in contemplating the various orders of beings.

In the inanimate world he views in silent admiration the various and harmonious motions of the celestial bodies around their common centre. He considers with increased interest the plant, as it frees itself in some degree from the common law of gravitation, which binds the mineral to the mass. He loves to watch its growth, its flowers and its fruits, the first essays of the self-supporting and self-renewing power in nature. With still greater interest he contemplates the animal, a plant, as it were, which, through the emancipating act of nature, has gained that freedom after which the whole vegetable world seems striving. It is, however, not merely the perfection of the vegetative system which engrosses our interest in the animal; it is the infancy of the intellect, of feeling, particularly in animals of the highest orders; it is the dawn of human nature in the animal world. Still the interest with which the true student and lover of nature observes an animal, and the wonderful displays of instinct, has for its object, not so much any individual, as the whole class to which it belongs. For the instinct which directs the animal to provide for itself and its offspring, however perfect for its purpose, binds each individual to that particular and finite mode of existence which nature has assigned to every species, and which no individual is able to rise above. Even within this contracted sphere of existence, the individual animal cannot be said to be the real author of its mode of life and action, as this does not in any way depend on its own choice, but is controlled by instinct, the unalterable law of the species.

But in the sphere of existence which God has marked out for man, there is no degree of excellence which he must attain, and none which he cannot pass. There is no law of instinct, binding upon the whole race, that would prevent the individual, from rising above, or sinking below, the rest of his fellow-men. For every individual human being is created a free agent, capable of infinite improvement. On this account man is the object of a deeper affection than any other created being, or species of beings we know. Not merely the whole race, but each individual, is the object of an ever-increasing interest. Every improvement of man in bodily comfort, or in social blessings, in knowledge and taste, goodness and piety, is an object of interest that is ever new; because the individual in whose advancement toward perfection we rejoice, was, and still is, free to choose the opposite course.

The moral self-dependence of man, which makes it impossible for any other to calculate with certainty upon his future conduct, gives rise to those feelings of lofty trust and tender reliance, which make friendship among men a virtue. The love of man to man commences with the daybreak of human existence. It is the angel of joy that welcomes him into being; it gives him a home; it leads him to the temple of knowledge; it continues with him in his temptations; it leans on his bosom; it stands by his cross; it opens the heavens, and sees him at the right hand of God. Do we yet ask, whether those who were interested in each other in this life will meet again?

Let each one ask himself first, whether his interest in another is strong enough to live through the burning summers, and chilling winters, and all the lukewarmness of the intermediate seasons of this life. Let him ask himself next, what he loves in his fellow-man. Is it the costly frame, for which the world honors the object of your affection, or the inestimable image itself, the likeness of the living God? "He that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." Then, if you love another for his free and noble thought; for his deep and tender affection, rejoicing in self-sacrifice, embracing all mankind, and aspiring to the God of love; still more, if you love him for what is most truly his own, for his virtue, justice, truth, and holiness, — O then you need not ask whether the object of your affection be immortal. You indeed do not see them now upon whom your eyes once rested with delight; but what you loved, and still love, in them, you never saw. But this, too, you will see when their spirits meet your mental vision, as once their bodies stood before your mortal eyes. Those, also, who quitted this world before we could know them, but who have left behind, in their works and in their lives, monuments of their minds, the just men made perfect in heaven, and Him who without a change ascended from glory to glory, — we shall know them face to face, if we now begin to deserve their love. And when we ourselves shall have entered that invisible kingdom to which now our highest thoughts and loftiest hopes ascend, can we suppose

that our love, in the height of its glory, will forget or disown its birth-place, — when we read that the rich man, in his torments, did not forget his five brethren in his father's house?

The growth, the permanence of our love to our fellow-men, depends on their, and our own, growing excellence. For love is the vital interest of the soul in perfection. The most intimate unions of love among men, if they are not founded on continued striving after perfection, are less like the golden fruits, than the golden leaves of autumn, whose dying charm contains no promise of a coming spring. But is not that the true love which goes to save that which is lost, which extends not merely to *our* enemies, but even to those of God and goodness? This is indeed true and perfect love; but it is love in search of its object, — it is the forereaching faith of love that, even in the depth of corruption, seeks and cherishes the germ of salvation and the hope of heaven.

The love of man to God, also, is susceptible of perpetual progress in extent and in truth, in proportion to his ever-increasing knowledge of Him, the inexhaustible source of every kind and degree of perfection, whose being is perfection itself. If we love God now when we cannot see him, how much more shall we love him when we shall see him face to face. Still, as he is, we can never know him. The sun that now appears to us the centre of this world, may hereafter appear to us but as a planet, carrying with it a system of worlds around an unknown centre; and though we should arrive at length to a knowledge of

all created things, the creation of God is continual production, world without end. Thus, our love of God will grow with our knowledge of him; and the the deepest source of our knowledge, as well as our love, we shall ever find within ourselves. For we know Him in whose image we are created, only as the recognition of that image in our minds leads us on from glory to glory.

By the moral powers, which I now intend to consider with a view to the future state of man, I mean his conscience and his will. This subject implies two questions to be answered. First, whether the moral powers themselves are to be considered immortal endowments of man; whether in the life to come he will still be a moral agent, free to choose between good and evil, and responsible for his choice; capable of virtue, and liable to sin; a fit subject of reward and punishment. In the second place, I shall consider the question, whether the moral character which a person actually forms in this life, is likely to pass with him into another state of existence; and whether it will meet there with its natural consequences in a just dispensation of rewards and punishments. Accordingly, the immortality of the moral nature and character of man is the subject of my present inquiry.

Propensities like those with which nature has endowed animals in general to preserve themselves and their species, are implanted also in man. Man is prompted by his animal nature to seek means to support his life, and to avoid or avert whatever seems to

endanger it. He is prompted also to impart the means of support he possesses, and to risk even his life for his offspring.

But the animal is instigated to provide for itself, to sacrifice itself only for its offspring; while man is prompted, by the inborn revelation of his destiny in his heart, to spend all he has, to lay down even his life for his friends, and to see in every human being a friend and a brother. On the other hand, the animal is impelled to provide only what is necessary for itself and its young. But man is tempted to stretch out his hand after every thing that comes within the ever-extending grasp of avarice. Still more, while the lioness is constrained, by the law of her nature, to risk her life for her young, the human mother is able to strike dumb the voice of nature within herself, to expose and abandon her offspring.

Thus, every animal, so far as we know its species from observation and history, is irresistibly controlled by the same finite instincts. But man differs from the animal in two respects. First, there are impulses and designs in human nature, the object of which lies beyond the reach of animal instincts. In the second place, those impulses which man has in common with the animal, as well as those which are peculiar to himself, can be resisted and overruled by an uncontrollable power in each individual. The motives of action in man are not, as in the animal, decisions of nature without appeal. They are mere pleadings of the divers animal and spiritual constituents of his nature. Their success depends on the sanction or veto

of an absolute executive in the human soul, — the free will of each individual. This principle of freedom in the soul of man, which breaks, as it were, the mighty tide of instinct that directs all the motions of the animal as a living machine with undivided power, is the first constituent of his moral nature. In order to draw just inferences from this important fact, for the future as well as the present condition of man, it is necessary to attend to the part which is assigned to the will in the gradual unfolding of his nature.

In the first manifestations of human nature, in the infant, we see no other living principle at work than what we perceive also in the animal; except that there appears in man no evidence of any specific instinct, like that which makes the young duck, as soon as it has burst its shell, launch itself confidently upon an untried element, and which generally assigns to each animal very early its definite mode of existence. Instead of such a specific instinct, we find in man desires which the most complete gratification of animal appetites cannot satisfy. The child, who looks forward with joy to a simple gratification of his senses, soon shows, by the partial disappointment which accompanies the actual attainment of his wishes, that the present and tangible was not the real and ultimate object of his soul. The curiosity of the child, also, which is not, like that of the animal, confined to a search after the means of subsistence, is one of the early indications of that power in man, which manifests itself by a tendency to unbounded action, and which we call the mind. This infinite principle in

man, however, is so intimately connected with the animal life within him, that, at first, it appears only as an additional power and inducement to seek after a more complete gratification of the appetites and senses. It leads to the discovery of new means of subsistence, and increases the pleasures to be derived from those already known. Man refines upon the necessaries of life, the common articles of food and of dress. He would have the house he lives in at the same time protect him against the discomforts, and secure to him the advantages, of living in the open air. There is an infinity, partly real and partly imaginary, in the luxuries of life, because they are the results of the agency of the mind, for the benefit of the senses; and it is this, more than the comforts and amusements themselves, which renders them objects of an absorbing interest to man. But, in order to preserve him from forfeiting his highest claims to happiness, there arise in his soul desires after more perfect enjoyments than any gratification of the senses and passions can afford or promise. The spirit of truth, love towards all men, and devotion of the soul to God, spring up in the mind; and he perceives, that the highest skies, to which worldly advantages and honors may raise him, are far below the real heaven, after which the strongest energies of his soul are aspiring.

The desires of the mind, though gradually growing out of the animal propensities, are of a decidedly different character as soon as they are fully unfolded. According to his animal nature, man considers the

present life as the whole of his existence, and self-preservation is the chief object of his desires. As a spiritual being, he considers this life only as a part of his existence, subordinate to his immortal interests, which is to be sacrificed, if necessary, for his highest happiness, which is founded on truth and justice, kindness and piety. His affections are not confined to those who have been kind to himself, but are extended to all who deserve his love. His desire of knowledge, when a selfish principle, is restricted to those objects which are necessary or agreeable to his appetites and senses; but when a spiritual principle, prompts him to the pursuit of all truth. In his intercourse with men, the selfish principle leads him to consider them only as instruments of his own pleasure; but his spirit prompts him to consider himself only as one of them, and to seek his happiness in that of all. Thus, according to the gradual unfolding of his nature, the spiritual principle, by degrees, impels man to seek the springs of happiness beyond the necessaries and luxuries of life. Whatever be his condition, his mind is constantly pressing onward after a more extensive sphere of action, a higher state of being, a prospect of true and lasting happiness.

There are some cases, in which the highest longings of human nature do not come in collision with meaner interests; and, in such cases, all men are eager to avail themselves of all that holy joy which good intentions alone can give. Generally, however, the gold of pure and solid happiness does not lie bare on the surface to surprise the fortunate finder.

Truth, justice, and love demand of him who would reap their glories, to deny himself, and take up his cross. A crown of righteousness is laid up for him only who is ready to be crowned with thorns. In these cases there arises a conflict in the soul between different principles of action, between spiritual and animal desires or passions. This contest in the human soul is not settled, as it is in the animal, by the irresistible control of instinct. For whenever different animal desires come in collision with each other, instinct regulates them in such a manner that the less important tendency always yields to that which is more essential. The animal quits its play without reluctance, in order to satisfy its hunger; and in the same manner it leaves its food to defend its life, and risks its own life for that of its offspring.

But among the various animal and spiritual impulses, which agitate the soul of man daily and hourly, and, like so many pretenders, contend for the sole dominion over the whole, there is not one which nature has invested with the native sovereignty of instinct. The desire to take advantage of a good opportunity for acquiring wealth or power, is checked by the consideration, that, in making use of it, we should commit an act of injustice or unkindness toward others; and the wish to save another person's life is counteracted by the fear of losing our own. In these and all similar instances, the person, who is thus actuated by two opposing principles, feels, that he is not compelled to follow his selfish, any more than his disinterested motives. It is a contest be-

tween two powers within him, which can be decided only by the interposition of a third independent power. This power, whose weight in the balance of human motives, decides the competition between selfish and disinterested principles, is no other than his free agency, the choice and effort of his own will.

The power of choosing between selfish and disinterested desires, is absolute, in so far as the individual is at liberty to determine which of these two courses, marked out by his inclinations, he shall endeavour to pursue. But his choice is limited to the alternative. He must determine upon following the call of his spirit, otherwise the loud and immediate appeals of passion, drowning the small voice of reason, will carry the day in the wavering mind. Still more, the mere willingness of the spirit is not sufficient to make up for the weakness of the flesh. The first act of the will, which consists in a mere choice, a wish or a vow to be good, must be followed out by actual exertion, by deep and persevering effort. The ploughshare must be pressed firmly into the ground that is overspread with noxious weeds. Otherwise, we till for the weeds, and not for the good seed, which will not take root on the surface.

Thus we see in man, at first, only the principle of animal life in operation. This, however, is soon aided and enlarged by the infinite essence of life, the mind. At last, the mind, for a time the servant of the body, claims the place which nature has assigned it, asserts its independence of the body, and mastery over it. But this victory of mind over matter in

man can be obtained only by the exertion of his own free will. Man is tempted, by the selfish principle in his nature, to give himself up to the pursuit of the greatest happiness that can be obtained by the least exertion. He is prompted, on the other hand, by his own spirit, to strive after the greatest happiness to be obtained by the utmost exertion. The same principle, which makes him desire a sphere of action beyond the necessaries and luxuries of life, prompts him, also, to use and exert his own will in resisting and overcoming the attractive power of appetite and sense, so far as it is prejudicial to his greatest happiness, which is founded on perfection ; that is, on the free and harmonious exercise of all his powers. If a person obeys this prompting or desire of his spirit to overcome the opposing appetites, his desire is converted into the greatest joy ; and if he disobeys it, it is changed into the deepest pain of which human nature is susceptible, — the joy of an approving, and the pain of a condemning conscience.

Conscience, then, is that principle in man, which is manifested, first, by an impulse or desire to exert all the strength of his will, in preventing his appetites from interfering with the attainment of the greatest perfection and happiness, and then, by feelings of pain and pleasure, adapted to the degree in which that impulse has been obeyed or neglected. The appetites, so far as they are opposed to the monitions of conscience, we call temptations. The willing obedience of man to his own conscience, we call virtue ; and the wilful disobedience, we call sin.

Conscience does not inform us, whether the views of duty we form are in themselves right or wrong. Conscience merely prompts us to exert our intellectual faculties to ascertain what is right, and then to use our active powers to do accordingly. Our moral joys or pains are infallible decisions of this question only: — Whether, and how far we have exerted or neglected our faculties. In the same manner, virtue consists, not in doing what is in itself right, but in striving to perform what the individual conscientiously holds to be his duty. Accordingly, the first part of a man's duty is to ascertain the whole of it; and a right use of his reason, for this purpose, will teach him to aim, not merely to conform himself to the moral opinions of others, or to be consistent with his own, or to fashion his conduct according to any factitious principles, but to make human nature his constant study, and to remove every obstruction to the natural unfolding of all his faculties; to restrict his appetites, that the intellect and the affections may follow their natural tendency to spread over, and to penetrate, like the light and the warmth of the sun, all created beings, and to rise in adoration to the eternal Source of intelligence and love. Conscience, then, in bidding us restrict the animal propensities by voluntary effort, does not tend to impair, but to enlarge our real power and freedom. As a wise friend, it advises us to lop off the lower branches of the tree of life, in order to secure its upward growth.

The animal, being governed by instinct, is, of course, neither liable to temptation, nor capable of

virtue. The moral powers, conscience and will, the power of free agency, constitutes the specific character of the human race, and forms, in every individual, the basis of personal responsibility. The animal is satisfied or dissatisfied with its condition; but man alone can be contented or discontented with himself. The glorious task of endless progress in perfection and happiness, is committed to his own free exertion.

Temptation is frequently considered as in itself an evil; indeed as the greatest of evils except sin. But this opinion seems to arise from an imperfect apprehension of the moral nature of man. Liableness to temptation is not a mark of imperfection in a created being, but the necessary means of the highest, that is, of moral, perfection and happiness. For, without any temptation to do wrong, there could be no merit, no virtue, in doing right. Jesus Christ was tempted by the prospect of earthly glory and earthly suffering, to forsake his spiritual mission. Yet we do not consider this as an imperfection in him, but as a quality, without which he could not have become a pattern of perfection to all men. It is by sin, by yielding to temptation, that we are changed from glory to shame. But God has made us liable to be tempted, that we might be capable of virtue and of moral happiness. Therefore, I would say, in the words of the Apostle, "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations; for the man that endureth temptation shall be blessed in his deed."

Ask yourself what is the object of your highest esteem in man. Is it what circumstances, parents, and friends have done for him? Is it what God himself has bestowed on him, his noble talents and powers? In all these qualities you honor the giver, not the possessor. You do not esteem a man for that which others have done for him, but only for what he has done for himself; his own true merit. You respect him for having made goodness his choice, when he might have chosen, and was tempted to choose, the opposite course. It is the free and strenuous effort of his moral nature to overcome all obstacles in the way to endless perfection, it is the glory of virtue, for which we esteem man in ourselves as well as in others; and the deepest and purest happiness of which man is capable, springs from that only sure foundation of self-respect. The man, who withstands temptation, lays up, in his own soul, treasures more than sufficient to insure his happiness against the loss of all other means of enjoyment. Satisfied with the consciousness of deserving to be happy, the Christian martyr takes up his cross as a part of the glory that is set before him.

Liableness to temptation, conscience, and free agency, three principles, of whose existence the consciousness of each individual affords incontestable proof, are the foundation of good and ill desert, and a righteous retribution, or dispensation of rewards and punishments. Conscience renders every one happy or unhappy, in proportion to his desert; that is, the degree of faithfulness or unfaithfulness, with which he

obeys, or disregards, its promptings. The mode, in which conscience dispenses blessing and suffering, is the origin of our ideas of retributive justice. The rewards and punishments of conscience are just, because they are in perfect conformity to the nature and character of man. They are just, in the first place, because conscience never requires an exertion to which the individual is not equal; secondly, because the joys or pains awarded are commensurate with his good or ill desert; and, thirdly, because its punishments and rewards are motives to strive after a higher state of perfection and happiness. This third characteristic of a truly moral retribution is particularly important, as, without this, the rewards and punishments distributed by conscience, however correctly proportioned to past merit or guilt, would not be perfectly just, since they would not do justice to the infinite principle in human nature. The rewards and punishments, which are the consequences of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, have another and a higher purpose than that of affording pain or pleasure for past virtues or sins. The pain, by which conscience punishes a bad action, is an incentive to repentance and reform; and the joy, by which conscience rewards the virtuous deed, is an impulse to higher moral effort. There is no vice so abject, from which the voice of God within him does not call back the sinner to virtue; and there is no pain of conscience so great, that it is not transformed into joy, if the sinner obeys its call. The kingdom of heaven returns to the heart as soon as that of the world is excluded;

and there is joy in heaven over every sinner that repenteth. On the other hand, the peace, by which conscience rewards every conquest of self, however glorious, or however humble, is not a luxurious repose, but a temporary, invigorating rest, that calls for new and more valiant effort. The punishments of conscience are corrections ; that is, checks upon the wrong, and promptings to the right course, which consists in striving after perfection ; and the rewards of conscience are encouragements to still greater attainments in excellence. Conscience, therefore, in all its promptings, bears witness to the power and destiny of man to rise, through his own free exertion, from any degree of vice, however low, and from any degree of goodness, however high, to higher attainments in excellence and happiness.

Of all the sources of pleasure and pain, conscience is the only one, whose dispensations are always marked with perfect justice, even in the present state of existence ; and, for this very reason, it affords a standard for men in society, and a preconception of the consummation of divine justice in the life to come. This perfect justice distinguishes our moral from our adventitious pleasures and pains. Adventitious I call all the joys or pains, that flow from other sources than a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience. The moral state of man does not depend on what is adventitious in his condition. His conscience chides him for a successful, as well as an unsuccessful falsehood ; and it rewards him equally, whether his honesty be followed by prosperity, or ruin. Neverthe-

less, there exists a natural connexion between moral and adventitious good or evil. They are parts of the state which Providence has assigned to man, and one generally leads to the other. Moral happiness springs from the highest exertion of the will; adventitious happiness results from the most perfect use of all man's other faculties of body and mind, and a condition in life suited to his wants and his powers. It is in striving after the highest adventitious good, that man is checked by the tempting influence of his appetites, which his conscience bids him to subdue, and thereby attain to moral satisfaction. This moral effort generally aids us in the pursuit of adventitious good, be it wealth, or knowledge, or the confidence of men; and, on the other hand, by yielding to selfish desires, we are more likely to bring upon ourselves adventitious evil. Now those sources of adventitious pleasure or pain, which are the natural result of moral effort or negligence, such as well-deserved affluence or want, bear a moral character, which distinguishes them from all other adventitious good or evils, such as inherited wealth or poverty.

There is much adventitious good and evil in this world, that is enjoyed or suffered by men, without any good or ill desert of their own. But his moral nature bears evidence to the design of Providence, that man should make adventitious evils sources of moral pleasure, by overcoming or enduring them with courage and resignation. For this purpose, every good and every evil becomes to us a temptation, that it may be converted into a moral good. The man

who has inherited a large property is tempted to use it for luxurious ease, or to lock it up in his chest, while his spirit prompts him to employ it for supplying his fellow-men, who are suffering from ignorance and poverty, with the necessaries of animal and intellectual life. There is no situation in life, prosperous or adverse, which man cannot make use of to change pain into pleasure, and pleasure into perfect happiness, through virtue. Thus the spiritual and moral nature of man shows the design of Providence, that all adventitious pain and pleasure should serve the purpose of moral discipline.

The same design is manifest in the common course of natural events, and in society. It is a fact that virtue is generally rewarded by success, and vice punished by suffering. There are indeed many instances of undeserved joy and trouble. But they are few compared with the evidences of retributive justice in the world; and among them there is none, which, on the supposition that the present life is only the beginning of man's existence, cannot result in higher improvement and happiness. The natural feeling, which calls every human being to the relief of innocent suffering, and to the generous disdain of ill-deserved prosperity, seems, indeed, to be a forerunner of a perfect judgment, that shall "render to every man according to his deeds."

In the education of children, and in society at large, where men are called upon to determine the condition of their fellow-men, and to dispense rewards and punishments, they are bound in conscience to follow the

same standard of retributive justice. Conscience demands such an organization of society, as will put means of support, improvement, and happiness, equally within the reach of all. The power to reward and punish should be exercised only to excite and strengthen, not to counteract, or supersede, the retributive judgment in the mind of each individual. Rewards and punishments, when suited to the moral nature of man, are calculated to awaken, by a natural association of ideas, the self-reproving and self-encouraging principle in the soul, which supersedes, in a moral point of view, all outward retribution. Disheartening censure and excessive praise are equally prejudicial to the harvest of moral excellence, that prospers in the moderate temperature of a true Christian discipline. Rewards and punishments, in order to be just, should be not only impartial, correcting and encouraging each one according to his deserts, without respect of persons; but calculated to do justice to the nature and infinite destiny of man. No reward, however well balanced in the scale of merit, no wreath of laurel or of olive, however well deserved, can truly benefit the receiver, unless it direct him to a higher object of exertion, to a crown laid up for him in heaven. On the other hand, all punishment that is not calculated for the improvement of the transgressor, is not just, in the highest sense of the word. No one, whose heart is full of true family affection, ever gives up a son or a brother, as lost to all hope of moral recovery. And he who stretches forth his hands to the whole human family, and says, Behold

my mother and my brethren, the true Christian, never despairs of any child of God, but trusts that the wayward child may still return to Him who has eternal life, though he should thrice deny him.

If there are cases in which society is obliged, in its own defence, to exterminate a dangerous enemy to the rights of all, instead of endeavouring to correct him, such measures may be justified as acts of self-defence, but not as punishments or acts of corrective justice. For this requires that no other pain should be inflicted than what is necessary to overpower the criminal desire, and to remind the transgressor of a corrective principle, a court of justice in his own breast, which alone is qualified to answer the true end of a righteous retribution; that is, to restore the offender to society and himself. Every act of mere self-defence is a declaration that it is not in the power of the earthly judge to do full justice to the moral nature of the offender, without endangering the rights of all; and the spirit of justice looks up to a higher power, that can say to the malefactor on the cross, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise."

Every punishment is an evil that would be a crime, if it were not necessary to check the criminal propensity of one who has wilfully infringed the rights of others. Accordingly any unnecessary evil, inflicted for other purposes than that of correction, and any evil that exceeds the amount of what is accounted necessary for this end, is a crime committed by the punisher against the offender. No punishment is just but what is founded on wilful transgression, and calculated to correct or reform the transgressor.

I shall be told by some, that correction of the offender is not the true, or at least not the only true object of punishment. It is intended as a terrifying or warning example for others. But if punishment be considered as an example for others, and this consideration should be allowed any influence upon the amount of suffering to be inflicted, I would ask, Is it meant to be an example of justice, or injustice. If of justice, then punishment is justified no further than it is calculated, as a salutary evil, to secure society against the criminal disposition of the offender. If it exceeds this end, it will array all the natural and moral sympathies of men on the side of the punished ; or if it operates at all as an example, it will only exemplify the doctrine, that the power of punishing is sufficient to justify its use.

This may suffice to show, that all correct ideas of retributive justice are derived from the mode in which every one is rewarded and punished by his own conscience ; that accordingly all rewards and punishments, in order to be just, must be adapted to the real desert of the individual, and calculated for his improvement.

I have said before, that there is no situation in the life of man which cannot be made subservient to moral improvement, since there is none which is not exposed to temptation. The selfish principle in his nature tempts him to use all that in any way belongs to him, to satisfy his appetites and passions. Love of ease, or money, or honor, or power, contends in the soul of man with philanthropy and piety, for the use of his property, talents, knowledge, and every kind of

advantage and excellence. There is no degree of merit so high as to place man beyond the reach of temptation, or to prevent him from rising still higher. And, on the other hand, there is no degree of vice so low, that man cannot, by his own will, degrade himself still more. There is an infinity in vice as well as in virtue, showing forth the exhaustless and incalculable power of the moral nature of man.

There are different degrees of temptation and of virtue. A man whose virtue is proof against a bribe in the shape of money, may be corrupted by flattery, or awed into wrong by authority. Thus there are three degrees of temptation and of virtue implied in this saying of Paul, "Let him that stole, steal no more ; but rather let him labor, that he may have to give to him that needeth." He who stole overcomes the lowest degree of temptation, by his virtuous resolution to steal no more. But though he has conquered the desire of dishonest gain, he is still subject to that of indolence, which is to be overcome by a higher effort, the determination to labor. Yet with all this he may be avaricious and a miser, laboring for himself only, not for others ; and this third degree of temptation requires a still greater degree of moral effort, in order to add to the virtues of honesty and industry, that of charity. Our moral power grows by constant exercise, and what once required an effort, is rendered easy by habit. But the demands of conscience, and the temptations to disregard them, grow in proportion to our strength. The power and glory which a man has won by his merits, if it does not operate as an

incentive to more glorious efforts, will prove a stumblingblock, and betray him either into criminal ambition, or indolent self-content.

I have endeavoured to give a succinct description of the moral powers of man, to show how, by the co-operation of conscience and free-agency, by self-command and self-obedience, he is able to render himself worthy of existence and happiness, and to look upon every step in his endless progress, as in part his own work. Is it reasonable to suppose that the power of man to act according to his choice, to work out and to merit his own happiness; that his moral nature, which alone distinguishes him from the animal, and constitutes him the fellow-worker with God, should be extinguished by death? Take all we have, and all we are, is there any thing in human nature, on which we can rest our hope of immortality, unless it be the ever-growing power of virtue,—the power to overcome temptation and to press on to the mark of the high calling of God, to godlike perfection? Can it be supposed that that principle in our nature, which enables and prompts us to sacrifice property, health, all the endearments of life, and life itself, should itself be subjected to death?

I shall be told by some, that the consequences of our moral efforts will remain for ever, although there will be no more occasion for any further exertion, in a state in which there is no temptation to be overcome. Those who have attained to a state of heavenly joy, will be conscious that they are still the same beings, and that their present happiness is the result of their

own virtue. They will immediately be made as perfect and happy as man can be, or they will be carried on, by an irresistible and ever-increasing impulse, to higher degrees of excellence and happiness.

Against this opinion I would observe, that the highest moral happiness does not result from the recollection of past virtue, but from actual moral exertion. If, then, in a future state, all occasion for virtuous effort ceases, the vital principle, the very root of moral happiness, is cut off. If we are made to enjoy a felicity which we are not continually producing and deserving, if we are carried on to higher states of perfection by an irresistible impulse, we are no longer the same beings; and if we are still conscious of what we have been, we cannot help perceiving that we are not changed from glory to glory, but that we are transformed from moral agents into animals governed by instinct. By these reasons I am led to the conclusion, that there will be in heaven as well as on earth, opportunities to deserve, as well as enjoy happiness. There will be occasions for the exercise of every kind of virtue, of self-denial, of incorrupted justice, and perfect love casting out fear and sacrificing the greatest good we possess, for the highest felicity to be obtained by virtue. If we believe in the immortality of our moral nature, we must suppose that, in every successive stage of our existence, greater moral efforts will be required in overcoming greater temptations, and thus endless felicity is to be gained by ever-growing virtue.

Indeed, if we are right in drawing inferences for the

life to come from what the present state has revealed to us of our nature, we may trust that opportunities of deserving what we enjoy, will not only continue to exist, but increase in number and importance. The infant, being born in utter dependence on others for support and comfort, is evidently designed by Providence to be educated to depend on himself, on his own efforts in active life. Accordingly I believe that the whole present state of man is designed to educate him for a still greater independence on outward circumstances, and for reliance on his own exertions for happiness in the life to come.

If we believe in man's immortality, we must suppose that man in a future state will essentially be the same being, and, consequently, a moral agent; that is, a being free to choose between the injunctions of conscience and the instigations of opposing appetites. As a moral agent, he must be liable to be tempted by any advantage he possesses or expects, to neglect exerting himself for a higher but more distant good, and be capable of rising above every temptation. He must still be able, by constant virtue, to enjoy, every moment of his existence, the highest happiness of which human nature is susceptible, which consists in moral satisfaction; and, on the other hand, he must be able to persevere in sin, and, consequently, in moral misery.

If man is an immortal moral agent, he must be able, at every moment of his existence, to turn from virtue to sin, and return to virtue. This is a principle founded on the moral nature of man, and there-

fore not confined to this life. This is set forth in Scripture frequently and fully. Thus, Ezekiel says, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die; but the man, that doeth what is lawful and right, shall save his soul alive." The same prophet goes on to say, "If the righteous man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, for his iniquity that he hath done, shall he die." "Again, when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die." The principle, which is here so explicitly taught, belongs to the essence of man's moral nature, and must therefore apply to the future state, as well as to the present.

The power to choose between good and evil cannot be destroyed by any act of its own, that is, by any choice and determination that may be formed. The most constant moral exertion does not preclude for ever a relapse into sin. It only fits the mind for higher effort. It is, as I have observed, the first part of man's duty to ascertain the whole, and to act according to the result of his faithful inquiry; and no doubt every new sphere, upon which man enters, in his endless progress, will require, on his part, adequate moral exertions in directing his intellectual and active powers to know and to perform his ever-increasing duty. And surely, He, who created man a moral agent, will open to him spheres of action, adapted to his growing capacities.

On the other hand, faith in the immortality of the moral nature of man leads us to suppose, that, neither

in the future nor in the present life, man can sink so low as not to be able to rise again by the same power by which he has degraded himself. Though he be dead in sin, he can rise again from his self-made grave, by the undying energy of his moral nature, aided by the active and enlightened sympathy of his fellow-beings, and the redeeming love of God. "Come now, let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall be as wool." Only let it not be supposed, that any artificial dye, or even the hot waters of repentance, can restore to the face that is flushed with crime, the native beauty of innocence. Nothing can cleanse the noble metal from its base alloy but fiery trials, a moral regeneration, wrought out by unwearied struggles, and resistance unto blood, against the craft and violence of temptation.

The mountain path of virtue that leads to the glory of moral transfiguration, is accessible to the sinner, as well as to the righteous. But while the just man ascends in the strength of holy joy, the sinner has to clamber upward under the load of his guilt; and if he delay throwing it off beyond the term of this life, his burthen will become a mountain load. Yet faith, the spirit of virtue, may then, even then, remove mountains. For who would doubt or limit the power and the goodness of Him, who has endowed man with this power to rise and fall, and by his own choice to rise again from the lowest fall? This very gift of a free moral nature implies the assurance, that the

gates of mercy will never, at least, not for ever, be closed against a penitent child, whenever and wherever the starving soul asks the bread of life of a Father, whose mercy is greater than our sins, who is infinite in love, as in power and wisdom.

From the previous considerations, I do not see how any one, believing in the immortality of man's moral nature, can doubt, that man will, throughout the eternity of his existence, retain the power to make himself, by his own choosing, an angel of light or darkness.

Man's conscience, also, will survive death, to encourage and warn, to reward and punish, according to the same eternal principles of retributive justice. The state of happiness or suffering, which is the result of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, will still be distinct from, and superior to, all adventitious pleasure and pain.

But not only the moral powers of man, the moral character also, which he has formed in this life, will enter with him upon the future. When all those external distinctions, great and small, by which our condition in this world is determined, shall have passed away, our character, with all its lights and shades, will endure, and establish our standing in the future. Of all our possessions in this life, nothing will remain to us except what even now is most truly our own, — our virtues and our sins. A record of our whole life will be laid open within us, from which, at present, our memory is able to quote only separate passages, — a faithful record of our moral history, in

which not a single event, not the slightest tendency of our will is omitted. The character of man is never formed, but always forming. It is the natural and gradual working of that moral capacity, which man brings with him into this world as an outfit for eternity.

I have spoken of the future state of the moral nature and character of man. My last question regards the external condition of man as a moral agent; I mean such adventitious good and evil, as bears a moral character. We have seen, that, in this life, the condition of man, the state of his health, property, intellectual progress, and standing in society, are frequently, though not always, in conformity to his moral character. When we consider the nature of man and the elements of society, we perceive, that it must have been the design of creative Providence, that man's external condition should depend on his real worth, even in this life; but that this design was not carried into effect by absolute force, but intrusted to man as a free and responsible being. It is the abuse of this trust which frequently obscures the just design of the Creator. Therefore, when we see so much unfair dealing, deceit, and oppression, among men in the life that now is, we look forward to that which is to come, as the great "jubilee, when liberty shall be proclaimed throughout the world, and to all the inhabitants thereof, and every man shall return to his possession."

Some are inclined to think, that, in the future state of man, there will be no enjoyments or pains besides

those which consist in the approbation or disapprobation of his own conscience; that this alone is to be his heaven or his hell. But the pleasure we derive from improvement in knowledge, and the pain which results from ignorance, independent of our moral efforts or negligence, are not less real, though they are less in degree, than moral happiness or misery. The same is to be said of the pleasure or pain we experience from the virtue and love, or the evil conduct and misery of others. These adventitious pleasures and pains have a foundation in the nature of man, and belong to his immortal self. Still more, they are necessary to the exercise of his moral powers, and, consequently, to the attainment of moral happiness. There can be no virtue, or moral effort, without temptation to be overcome. Now there is no temptation in mere disobedience to the voice of conscience, no pleasure in wickedness as such. There must, then, be an intrinsic charm in those things which are condemned by conscience; otherwise there could never be in the soul a conflict of motives and a moral victory. On the other hand, the end of virtue is to obtain moral satisfaction, by causing the spiritual desires to prevail over lower interests. But the spiritual, as well as the selfish desires, are not productions of man's own will; they are necessary for the exercise of it, whether for virtue or sin. Accordingly, it is to be presumed, that there will be, in the future life, adventitious good and evil, selfish and spiritual pleasures and motives, distinct from moral capacities and attainments, though constantly coöperating with

them in essentially the same manner as in the present state.

In examining the future condition of man as a moral agent, I shall consider, first, those adventitious pleasures and pains which man enjoys or suffers, independently of his own merit or demerit; and then those which he experiences in consequence of virtue or vice, — his future rewards and punishments.

As man is created with the desire of happiness, his own nature leads him to believe that its Author, in order to do justice to his own work, will let him suffer no more pain than what is necessary to his improvement and happiness. All men being created with essentially the same immortal capacities and desires, the same trust in divine justice leads us to suppose, that, in regard to the adventitious good and evil which is distributed among men without reference to their desert, a perfect equality will be observed. There is, however, in this world, much inequality in the natural condition of men, even if we do not consider the artificial distinctions of their own invention. True, we find in every individual the essentials of the same nature, implying the same immortal destiny. But they differ widely in the means to obtain the end for which all seem created, — in natural advantages, bodily and mental faculties, and in the success or failure of their various undertakings. But there is an equalizing design apparent even in this diversity of natural gifts. The different qualities and talents we discover in various individuals, seem to be designed to make up for the peculiar defects of each. Still more, God

has implanted in every human soul a thriving branch of his own love for the whole human race, that each may find his own happiness only in the happiness of all; and especially of those who are least able to take care of their own interests. The partiality of a mother for the weakness of her children, is only justice in disguise; and the principle from which this feeling flows, belongs, in fact, to every mind that has not lost its natural tone.

Still, there remains much inequality in the condition of men, which can be reconciled with the idea of overruling justice, only by considering the present state as but a part of the moral discipline to which all are necessarily and constantly subjected. In order to bring to light all the powers which are laid up in the nature of man, and to improve upon them by his own exertions, it seems necessary that he should pass through the school of adversity, as well as that of prosperity. I have said that every good he possesses becomes to man, on the one hand a temptation to rest satisfied with this possession, and on the other an encouragement to use it as an instrument of greater excellence. Every evil becomes a temptation either to submit to it pusillanimously, or to be impatient under it; whereas misfortune might and should be an incentive to fortitude and pious resignation. Thus all adventitious good and evil is suited for moral improvement; and as this double discipline is necessary for all men, simply as moral agents, it is a natural consequence of our trust in the distributive justice of God, to believe that no individual will experience

more pain, or less satisfaction, than any other. Each one, in his time, will receive his equal share of undeserved good and evil; and no one more than is necessary for his improvement.

This view solves all doubts with regard to the distributive justice of God, which arise from the unequal division of good and evil in this world. Whether a person receive his good things or evil things in this life, or in the future, does not affect the justice of the dispensation. Every one enjoys undeserved good, that he may acquire those virtues which can only be gained by the right use of prosperity, and suffers only so much evil as is necessary to acquire that moral strength, which is the fruit of a spirit rising above it. That all are not happy or unhappy at the same time, affords an opportunity for a third class of virtues to spring up; namely, on the part of the sufferers to see others enjoy without envy, and on that of the happy to deserve their blessings by imparting them to those who are in want. It is evident, moreover, that, by acquiring those virtues for which prosperity is the natural condition, we fortify ourselves beforehand against the temptations connected with want; and the same is true when want comes before prosperity. For all temptations spring from one source, and all virtues are only different forms of moral excellence.

By the manner in which a person uses the good and evil he meets with, according or contrary to the injunctions of his conscience, he becomes a subject of retributive justice. He is rewarded and punished by his own conscience, and this retributive judgment,

while it dispenses moral pleasure and pain, applies also to his external condition. He enjoys whatever external advantages he obtains by his moral efforts, more highly, and suffers for the sad consequences of his sins more keenly, because he feels that he deserves what he enjoys or suffers. On the contrary, his pleasures are marred, and his sufferings are soothed, by the thought that he does not deserve them. The external condition of men in this world corresponds to the manner in which each one judges himself by his conscience, only so far as to convince us of the design of Providence, that whatever is imperfect in the dispensation of rewards and punishments in this life, is permitted, only that it may give rise to the virtue of bearing even injustice with equanimity; and that absolute justice will be rendered in the end by God's own judgment.

We believe in the retributive justice of God, when we trust that God will judge every individual as he is judged by his own conscience, according to his good or ill desert. "Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." This principle, that every one shall be judged according to his deserts, which is so often set forth in Scripture, and with indelible characters engraved upon the heart, implies the three abovementioned qualities of retributive justice.

In the first place, God will reward and punish man only for such actions and omissions as depended on

his own free will. A righteous retribution, or recompense adapted to the real merit or demerit of each individual, is inconceivable, unless he be considered as a free agent. You may as well attach merit and think of reward as due to the fig-tree for bearing sweet fruit, or impute malevolence and award punishment to the hemlock for containing poison, as speak of good and ill desert in man, of virtue to be rewarded, and sin to be condemned, if every action and intention of man is predetermined by absolute necessity. A judge who should condemn a man because he was born blind, would be deprived of his office. He who should award the civic crown to him who had inherited the largest property, would be thought distracted. And is it possible to conceive that God should punish man because he has created and predetermined him to be wicked, or that he should reward him for being compelled to do right? It is evident that a belief in universal predestination, is in fact a denial of all that can be called reward or punishment, merit or demerit, virtue or vice, in this life as well as in the future.

But a righteous retribution supposes, not only that man is a free agent, but that the particular act also, for which he is to be judged, should have depended on his own free will. Thus man is to be judged according to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or neglected opportunities of forming just conceptions of religion. But for the conceptions themselves, which are the result of his faithful inquiry, whatever they be, — for his creed, he deserves neither reward nor punishment. For it is indeed in our power to

open or shut the eye of the mind to the light of truth, and to improve or spoil our vision; but it is not in our power to see things differently from what they appear to our senses or our understanding. That only which depends on our own choice and determination, is a proper subject of retribution; and to say that a person believes a thing because he chooses and is determined to believe it true, is as much as to say, that he does not believe it. Free agency, then, is the first requisite for a just retribution. All the promptings, the promises, and the threats of conscience and of Scripture, are empty sounds and signs, if man is not a moral agent, free to obey or disregard them. "If I had not come and spoken unto them," says Jesus, "they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin."

The second essential attribute of a just dispensation of rewards and punishments consists in their being adapted to the good or ill desert of each individual; that is, to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or wilfully neglected to ascertain and perform his duty. Every one will experience as much good and as much evil, as his good or bad intentions have deserved, according to the decision of his own conscience, which not only distributes rewards and punishments of its own, but contains the promise of a state of pleasure or pain adapted to our deserts. Reason and revelation establish the belief that the messenger of God in the soul of man, his own conscience, as it is the judge of his present conduct, is also the prophet of the life to come.

This principle, that rewards and punishments in the life to come will be commensurate to the good or ill desert of each individual, involves two great truths. It asserts, in the first place, the necessary and eternal connexion between goodness and happiness, wickedness and misery. No doctrine is more clearly taught in Scripture, or more powerfully insisted upon by the gospel of justice in our own hearts, than this ; — that they that have done good, shall come unto the resurrection of life, that is, of happiness, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation, that is, condemnation to punishment. The doctrine that all men shall be saved from future punishment, whether they have done good or evil, contradicts the prophet in our heart. It is opposed to the belief in divine justice and a moral government of the world, and undermines the faith in immortality itself. For if we examine the experience of all ages and our own, we find that the most powerful motive for men to look forward to a life to come, consists in the sad contrast between the moral law and judgment within us, and the present state of the world, in which virtue so often is compelled to beg alms and existence of successful wickedness. The success of vice and oppression of virtue are reproaches against the Ruler of all events, unless we suppose that God allows virtue to sow in tears, only that it may reap in glory ; and that he suffers the tower of pride to be raised so high, only that it may more surely attract the lightnings of divine justice. Vice indeed is allowed to hold out pleasures, and to afford them for a time, so that man, by his

own free effort, may deserve and anticipate the distant spiritual good; but the future judgment, as a full revelation of perfect justice, will surely establish the principle, that his choice of the tempting present will as surely lead to greater future ill, as that his timely forbearance will be justified by satisfaction in the end. The artificial gratifications of sense and passion, contrived by men in this world to beguile their own reason with regard to the true state of their being, will then appear what they really are, — unsuccessful attempts at a moral suicide. The wicked will in vain endeavour to appropriate to themselves enjoyments due only to the good. "The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."

But the prospect of a future retribution not only implies a decided difference in the end that is set before virtue, and that which awaits wickedness; but as there are many degrees of merit and of guilt, it is manifest, that the same reason which we have for believing, that virtue will be followed by happiness, and vice by misery, must lead us to infer, that the degree of future enjoyment and suffering will be in exact proportion to the amount of merit and of guilt. "He that soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly; and he that soweth bountifully shall reap also bountfully."

The amount of joy and of suffering to be awarded, must be determined by the true end of rewards and punishments, which implies the third essential characteristic of a righteous retribution. If the above stated views of justice in general are true, they lead to the

conclusion, that the recompense, in order to be just, must be calculated for the moral improvement of man. The punishments must be corrective, incentives to repentance and reform ; and rewards must be impulses to higher moral effort. The punishments inflicted, and the rewards conferred, cannot be just, without doing justice to the nature of man ; and, consequently, they cannot be calculated to destroy his free agency and capacity of infinite improvement, by depriving him of the power of rising, through virtue, from any degree of wickedness and misery, to goodness and happiness, or from any degree of excellence to higher attainments in perfection.

Conscience, by its punishments, calls the sinner to repentance. It promises to him who is dead in sin a moral resurrection ; while its highest rewards lead us humbly to acknowledge how far our proudest attainments are below the high mark of our calling. The conscientious parent punishes and rewards his child to improve him. Society, in dispensing rewards and punishments in the way of legislation, and by the approving or condemning expression of public sentiment, has, or ought to have, no other object than to remove all obstacles, and add new incitements, to the free unfolding of the powers, taste, and talents of its members, to rise to higher degrees, and thus to raise the standard of human excellence. Conscience demands and promises a condition that meets and strengthens the feelings of retributive joy and pain which it bestows, in being adapted to the good or ill desert of the individual, and calculated for his moral

improvement. And this promise, which parents and society are called upon to realize, is it not the promise of the Author of conscience? We may rest assured, then, that the sentence of the supreme Judge will not reverse, but confirm, the precedent he has himself established in our moral nature, the verdict of our own conscience.

This view of the true end of a righteous retribution leads me to infer, that the duration, as well as the degree, of future rewards and punishments, will be determined solely by a regard to the true interest of the individual. Every one will receive as much enjoyment or pain, and for such a length of time, as he deserves, and needs for his moral improvement.

The Gospel of Christ, in many passages, seems to be opposed to this view of future rewards and punishments, as means of moral improvement. In describing the future condition of the good and the bad, Jesus says, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal;" that is, eternal happiness. I shall not attempt an explanation of every passage that relates to this subject; nor enter into controversy with those who seem more anxious to embrace the dead letter than the life-giving spirit, and are intent upon finding out what is new in theory, rather than what is practical and eternal in the Gospel of Christ. The great practical object, which is manifest in all that was revealed by Jesus of the life to come, seems to suggest the true explanation of such passages. The success of vice, and the oppression of virtue in this world, seemed to

give the lie to the truth that is asserted by conscience in all its promptings and judgments, that virtue must always be productive of happiness, and vice of suffering. Jesus came to save this truth, and to establish the faith that is founded upon it. His object was to strengthen the commands of conscience, whose promises and threats proved insufficient to sustain the virtuous under oppression, and to restrain the oppressor by the certain prospect of a righteous retribution. Jesus promises everlasting happiness to the good, and everlasting misery to the wicked; but he nowhere says, that those who have been virtuous or vicious once, or for some time, shall continue to be so for ever. This, indeed, would imply a contradiction, as present and continued goodness or wickedness does not consist in a mere habit, acquired by past virtue or vice, but in actual moral efforts, or actual disregard of conscience. Now it is evident, that the righteous, who are deemed worthy of eternal reward, are not those who have been righteous for some time, but have afterward become vicious; and that the wicked, who will be condemned to perpetual suffering, are not those who have afterward repented and reformed. For it is said, "If the wicked will turn from all his sins, and do that which is lawful and right, in his righteousness he shall live." And again; "When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, in his trespass and in his sin, in them shall he die." The righteous, therefore, who shall be blessed for ever, are those who persevere in well doing; and the wicked, who

are doomed to suffer for ever, are those who persevere in vice. Blessing is here evidently made to depend on virtue, and suffering on vice; and the continuation of bliss or suffering on man's persevering in virtue or in vice. The great practical truth, then, contained in all those passages, is simply this; that perpetual happiness is the certain reward of persevering virtue, and perpetual misery the certain punishment of continued vice. This is true already in this life, with regard to our moral pleasures and pains; and will be true with regard to our condition in general, in the life to come. The perseverance itself, whether in virtue or vice, depends, and must always depend, upon our own free will.

Angels may fall through sin; and if angels can fall, they can also rise again through virtue. When the rich man, in the parable, asked for himself only one drop of that abundance which the beggar Lazarus enjoyed, his request was denied, because he claimed a gratification he had not deserved. But, though in his lifetime he had not treated Lazarus as a brother, there was a spark of true affection in his soul, an anxious thought of his five brothers in his father's house; and the torments, which had not consumed, but brought to light, this precious remnant of humanity in him, were surely intended to aid him in purifying his whole being. The shepherd will go in search of the sheep that has gone astray; and will a father's heart be inaccessible to the prayer of a penitent child, though it rise from the abyss of self-created misery? Nay, the son of perdition, with the undy-

ing worm in his heart, if he strive, and strain to the utmost all the immortal energies of his nature, to wrestle with his own fiendish self, and lay hold of the altar of refuge, the seat of unbounded mercy, will surely see the ray of salvation dawn upon the night of his despair, and the psalm of thanksgiving will burst from his heart, — "If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there!"

I would say, then, in the words of Scripture, "Happy is the man whom the Lord correcteth." — "As a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee."

The manner in which a person bears the rewards or punishments awarded to him, forms the subject of further retribution; and thus, not only is the present life a state of probation for the future, not only is the future a state of retribution for the present; but every moment is a preparation for the future, as it is the result of the past. Our whole existence is a state of perpetual probation, and of continual, adequate retribution. The perpetuity of the moral state of man is a necessary consequence of the immortality of his moral being, the loss of which would imply that of his identity, and, consequently, of his immortality. For, if we believe the soul of man eternal, we must suppose, that, throughout eternity, he will be essentially the same being.

In this respect, also, will the divine judgment probably correspond with that of our own conscience; that every one will be judged, not only for single actions or omissions, but for the moral character he

forms by a continued performance or neglect of his duty. We shall have to render an account for the moral progress we have made, or neglected to make, during certain seasons of probation. The present life is, to those who have experienced most of its vicissitudes, such a season of moral probation, for which they will be called to an account in the judgments of God. Those who, by an early death, or by other circumstances, are prevented from forming a moral character in this life, will not be left without an opportunity of deserving, as well as enjoying, the happiness for which they were created. Thus, for every season of moral probation, man will have to look forward to a day of judgment.

If the above views of future retribution are correct, they establish a harmony in all the cases in which the power of dispensing rewards and punishments is exercised. All that is sacred and dear to man is secured by this invaluable trust, that God is just, that he will judge the world according to the same principles of retributive justice by which each individual judges himself through his own conscience; the same principles by which parents should be guided in the education of their children, and men in society. Man is to be judged only for such actions or omissions as depend on his own choice. His rewards and punishments are to be in exact proportion to his good or ill desert, and calculated for his moral improvement.

On the contrary, if we suppose that God will judge men in the future, according to different principles from those by which they do, or ought to, judge them;

selves in the present life, we destroy the natural connexion between our social duties and religion. If there be such a difference between divine and human justice, it is impossible that our various social relations should derive from religion that sanction and strength, which we justly consider as the invisible and eternal security of the life of man in society. How can the just man trust in God, how can the unjust fear him, if justice and morality are not essentially the same in heaven and on earth? It is vain to expect that the prospect of the life to come will induce men to conform their present condition to the dictates of justice, if they suppose that God will judge men without regard to the ability of each individual to perform his obligations, and the degree of his merit or guilt; or that he will reward or punish them for any other purpose, or in any other manner, than what is calculated to do justice to the moral nature of his immortal children. The ancient Greeks and Romans, while their public affairs were regulated, in a great measure, by principles of justice, continued to worship a host of gods, charged with actions which would have banished them from the sacred home of civil freedom. The gods they worshipped could be no longer to them standards of conduct or models for imitation; and this want of a rational faith in the existence of sovereign justice, proved a more fatal enemy to the freedom of the ancient world, than all the successful craft and violence of its great tyrants. Such has been, and such must be, the fate of every nation whose ideas of the character of God and the duty and destiny of man are not more exalted than

their own actual state of improvement; whose practical and living creed is not founded on the belief that God is just, and will do justice to the free and ever-growing nature and the moral character of man.

Is it said that the Scriptures frequently speak of divine justice in terms which do not agree with the essential requisites of perfect human justice? The Scriptures establish and enforce the eternal principles of retributive justice; but they are often clothed in figurative language, calculated to render them plain and impressive, particularly to the primitive hearers and readers of the word. But these figurative illustrations were surely not intended to be taken for the eternal truths themselves, and thus to become instruments of a strange idolatry of Scripture words and images. The race of Greece was run when those noble pioneers of knowledge and freedom, instead of consulting the revelation of truth and of glory in the inexhaustible resources and endless strivings of the soul, worshipped their own greatness and the idol representatives of their passions and fancies. And the doom of Christendom is sealed, if Christians, instead of grounding their faith upon the simple principles of moral and religious truth, which are promulgated alike in nature and Scripture, insist upon worshipping the imagery of Scripture language, and their own creed, — thus setting up the temporary result of their own investigation, or indolent assent, as the unalterable, universal, and infallible platform of faith and practice.

These are some of the fundamental provisions of

that charter of freedom which God has established in human nature. High in the firmament of the human mind, he has placed the sun of righteousness, to rise and to set at our own bidding. He has intrusted us with the great seal of our own destiny, with the power to establish our own perpetual misery, by continuing in wickedness, or to lay hold on eternal life by perseverance in well doing.

In the foregoing observations on the future state of man, I have endeavoured to consider all the constituent powers and most important manifestations of his nature. It was my intention to enter, and to lead my readers more deeply, into that revelation of the future state of man, which every one possesses in his actual being. If our views of the life to come are founded upon what is real and essential in our present being, there is little danger of running into unprofitable dreams of a passive state of rapture or torment, without a moral object, and, consequently, without a satisfactory influence upon our present conduct. I have spoken separately of the body and of the mind of man, with its chief faculties, the intellect, the affections, and the moral powers. I have spoken first of the future state of each faculty by itself, and then of the attainments we make by exercising it in this life. This separate consideration of the various constituents of human nature, seemed necessary in order to be definite and distinct on each subject. But it is impossible to form a correct view of any part or power of man, without considering it in connexion with all

the other faculties and attainments which centre in each human being as one immortal self.

I have not expressed in this article the opinions of any sect or party, but simply my own particular views.* However I may have failed of doing justice to the subject, I am conscious that my only object has been that which was expressed in the great question of Pilate. I now commit this humble effort to that spirit to which Christ committed the solution of that question.

* The principles contained in this article I first advanced in a treatise "On the Destiny of Man," published in 1823, in the first two numbers of the "Literary Journal of the University of Bale."

HISTORY.*

1. History of the States of Antiquity, from the German of A. H. L. Heeren, &c. Northampton, Mass., 1828. 1 vol. 8vo.
2. History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies, from the Discovery of America to the Independence of the American Continent. From the German of Heeren, &c. Northampton, Mass., 1829. 2 vols. 8vo.

In judging of an historical work, it is necessary to keep in view the general requisites which constitute the historical character of a narrative, as well as the special purpose for which it is composed. The work of Heeren, which Mr. Bancroft has introduced into our literature, is intended to exhibit an outline of the most important events in ancient and modern history, and to be used particularly as a guide in studying, and as a text-book in delivering lectures on history; for which purpose it is commonly employed in the universities of Germany. It is the object of the following remarks to show what we consider the general requisites in an historical work, and the particular

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qualities which fit it for a guide and text-book ; and at the same time to determine how far the work under review is adequate to these demands. The translation, so far as we have been able to compare it with the original, is generally fluent and correct. Some harsh and obscure expressions may be easily corrected in a second edition, which we hope will soon be called for.

The attempt to fix upon the general requisites or essential qualities of a composition which lays claim to the name of history, is attended with peculiar difficulties. They arise, not so much from a want of eminent works in this department, as from too great a variety, which, like too many rays of light, are apt to blind the vision as effectually as utter darkness. Every student of history must be struck with the great variety of taste, method, and design, which characterizes the most prominent historical works ; and the still greater multiplicity of opinions and criticisms on the peculiar merits of these productions. Take, for example, the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, of Livy and Tacitus, the chronicles of Tschudi, the history of Hume, and that of John Müller. The more the reader is able and willing to appreciate the peculiar excellence of each of these works, the more he is liable to mistakes in regard to their general historical character and authority ; his judgment being biased by qualities which may assign to them a rank among works of fiction or moral philosophy, at the expense of their historical merit. Under these perplexing circumstances, a fair estimate of the credit

due to an historical work as such, is, perhaps, less to be expected from one who views it as a learned judge, than from a man of common sense, who decides upon it as a juryman, not according to preëstablished rules, but as a matter of fact. To such an unbiased judge of history, language itself seems to point out its true character, by the twofold meaning it assigns to the word. When we speak of the history of the Romans, we mean the deeds and remarkable events relating to this nation. But when we speak of the history of Livy, we do not mean the events in the life of this man, but the account or narrative of the Romans, which he has left us. Accordingly, if we be justified in ascribing this double use of the word history (as we find it in several languages) to the philosophy, rather than to the poverty of the language, we may say that a description can be considered as history, only so far as it is founded on history, that is, on real facts and events. To those who may think that, under this play of words, we have brought forward nothing but a truism, we answer, we should be sincerely glad to plead guilty to this imputation. We heartily wish that nothing but history might be related and considered as history. But when we examine the most eminent works designated by this name, we soon discover, besides the only legitimate ground and object of history, many deviations, occasional and systematic, some arising from unfair, and others from conscientious motives. The more the views from which these deviations from truth proceed are settled and general, so much the more they affect the

whole character of the narrative; while personal and temporary interests are more apt to affect the particulars. The characters of the narratives themselves, and that of their authors, and the circumstances under which they wrote, commonly disclose to us the causes of these deviations; and it is easy to point out a scale of more or less personal or enlarged views, which induced the historians thus to renounce their proper object.

The biographer, who undertakes the description of one individual, if he is himself this individual, is liable to be led away by the insinuations of self-love, which is likely to appear as much in the apparent modesty with which he details his merits, as in the self-complacent humility with which he confesses his faults. On the other hand, if he writes the history of another person, he is frequently tempted to flattery or abuse, by the influence of the elevation or debasement of this individual upon his own standing and prospects. The propensity to exaggerate the merits or the faults of individuals, extends in monarchies and aristocracies commonly to certain families, and standing political and religious institutions, in which all have become so domesticated, that they regard them with a kind of family attachment and implicit faith. In republics, the spirit of exaggeration is commonly directed for or against certain parties. Europe abounds in pompous narratives of the reigning families, and of political and religious establishments, which seem to rise in the admiration of men, as their claims to their esteem become more and more uncertain, a matter of reminiscence rather than of reason, and at last outgrowing

even the memory of man. Among these panegyrics in the form of histories, the most dangerous to the cause of truth are by no means those which manifestly show that they are written with a golden pen, but those in which falsehood and slavishness appear, — strange to tell, — as moral and religious principles. The loyal historian thinks it his sacred duty, not only to extol the merits, and to pass over the faults of his prince and his august family, but, moreover, by an astonishing resignation of his reason, to find perfection in every act of him to whom he is obliged to ascribe, in addressing him or speaking of him, all the attributes which devout persons attach to the Supreme Being. This conscientious servility, the greatest triumph of falsehood over truth, is so much the more injurious in history, as it binds the understanding of the student, by engaging his esteem and affection for the honest intention of the writer. There is hardly one among the historians of Europe, whose works do not exhibit symptoms of this moral malady. We discover traces of it even in the works of Heeren ; though in him this infirmity does not amount to wilful alteration of facts. Yet it appears in the disdain with which he speaks of the undistinguished many as opposed to the privileged few ; in his representations of the English, and of the French revolutions ; of the Holy Alliance, and the restoration of political legitimacy in Europe. In general, however, the principle of truth is so predominant in this historian, that it leaves his clear and scrutinizing mind unconfined, as we see it especially in his account of the American revolution, and

the institutions and the progress of our country. This general regard to historical truth secures confidence to his statements, which are more precise and succinct than we find in other works on universal history.

But the want of independence in historical works, originating in countries in which the nation, as well as its historians, are swayed by despotic power, is not confined to those countries. False coin is not less false for its bearing the escutcheon of a republic, rather than the head of a king. In our own republic, in which the capital of history is not vested in ponderous volumes, but in the circulating medium of daily events, our newspapers, the temptations to misrepresent facts and characters are more temporary and various than in Europe. That our newspaper history is different from the real history of this country, is, we believe, generally acknowledged ; though the adherents of each of the contending parties may endeavour to throw the charge altogether upon their opponents ; or, at least, if there are any honest, or generous, or politic enough to confess that there is a mote in their own eyes, they would still see a beam in those of their dissenting brethren. Those, therefore, (must we say a few ?) who read the newspapers, not for the purpose of seeing their friends lauded and their enemies abused, those who read the accounts of both parties, have need of a peculiar skill, a new kind of algebra, to find out from the proportion of positive and negative quantities brought together, the unknown quantity sought for ; that is, the simple truth. But even in the calculation

of those who always expect to find the truth between the two extremes, there is much fallacy. The whole truth frequently lies exclusively in one direction ; and even the spirit of moderation and caution may become a passion, and be carried to a dangerous extreme. The man, who is predetermined to choose the middle way, is apt to lose all decision in judgment as well as action ; to discredit all accounts, only because they are supported by a violent party ; to be afraid of an excess of truth and virtue ; to disregard the strict line of demarcation between right and wrong ; to seek truth between truth and falsehood, and goodness between virtue and vice. In history, this excess of moderation takes away all distinct outlines from characters and events.

There are characters and events, which appear in so different a light as related by the different parties, that it becomes the duty of the historian to give the account of each. Thus, in the history of the two rival queens in England, and in that of the Puritans, the accounts of both parties are to be stated ; and in representing some of the most important characters and transactions in the French revolution, which are still involved in mystery, an impartial judgment requires a knowledge of the different party accounts, of the royalists, of the two republican parties, and of the adherents of a constitutional monarchy. It is quite a different task, one too, which bears its reward in hand, to consult, in representing such scenes, chiefly the taste of the numerous class of readers, (as yet we fear the plurality,) who take up an historical

work as a novel, warranted to be true; in which they expect, as a matter of right, to be gratified with objects of admiration, and of horror, with suffering saints and triumphing monsters. We must ascribe some part of the applause, which the Sketch of the French Revolution, by Walter Scott, in his life of Napoleon, has met with, to a very general want of a genuine relish for historical truth, to a public hungering and thirsting after food for admiration and abhorrence. Yet the eminent historical talent, which characterizes the novels of this author, is a sufficient proof, that he could not, in any instance, have calculated upon a perversion of the public taste, which he himself, by his works of fiction, has raised to such a nice discrimination of truth, that the judgment, which condemns his essay on the French revolution as a history, may more properly be considered as his own work, than that essay itself. It is, indeed, one of the highest moral exertions of the intellect, to view, and represent justly, the actions and principles of others when opposed to our own. It is an effort which the young should be taught to make from their earliest years, and the want of which should never be excused in any writer, though it be supported by great power and ability. For falsehood is dangerous in proportion as the arguments, by which it is maintained, are good. The history of our own country exhibits characters and events, particularly toward the close of the last, and in the beginning of this century, which cannot be placed in a fair historical light, without giving the accounts of both par-

ties. These are chiefly to be obtained from the newspapers, periodical works, and pamphlets, published at the time. In regard to these ephemeral records of our history, we would add one observation. Their frequent appearance, in every part of the country, fits them to notice every fleeting event, of which the consequences, perhaps, appear only at a time, when otherwise it would have been long forgotten. On the other hand, this circumstance renders them peculiarly obnoxious to party influence, which lessens their claim to general and lasting credit. Accordingly, we should presume, the future historian of this country will feel embarrassed, at once, from the superabundance and the scarcity of materials for his work. One very important source of our history has begun to be opened in the publication of the memoirs of influential men; in which French literature is particularly rich.

We have spoken of the injurious influence of party spirit in politics upon history. Its influence upon religion is evident from all the records of ecclesiastical history. If we examine the descriptions, which authors, belonging to different religious sects, have left of those, who, more or less, dissented from their own opinions, it would almost seem, as if they had endeavoured to imitate nature in forming distinct races of men, with white, yellow, red, and black skins. The party historian, of course, represents those of his own sect as the privileged race, while he describes other sects as colored people, with more light or shade in their characters, as they differ more

or less from the chosen race. Therefore, in examining the moral portraits, exhibited in party records, we cannot judge from the coloring alone, whether we behold an angel of light or of darkness; for this depends, we know, on the painter's being born in Africa or in Europe. To the true historian, many of these party records are valuable only as unintentional autobiographies of the writers; while with deep regret and indignation he sees religion, the life-spring of truth, and therefore of history, employed as a sufficient ground for legitimating the productions of falsehood.

Perhaps the most abundant source of history is the love of country, the desire of those, who look beyond their own narrow sphere, to make known to other nations, and to preserve to coming generations, the lives and deeds of their countrymen. This truly patriotic aspiration, which has incited the most distinguished historians of all ages, cannot mislead the writer, so far as patriotism is a philanthropic principle. Patriotism is a virtue, it is philanthropy, when it is an enlargement of our interest in ourselves and our principles to a whole nation. But as soon as it becomes a spirit of hostility and pride toward other nations, it is no longer a moral or philanthropic principle, since it is not an enlargement, but a restriction, of the noblest powers and best affections, which should take in the whole family of man. The writer, whose aim it is to exalt his whole nation to the disparagement of others, by hiding the faults of the former, and enhancing those of the latter; who mis-

leads the minds of his countrymen, and particularly of the young, through principles of national pride and intolerance; such a writer, who does not deserve the name of an historian, commits as grievous a breach of international law, as any that is recognised as such by the law itself. His offence is equalled or surpassed only by that of him, who is base enough to disfigure what is really great and good in the history of his own country, to please and serve its enemies abroad and at home. The design of preserving to coming generations the deeds of their ancestors, is a patriotic aim, which sometimes leads the narrator to magnify them, so that they may serve as models for imitation. The historian, who relates the deeds of his own contemporaries to preserve their memory, is less exposed to this temptation, than he who undertakes to make known to the present generation the remarkable events in the history of their ancestors. This desire of magnifying the deeds of their forefathers, so common among ancient and modern historians, and frequently excused as an excess of exalted filial piety, is a serious error in regard to history, as well as morality and education. As soon as the historian of a nation ceases to think that posterity will be benefited by the knowledge of the faults, as well as the merits, of their ancestors, or rather, as soon as he has any other object in view than to represent them as they actually were, whether deserving of censure or imitation, he forfeits his right to describe them.

The last remarks, in regard to a national historian,

lead us to a more general observation, concerning the apparent predisposition, in some historians, to exalt antiquity above modern times, and in others, to retaliate this partiality by reversing it, instead of doing justice to both. We here see, in the department of history, the same difference, which, in that of education, appears in the partiality of some, for what is called classical learning; and of others, for what they technically designate useful knowledge. The partial admirers of antiquity are apt to overlook or slight what is classical in the productions of modern times, while their opponents restrict their conceptions of what is practical and useful, so much as to exclude the study of antiquity; as if the enlargement of the mind, which grows out of this study, was not as real as any economical advantage. The works of Heeren are, in general, free from such partiality. He appreciates what is great and good, or faulty, in the peculiar institutions of all times. It is another trait in the historical character of Heeren's works, that he does not allow his imagination to swerve beyond the domain of history, either to the unknown past, or to the dark future; and that he does not pretend to indicate the laws, according to which, all that has happened must have come to pass. His works are, in general, characterized by the endeavour to exhibit the actual state of things in every period, in its connexion with the past and the future, so far as it can be ascertained. In his reasoning on the past, faith and skepticism seem to prevail in due proportion. His criticisms on the work of Niebuhr on

Roman history seem to us to contain more truth, than the high encomiums this work has met with from German and English writers. Heeren says, concerning it, "There is almost more of criticism than history, with a constant effort to overturn what had been received. Acuteness is not always perception of truth; and it is not so easy to believe in a constitution, which is not only against the prevailing view of antiquity itself, (inferences from single passages do not at once overturn what all the rest assert,) but is also, according to the author's own confession, contrary to all analogy in history. But truth gains, even where criticism is at fault; and the value of several profound investigations is not, on that account to be mistaken."

Not satisfied with the truly valuable, though somewhat exaggerated skepticism of Beaufort, Niebuhr has attempted, on the ground of etymology, (a very unsafe guide in historical research,) and of some detached passages of ancient authors, to put an hypothetical account of the origin of the Roman state, and particularly of its two great political parties, in place of the commonly received narratives of Livy and Dionysius. But though these narratives are evidently raised up with fables, and stained by partiality, their account of the primitive institutions of Rome cannot be entirely disregarded. When they, for example, relate, that, in the *comitia curiata*, every Roman citizen had a vote of equal value, and that the first tribunes were chosen in these primitive assemblies of the whole people, we have no right to substi-

tute for these accounts a theory, according to which they must appear as falsehoods. Niebuhr's, as well as Beaufort's, great merit seems to us to consist in their having put to a severe test the ancient documents we possess. Beaufort has been particularly successful in pointing out the gradual unfolding of the various political institutions of Rome. Niebuhr excels in representing the true character and progress of the great political struggle between the patricians and the plebeians. His historical skepticism is sound and impartial; but it seems to overstep its own limits, or rather to be directed against itself, when he substitutes fictions of his own for what he believes fictitious in the accounts of the ancients.

Whenever Heeren ventures upon a view of the *future*, it is always done without pretension; without that air of prophecy with which historians are apt to relate their second sights. Only in a few instances does he intersperse his calculations of historical probability with his own wishes, which we think he might better have foreborne, because we generally disapprove of these interspersions in a work of history. His views of the future are commonly founded on a thorough knowledge of the past, and therefore worthy of all consideration; since it is certainly probable, that men will act from the same or similar motives or views, which have hitherto directed them in their various pursuits. But we ought not to carry our reliance on these calculations so far, as to overlook the free incalculable powers of the mind. One great discovery, like that of gun-

powder or of printing, one great impulse and effort of the mind, like that which gave rise to the crusades and to the independence of America, may tear asunder the feeble web of well-contrived anticipations and provisions. We would recommend this subject to the consideration of those, who, in their theoretical or practical schemes, are inclined to place too much confidence in the assertion, that "the history of the past is, in fact, the history of the future." This saying is true, indeed, in regard to minerals, plants, and animals, but not to men as such, that is, as free beings, endowed with faculties for infinite improvement.

In many historians, we find a prevailing tendency to trace the *designs of Providence* in the course of events. This investigation has, in many cases, led to a more profound understanding of the hidden links of events, apparently disconnected. But it has also, particularly in ecclesiastical history, given rise to many presumptuous suppositions. Men are apt to lend to an overruling Providence, their own schemes of a satisfactory government of the universe. They do not consider, that they see but few of the causes of the events of this life, from which they would infer the plan of Providence; and that one principal source of events, the free determination of men, cannot be made the subject of any calculation. They are apt to forget, that the good or ill success of human endeavours cannot be considered as a proof of right and wrong, or as a manifestation of the last and highest moral judgment. For that success itself can-

not be considered as the end, but only as one of the means of that just and provident government, which has for its object the whole of man's existence, of which this life, with all its successes and disappointments, is but the beginning. Most of these speculative historians suppose the object of divine Providence, in the direction of human events, to be the GRADUAL *improvement of mankind.*

This plan they endeavour to trace in the fate of individuals and nations, — their rise, their conquests, their institutions, and their downfall. How far, we ask, is this view consistent with experience and history? It is true, human nature is so constituted, as to show forth the design of its Author, that each generation may be educated by those which precede it, and may improve upon their attainments. But it is evident, also, to those who are not prejudiced by any preconceived theory, that the use of these natural endowments of man is left to his own determination, and that he has as little reason to impute the ill employment of these means to the Power who gave them, as to expect from it any agency for bringing about events, for which he has already received sufficient faculties. The constitution of nature and the course of events are sufficient to convince us, that it was the plan of Providence to make mankind the free and responsible authors of their happiness or unhappiness. And this plan seems to require, that it should indeed be in the power of an individual, or a nation, to abuse their faculties, so as to deprive others of their chance of improvement and happiness for

a time. But the same regulation assures us, that a future state will fulfil the promise of the present to those who are deprived of earthly prosperity. Still more, even in this life, new means of improvement will be offered to those who have lost, or never possessed them. The time will come for the slave to break his chain; and the savage will see the light breaking through the wilderness of his mind. Our faith in an overruling Providence leads us to believe, that every nation and every individual, however degraded, will, at some time, obtain the means of the highest happiness of which human nature is capable. But we do not expect, that any other than their own faithful exertion will make them free and happy; nor that, without it, those who are possessed of these blessings now, will be able to retain them. We think it as possible for "our enlightened age," as we choose to call it, to relapse into slavery and barbarism, as for the most exalted and refined nations of antiquity; whilst savages and slaves may become the standards of light and civilization. We do not believe, and history seems to confirm our unbelief, that truth will ever overcome error, unless the exertions of its votaries be at least equal to those of its adversaries. Both nature and history confirm the belief in man's being destined for continual improvement; but they contradict the theory of a gradual improvement, independent of his own exertions. The influence of this doctrine is injurious in regard to morals, as well as history; for it induces men to overlook or underrate those attainments in which

former generations have surpassed posterity, and is apt to create in the latter a dangerous self-satisfaction, and a regardlessness of their own responsibility.

Some philosophers, especially, in our times, those of the school of Hegel (now Professor at Berlin), pretend to a still higher intelligence, than the anticipation of future events from the knowledge of the past. They think themselves possessed of the universal theory, according to which, all things that have been, are, and will be, are preconceived and produced. They maintain, that all that exists and comes to pass, must be and ought to be; subverting, in this manner, the proper ground of history as well as of morality. Compliance with existing circumstances and established powers is the highest, or rather the whole, duty of man. Every nation is destined, according to this doctrine, to pass through various evolutions, in order to attain to the most perfect political state, the *hereditary monarchy*. No wonder that this system, however mysterious and truly barbarous the language in which it is expressed, soon obtained the hearty support of the government, under whose auspices it was taught. Thus, the prophetic saying of one of the greatest and richest minds, the German poet and historian, Schiller, has come to pass, that philosophy would soon become what religion had been, the great engine of despotism.

We notice these peculiar views of history only so far as they have, or may have, an influence on the representations of *facts*, (which cannot be of much consequence to him who thinks himself able to con-

strue them from his own theory of the universe.) Heeren has preserved his character as a historian clear from such theories. He thus speaks of himself, in the preface to his Modern History; "It never lay in his plan to raise himself to that higher point of view from which our speculative historians assume to measure the progress of humanity. The author deemed it his first duty to remain on the firm ground of history, and considered the possibility of doing so in the immense extent of his subject, as its most essential advantage."

While history is used by some philosophers, or as Heeren calls them, speculative historians, to trace their own theories in the course of events, we see it employed by others for practical purposes; as, for illustrating moral principles, or as ascertaining certain rights founded on treaties, conquest, or custom; and by others we see it used for works of fiction. But though there is an historical element in philosophy, morals, politics, and poetry, the department of history is not to be confounded with any other branch of knowledge or refinement. It is the duty of the historian first to examine with critical exactness the weight and authenticity of all the sources of information concerning the life and fate of the individual or the nation whom he undertakes to portray. If he does not write from his own observation, he must endeavour to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the character and prevailing ideas of the time from which the subject of his history is taken, and from which the accounts of it are derived. Geography and philosophy are the most necessary

means for this purpose. In this way he must try to obtain all the particulars, and then, through them, a clear idea of the whole of his subject.

In representing the history of a nation, he must not be led away by some splendid exhibitions of power, particularly military achievements, nor be lost in admiration of some prominent characters, — two faults which we find in almost every work on ancient history. With respect to the *internal* history of the nation, he will devote himself particularly to the study and representation of the most important pursuits of individuals, and of social institutions; such as the means of subsistence, peculiar habits, domestic life, legislation and administration, arts and sciences, and religion. In representing the external history of the people, that is, its various relations to other nations, he will relate not only its wars, conquests, treaties of peace and alliances, but more particularly its intercourse in peace, its commerce by land and sea, and the influence of the mutual exchange of commodities, and of the means of information and refinement.

On most of these points, the historical works of Heeren are distinguished before others. There is no portion of his history which does not prove its being derived from the genuine and original sources, to which he never neglects to refer the reader. He enumerates the chief works and documents frequently, with short and profound criticisms on the comparative importance of each of these sources. In his ancient history he gives a preliminary geographical sketch of each country he describes. In stating dates and facts, he is emi-

nently careful and precise. He gives a correct outline of the most interesting institutions, especially the political constitution of each country. But perhaps the greatest merit of his history consists in the description of the commercial and international relations of the ancient and the modern world. In his ancient history, we find the results of those deep and extensive researches laid down in his work "On the Politics, Intercourse, and Commerce of the principal Nations of the Ancient World," a part of which is already known to English and American readers, through Mr. Bancroft's translation, ("Politics of Ancient Greece.") In modern history, the origin and progress of the *colonies*, the most momentous result and medium of international intercourse, is, perhaps, the most successful part of the work. The history of the United States of America, in particular, of their rise, institutions, maxims of foreign intercourse, and general influence upon the other nations of the earth, betokens a mind which, through fair and thorough research, has risen to such an elevation as enables him to look beyond the political horizon of his own country, and to discriminate the heights and the depths, the lights and the shades, in the immense landscape of universal history, that is spread before him.

We have spoken of the general requisites in an historical work, with particular reference to that of Heeren; and will now add a few words on the special purpose for which it is destined. It is a valuable guide for every student of history, whether he pursue this study with or without another instructer. It in-

forms him of the most important facts, naturally and systematically arranged, continually referring him to the sources where he can find proofs and details.

In ancient history, the preliminary geographical sketches which we have already noticed, will be found particularly valuable. As a text-book for instructers, it has the common experience in the colleges of Germany in its favor. But it of course supposes history to be taught, not merely as a matter of memory, by dull recitations from the book. It is left to the teacher to direct the attention of the pupil to the most important points; to explain, enlarge, and enliven the narrative by suitable details and observations. It, moreover, supposes that history should not be considered as a branch of instruction which is to come in only by the way, as an appendix to other studies; but as a study of itself, and one of first-rate importance. We fear that the study of history has hitherto not been fully appreciated in our schools and colleges, and in our country generally. We do not suppose that history can give us the standard of our future conduct; we do not agree with those who would persuade us that we ought to imitate our ancestors, except in those things which our own reason and conscience command us to do. We have already entered our protest against this overrating of the past, this idolatry of history, which in Asia and Europe keeps down, in millions of human beings, every spontaneous effort of the free-born mind. Those who have grown up under the constant control of political and ecclesiastical institutions, derive their ideas of what ought to be, from what has been done.

But those who have grown up as beings who have a destiny of their own, ought to acquaint themselves with all that has been done, in order to meet the demands of duty. For, in order to perceive and do the best thing that may be done under the present circumstances, it is necessary to know them; and this is impossible without acquainting ourselves with the mode in which they came into existence; that is, with history. While, therefore, to the bondman, conscience is a matter of history, the study of history is a matter of conscience to the freeman.

The neglect of the study of history in our country is undoubtedly the cause of the undeniable fact, that there exists amongst us more pride than real knowledge of the actual state of our country, and of its relations to other nations. The importance of studying the history of our own nation need not be enforced. The study of the history of other nations is necessary, not only to understand their relations to our own, but, by acquainting us with their peculiar institutions and manners, it serves to set us free from national prejudices, while it teaches us the peculiar excellence of our own social institutions, compared with those of other nations and ages of the world. We learn to judge of ourselves from the elevated point of view of universal history.

By acquainting ourselves with the actions and manners of men and nations, and by comparing them with our own experience, we arrive at the most important result from the study of history, the knowledge of human nature, its original tendencies, its various pow-

ers and weaknesses. When we trace the facts recorded in history to their sources, we discover under this immense variety of phenomena, a secret, and, we may well say, a sacred history, the silent workings and simple unfolding of the mind. The study of this inward history does not require a rich apparatus of philological knowledge. All the actions of men, in the most distant regions and times, are words belonging to the same universal language, the knowledge of which is not acquired from without, but self-taught. All the deeds and transactions of men are expressions of the human mind, and cannot be understood as such except by self-observation, by discovering in ourselves the powers and tendencies of which history shows us the results. It is by self-observation that the history of the human race, which otherwise would remain a dead letter, becomes a living language, that establishes an intercourse between the most remote nations and generations of men.

To the student of human nature, it must be of the highest import to watch the progress of the human race, and its improvement, from its first dawn in Asia, the mother of nations and religions, of social institutions, and the centre of the commerce of the ancient world. We see the spirit of improvement advancing with the course of the sun, from the banks of the Ganges to the shores of the Mediterranean, awaking a new life in Egypt, Phœnicia, and Palestine, then calling forth a new world of light in Greece, the original seminary of the arts and sciences, of philosophy and civilization ; thence proceeding to Italy, the

great school of war and legislation ; and successively enlightening all Europe. But when the night of despotism, which had overshadowed Asia, began to descend on Europe, the sun of freedom, which had set on the eastern borders of the Atlantic, rose upon this western hemisphere.

Have we reason to believe that the spirit of improvement which has travelled round the earth, has found at last a permanent home ? The past seems to promise it ; but the fulfilment depends on the future. The history of religion and politics, the foundation of all other social institutions, shows us in Asia, herdsmen, patriarchs, conquerors, and despots, who still preserve their original character as herdsmen of human beings, who are controlled by political and religious institutions, as by instinct. In Greece and Italy, the power of one or a few human beings over the rest, was abolished ; individual liberty and self-government were claimed by the people. But while individual liberty had attained its highest state in Athens and Rome, the free citizens exercised a despotic sway over their allies, their provinces, and their slaves. In religion, a few individuals alone threw off the bondage of the established creed and worship of the nation ; and the greatest and best of these atoned with his life for this conscientious assertion of religious liberty. While the freemen maintained tyranny over their fellow-men as a matter of right, their freedom itself was only a matter of fact and of force, and was finally overthrown by force. It was reserved for the people of this country, by the declaration of its indepen-

dence, and in its constitution, to recognise liberty in politics and religion, as the birthright of every human being; to proclaim, that in politics the people themselves are alone and always entitled to frame their constitution and laws; and that in religion, even the people have no right to legislate, the profession and exercise of religion being not a matter of the state, but of individual liberty.

Our destiny, our duty, and our success, are thus adumbrated by our history.

We conclude this article with recommending to our own country, and particularly to our colleges, the Ancient and Modern History of Heeren, translated by Mr. Bancroft, who has thus acquired a new claim to the grateful acknowledgment of the public, for his judicious and truly patriotic endeavours to enrich our own literature with what is most valuable in that of Germany. We have only to add a wish, that the success of this work may encourage the translator, or some other competent mind, to complete it, by the addition of a history of the middle ages, in Heeren's style and spirit.

INAUGURAL DISCOURSE.*

THE creation of a new professorship to enlarge the circle of learning in this literary institution, must be welcomed by every friend of liberal education, who loves to see Harvard College growing up to the full stature of a University. For the true character of a university, as distinguished from other schools or colleges, consists in the universality of the instruction it offers. It is not limited to a few time-honored branches of learning, absorbing the whole strength of the tree of intellectual life; but putting forth its growing powers toward every ray of light, it gathers strength from all the elements, and maturity from every season of human improvement. An institution, that would make good its claims to the name of a university, does not confine itself to a few familiar connexions and friendships formed in its infancy, but is ever ready to multiply the branches of academic instruction, and to extend the right hand of fellowship to any faithful laborer in the vineyard of science and good learning, whether he be called at

* Delivered before the University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 3, 1831, on occasion of the author's induction into the Professorship of the German Language and Literature.

the earliest or the latest hour, and in whatever walk of literary life he be found.

With a view to make provision for all the various departments, which, in the present state of learning, compose the circle of academic studies, the government of the university, assisted by the enlightened liberality of a few individuals, have assigned to German literature a place among the regular branches of instruction in this university. They have thus confirmed an opinion of its general importance, which, from a native, might require an apology on the ground of a natural partiality. As it devolves on me to call the attention of the public to the establishment of the professorship, to which I have had the honor to be appointed, I would offer a few remarks *on the importance of the study of the German language and literature.*

If we consult the prevailing sentiment in the civilized world on this subject, we shall find, that, within the last twenty or thirty years, a remarkable change of opinion has taken place in France and in England. Since the time of Louis the Fourteenth, an immoderate respect for finish, neatness, and ease, in literary productions, with an excessive abhorrence of all inelegance, unrefined simplicity, obscurity, and mystery; in short, the worship of the outside of things, had taken possession of the life and literature of the French nation. No wonder that the arbiters of the French taste could not respect and relish the literature of a nation, whose characteristic fault, as well as excellence, consists in a comparative indifference to

finite and external things, and an all-absorbing interest in the boundlessness of every intellectual pursuit; and among whom the grave, the profound, and the sublime are sometimes embodied in unfinished, obscure, or indefinite forms. Much of the disrespect and disrelish for German literature, which was prevalent in France, was undoubtedly owing to the narrow self-complacency of those who were allowed to set the fashion of thinking in "the great nation." Yet it is but justice to say, that this disparagement of German literature was, in a great measure, to be traced to its own degeneracy in the seventeenth and the first part of the eighteenth century. At that time a slavish imitation of French taste and manners had crept into all departments of social and literary life, and a mad propensity to throw away their own patrimony, and live upon credit, had brought the nation to the brink of a disgraceful intellectual bankruptcy. Those who had, or pretended to have, a call for reforming and regenerating their national language and literature, proved themselves false prophets. Instead of building upon the solid, strong, and beautiful style of Luther in his translation of the Bible, as the true foundation of modern German; or going back to the rich stores of expression, contained in the ancient German language, as it still lives in the literary remains of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they corrupted the very fountains of intellectual life by large infusions of French taste and idiom. It was a vain love of innovation, without the genius of improvement, which led Gotsched and his followers,

the weak pretenders to a literary supremacy in Germany, to a tame imitation of foreign, particularly of French models, and a supercilious neglect of the inexhaustible productiveness of their own mother tongue, in which every one who is conversant with its spirit, and who seeks after an adequate expression for a new thought, can form, from the common roots of the language, new words, which are immediately understood and acknowledged by all as genuine German. Under the specious pretence of pruning and weeding, they lacerated the roots, and stinted the free growth of individual talent; while their own literary productions bore a striking resemblance to the fashionable gardens of their time, laid out according to the rules of geometry, with shrubs cut into the shape of urns and candelabra, with trees forced into the forms of squares, triangles, globes, or pyramids, with artificial ruins, and half-concealed grottos, beset with bowing Cupids and simpering Graces. No wonder, then, that they were looked down upon with pity by the French authors, whom they slavishly strove to imitate, and who saw in them none of the excellencies on which they prided themselves, and all the weaknesses which they excused in no one but themselves.

The revival of German literature took place at a time, when, all the energies of the French people being engaged either in politics or conquest, their attention was taken off from literary pursuits in their own, as well as in other countries. The generous impulses, that had sprung up in the glorious morning

of the French revolution, were corrupted, and pressed into the service of a military demagogue, who was prudent enough to dread, and attempted to smother, the embers of freedom, which are kept alive by a liberal education, and are soon fanned into a flame by an independent literature. But even during the reign of Napoleon, in his own France, there rose up against him an enemy braving the fearful sway of his bayonets, attacking and besieging the mighty son of fortune in his Tuileries, nay, within the precincts of his own soul. This enemy was a woman, a weak vessel indeed, but filled with powerful, ethereal essences; not a Charlotte Corday, or a Maid of Orleans, wielding the dagger, or bearing the Oriflamme, but holding a rod of enchantment in her hand, with which she touched the hearts, and moved the minds, of men, against the common enemy of truth, justice, humanity, and every generous and holy sentiment. Madame de Staël, notwithstanding her prejudices and her passions, will ever be ranked as one of the boldest and most successful opposers of the golden age of military despotism, and as the forerunner of a higher spirit, which is manifesting itself in the recent French literature, in the works of her friend Benjamin Constant, of Cousin, of Degerando, and of many new and true lights, that have since appeared in the literary firmament of France.

It is the peculiar merit of Madame de Staël to have roused the generous energies of her nation, from a vain idolatry of their own greatness, to an enlarged conception and appreciation of foreign merit. Thus

it was, through her work on Germany, that the productions of the poets, philosophers, and historians of that country, gained in France and other lands many zealous students and enthusiastic admirers. The philosophy of Victor Cousin has sprung chiefly from the fountains of speculation in the works of Kant. The elevated, spiritual views of religion and morality, which are set forth in the last great work of Benjamin Constant, were called forth by the kindred ideas of German philosophers, particularly those of Jacobi; and much of the extensive information there displayed, may be traced to the researches of German archæologists, especially those of Kreutzer. Thus was brought about, the remarkable change in public opinion, with regard to German literature, to which I have before alluded. From an object of common disregard, it has become one of general interest and esteem.

It was unfavorable to a true estimation of German literature in England, that, among the first modern works which were translated into English, there were so many bad ones, and that of many good works there appeared such bad translations. If, instead of the plays of Kotzebue, and other works, calculated to spoil the taste and feelings by an artificial, unpoetical, and essentially immoral excitement, either of impure pleasure or of spectral horror, the works of Schiller, Göthe, and Richter had been offered to the English public in translations like those of Coleridge and Shelley, the eye of English criticism would not have been blinded to the true character of the poetic

literature of Germany. The terms "German taste" and "German style" would have conveyed a very different idea from that which has been attached to them. Better translations of good works have already done away the first incorrect impression, and even the deep mines of German philosophy have begun to be worked by English enterprise. German metaphysics are no longer avoided from a weak dread of intellectual hardship, or from national bigotry, in England, as they are no longer summarily set aside as *du haut Allemand* in France; they now meet with all they require, — faithful and impartial study. Indeed it may be said of German literature in general, that it has been the subject of a change in public sentiment similar to that which has taken place with regard to Gothic, that is, ancient German architecture. A short time ago, every thing that seemed to combine a profusion of heavy or overwrought ornament in the parts, with a want of simplicity in the conception of the whole, was called Gothic, until a deeper study of the monuments of Gothic architecture revealed the mystery of these wonders of masonry, in which, as in the works of nature, the simple design they are intended to realize, is great enough to bear out and comprehend without confusion a countless variety of the most finished details. Thus in literature, those works which were characterized by extravagance in sentiment and diction, by a visionary philosophy, or an unprofitable accumulation of minutiæ, were pointed out as specimens of German style and taste. The tables are now completely turned; so that from the

writings of some learned foreigners, it would almost seem as if a deep sense of the unjust neglect with which German literature had been treated before, had betrayed them into the opposite extreme of injustice, that of overlooking its defects, or overrating its merits.

Such, I believe, is at present the public sentiment in France and in England, with regard to German literature.

In this our own country, and particularly in this literary vicinity, the attention which is paid to this portion of universal literature, is within the observation of all who hear me. The treasures contained in German works did not escape public notice, but soon gained that intelligent interest which is taken here in every thing that promises to enlarge and elevate the mind. In this university, where formerly German lore was classed under the head of "non leguntur," the library has lately been augmented by a considerable number of valuable works; German books, in their native type, are issuing from the University press; and there is every year an average number of fifty students of the German language. There are German books and teachers in every place of importance in this country. In Boston, particularly, where, as I am assured, about fifty years ago, not a German grammar or dictionary was to be found, there are now a number of persons who speak, and a large number who read, and enter into the sense and spirit of German works. Many German authors have already found a place in private libraries, among the literary representatives of other

countries, and gladden the eye of the stranger whose heart is not yet weaned from the pleasures of his childhood, the guides of his youth, and the great standards of his manhood.

Let us now examine some of the grounds of this general regard for German literature. There are reasons that must make this study interesting to every friend of knowledge and intellectual culture, whatever nation he belong to; and there are some which recommend it particularly to those to whom the English is their mother tongue. I will first point out some of the excellences of German literature, which seem to entitle it to *general* interest; and for this purpose let us direct our attention to some of the departments in which it has contributed its share to the advancement and diffusion of knowledge. I begin with the science of sciences, philosophy, or, as it is sometimes called, metaphysics; a department in which German literature is peculiarly rich.

Of all modern nations, I believe the Germans deserve the credit of having formed the most perfect idea of this great science; an idea which lies at the foundation of all their philosophical works, particularly since the great revival of philosophy through the influence of Kant. The various branches of knowledge, the natural sciences, mathematics, history, ethics, and theology, contain each of them a copious and various detail of facts and speculations; but also some general principles from which others may be deduced, and under which all the particulars may be arranged in a systematic manner. Now these principles

themselves form the substance of philosophy. Philosophy, according to the German idea of it, is the system of the fundamental and regulating principles of all the various branches of human knowledge. So far, therefore, as the universe is revealed to human knowledge, philosophy is the system of the universe.

With such an idea of this science, it is natural that all German speculations should bear more the character of beginnings, than of finished results. Important as some of the results are to which these speculative efforts have led, still their greatest value consists in the unwearied and never-satisfied strivings of the mind to sound and comprehend itself, and that whole, of which itself is but a particle. Jacob, who, in his dream, wrestled with the Lord of heaven and earth, bearing off in his lameness a revelation of omnipotence, is the true emblem of German philosophy. It is something that you must not expect to turn to immediate account in your particular trade or profession; nor is it necessary, in order to be benefited by it, that you should adopt its results. German metaphysics have been called the best gymnastics of the mind; and the true object of gymnastics, we know, is not to give the power to perform some great and astonishing feat, but methodically to unfold, invigorate, and refine all the growing powers of man.

It is true that this philosophic tendency of the German mind sometimes mistakes its true object, and setting aside the tribunal of common sense, runs wild into hypothesis. But the amount of evil is very small compared with the good proceeding from this source; and the faithful student, who is determined

to dig down to the true and living springs of German philosophy, will not mistake those transient and insufficient streams, which partake of the impure surface, for those which come from the lofty heights, or the unfathomable depths.

This philosophic tendency has sent a spirit of free inquiry into every department of science and learning. I say a spirit of free inquiry, — not a sneering skepticism, seeking, either by knowing hints or sarcastic allusions, to captivate those who think themselves wise, simply because they doubt where others believe, or to impose upon the ignorant and unthinking by high-toned, dogmatical effrontery. The genius of German philosophy is a spirit of laborious, thoroughgoing investigation into the nature of things, anxious to prove all, and hold fast that which is good. Thus it has surveyed the whole territory of faith and of doubt, has inquired into the elements and the origin of all sciences, has endeavoured to analyze every conception, to examine the title of every idea we form to a freehold in the domains of truth, and to trace its pedigree in the human mind.

It would lead me too far, to give so much as an outline of all that has been done in this vast field of intellectual enterprise. One point, however, I feel bound to touch upon, because it may tend to do away a current error, with regard to the general character of German philosophy. German philosophy has been accused of a tendency to materialism and skepticism, and of leading to a denial of those spiritual realities which form the foundation of the Christian faith, —

the soul of man, and the soul of the universe. "German materialism," and "German skepticism," have been used as by-words in works, which are generally, and in some respects, justly admired. Now the fact is, that in France the whole school of modern philosophy, from Condillac and the Encyclopædists, down to Cousin, the first decided opposer of this school, consists of advocates of materialism; and in England, the same system was established by Hobbes, and indirectly promoted by Locke, until Hume converted it into absolute skepticism; while the records of German philosophy, from Leibnitz to Kant and his disciples, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, and Fries, do not exhibit the name of a single materialist or absolute skeptic. This remarkable phenomenon is not owing to a want of freedom in expressing opinions different from those laid down in established creeds, supported by government or by public opinion; for notwithstanding all the arbitrary restraints upon the expression of *political* sentiments in Germany, it is certain that there is no country in which, ever since the reformation of the church, there has been so much liberty in the profession of *philosophical* and *religious* opinions. True, this freedom of sentiment is not owing altogether to a high esteem for the rights of the mind, but in a great measure to a reprehensible indifference on these subjects, favored by the skepticism of some of the rulers, as under the reign of Frederick the Second of Prussia. But whatever be the cause of this freedom from restraint, in the expression of philosophical and religious opinions, it proves that this remarkable fact, that

among all the philosophers of Germany there has not been one materialist, cannot be ascribed to circumstances and institutions of society, but must be found in the very character of German philosophy. Indeed, if there is any thing individual and characteristic in the literature, particularly the philosophic literature of any nation, that of the Germans is signalized by its loyalty to spiritual truth, as well as by its tendency to universal comprehensiveness. The philosophic tendency of the German mind has had a decided influence upon every department of learning. Examine every branch of science, from the highest to the lowest, from the works on religion and morality to those on the cultivation of the garden, the field, and the forest, and you will find the same scientific method, — the exact and faithful workmanship of the same spirit that lives disembodied, mourning or rejoicing, sporting or worshipping, in the full and free effusions of German poetry.

In no department, however, is the spirit of German philosophy so strikingly and continually manifested, as in literary criticism. Every book of importance that is published in any quarter of the globe, is analyzed and criticized in the literary gazettes of Germany, supported chiefly by the learned men in the different universities. Their views are really what they pretend to be, not merely occasional essays, skimming over the fluctuating surface of the literary deep under a borrowed flag, but serious and strict examinations of the contents and merits of each work. This scrutiny is founded upon a thorough knowledge

of all that has been accomplished in the department to which the work belongs, separating what others have said from that which is the author's own property, and, from this original matter, selecting those results which science herself may deem worthy to call her own. No one, whether native or foreigner, can be a constant and attentive reader of the critical works of Germany, without reaping, for his own mind, an abundant reward of his industry. Borne along on the broad and deep stream of independent criticism, with a complete atlas of the literary world before you, you cannot but feel your interest kindled, your mental energies called forth and quickened, your information enlarged and consolidated, and your trust in the victorious arms of truth confirmed.

After this brief survey of philosophy, as entering into all the various departments of knowledge, I shall pass to a few remarks on particular branches of learning and literature.

Theology, the science of religion, deserves the first consideration. That religion is not a notion or a precept, inculcated by education, or by the institutions of society; that it is a native and indestructible principle of the heart; that theology is not the arbitrary fabric of a dogmatic or philosophizing imagination; that, on the contrary, it is the knowledge of the essence and source of all reality, the ultimate result of the highest metaphysical speculation, as well as of the most thorough study of nature and of man; — these primary and vital truths of divinity have been no-

where so fully acknowledged, and scientifically established, as in the works of German philosophers and theologians. Among these, I will mention only two, as the most accessible to those who are not thoroughly acquainted with the language, Herder and Jacobi.

The merits of German scholars in ecclesiastical history, Biblical criticism, and the languages in which the records of our religion are written, are sufficiently known and acknowledged by learned Christians of every denomination. Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, Griesbach's edition of the New Testament, the Dictionaries of Gesenius and Schleusner, the Commentaries of Kuinöl, Rosenmüller, and others, are in the hands of every theologian.

Still, *German theology* is held up as an object of dread by many, who make it synonymous with a denial of the divine origin and the miraculous evidences of Christianity. It is true, that skeptical views on these subjects have been held by some German theologians, who have carried historical criticism beyond its true limits, by requiring evidences of truth, which history, from its very nature, cannot afford. But to charge this unbelief of *some*, upon *all* German theologians, is not more just, than to identify the doctrines of materialism and necessity with unitarianism, because some distinguished members of this denomination have held these opinions; or to charge all Calvinists or all Roman Catholics with the spirit of religious intolerance and persecution, because some of the professors of these forms of faith have persecuted their dissenting brethren. There is in Ger-

many a great variety of individual opinion on almost every important doctrinal point, in proportion as there is less of the spirit of association and party than in other countries. Every work that is published, must generally be considered as the expression, simply, of the author's own opinion, and not as indicating the common sentiments of a portion of the community. The public is inclined, either from respect for the rights of individual judgment, or from religious indifference, to hold in esteem every one whose conduct is marked by a sense of truth, justice, and benevolence, whatever be his religious sentiments; hence every one, in expressing his own peculiar opinions, thinks chiefly of what seems true to himself, and not so much of what he shall gain or lose in society by the frank profession of his sentiments.

The great diversity of opinion, which is the natural result of such a state of society, makes it highly important for the student of German literature, particularly of theological works, to be directed in the choice of his studies by a competent guide; but it makes it, in the same degree, unjust to judge of all, or even a portion of them, by any single production. Besides, I would call to mind again what has been said of German philosophy, that materialism, or unbelief in spiritual realities, is not an indigenous, but a rare, an exotic plant in Germany; so that even those, who doubt or reject the historical facts that form the body of Christianity, still embrace its spiritual essence. Though they deny a part of divine truth, they are not infidels or unbelievers, as the followers

of Hume would be, in case they rejected the historical evidence of our religion. Indeed, such is the state of the public mind, of society, and of education, in Germany, that real infidelity, or apostasy from faith itself, or the evidence of things not seen, is not likely to occur. The charm of novelty, which, in other countries, draws numbers after the Syren song of modern atheism, does not exist in a country where a general acquaintance with the history of philosophy preserves, at least, the well educated portion of the community from the allurements of a system of seeming liberty, but of real slavery of the mind. Even the weight of political oppression, which has curbed, but not broken, the German spirit, even the unsatisfactory nature of the external state of society which meets the "sight," seems to urge the mind to "walk by faith" alone; to resolve upon a life of intellectual action and enjoyment, and to seek in the "spirit-land" the substance of the things hoped for, but hoped for in vain under the dark influence of the princes of this world. Every German, whose soul has grown in sight of the bright examples of a high, though sometimes mistaken spirit of self-sacrifice, with which the history of his nation abounds, who has listened to the voices of the living and of the dead, speaking to him through their works, feels ever compassed about by a cloud of witnesses to the reality and eternity of the things which are not seen. All the branches of his instruction, though they seem destined to bear blossoms and fruits only for this life, become so many roots to fix the tree of spiritual

life more firmly in the eternal ground of his being. For if faith, or the trust of the spirit in its own essence, is the groundwork, and if love, or a vital interest in perfection, in truth, goodness, and beauty, is the soul of religion, then it may well be said of every one who has enjoyed a German education, that his mind has been nurtured in religion, that in it he has lived, and moved, and had his very being. He feels as if his great parent, even his own father-land, had presented him early, while yet a child, to the God of his fathers, and obtained for him a blessing with promise, that the great Spirit, who made him in his own image, who gave him this hard earth for his cradle, will guide him also through its wilderness, will feed his starving soul with the bread of life and the cup of salvation, and, when made perfect by suffering and endurance to the end, will raise him again in his own likeness.

So much for the spirit and the science of religion, as manifested in German theology. Many other departments of science and learning, which have been cultivated by German industry, I can now merely glance at.

In jurisprudence, their efforts have been most successfully devoted to the civil law, a study which has, within the present century, made uncommon progress, particularly through extensive historical researches. These inquiries into the history of law, without which the actual law of any land can be but imperfectly understood, have been instituted and greatly advanced by Hugo, Savigny, and other learned jurists and his-

torians. The knowledge of the history of the civil law, in particular, has been promoted by the recent discovery of the Commentaries of Gaius, an ancient Roman lawyer of great distinction in the time of the Antonines, — a discovery which posterity will ever hold in grateful remembrance with the other eminent merits of Niebuhr, the celebrated author of the Roman History.

What Hugo Grotius has done for the law of nations, is acknowledged by all. He likewise took the first decided steps toward making the law of nature, or the doctrine of the native rights of man, an independent science; which has been successively cultivated by Puffendorf, Thomasius, Kant, Fichte, and other successful laborers in this interesting field of learning. Much light has been thrown, by German jurists and philosophers, on the elements of penal legislation, on the nature of crime and of punishment, and the adjustment of the latter to the character and degree of the former. Particularly the literary controversy between Fäuerbach and Grolman, and a number of essays, called forth by their discussions, have elucidated many of the dark and deep things in this important department of jurisprudence.

Medical science in Germany has been carried to a high degree of perfection, chiefly in consequence of a thorough and universal study of nature, particularly by comparative anatomy and physiology, a science in which every recent advancement is intimately connected with the great previous achievements of the genius and industry of Haller.

Mathematics, ever since the time of Leibnitz, have been cultivated in Germany with a truly scientific spirit, which gives to the works upon this subject their lasting classical worth. Astronomy owes much of its present advancement to German observers, and still more to German mathematicians. What they have done in this department has been placed in its true light by one whom all acknowledge as a most competent judge, in a well known article on astronomy in the "North American Review."*

One of the highest places in the catalogue of the merits of literary Germany is due to its works on history, and on the classical productions of ancient Greece and Rome. German editions of the classics, together with dictionaries, grammars, and commentaries relating to them, are spread over all Europe and in this country. What is there in ancient literature, from the minutest details to the great ideas embodied in its highest works, that has not been searched out by the matchless perseverance, and appreciated by the critical acumen and independent taste, of German philology? It is this faithful interpreter, which has enabled the German historians, those travellers through the realms of time, to trace all things to their beginnings, and thus to lead the present generation to a true knowledge of their own condition, as the point from which they must start in order to rise beyond it, and place the coming generation on a higher stage of action. The works of John von Müller and of

* North American Review, No. XLVII. for April, 1825.

Heeren have already found their way to the notice and esteem of the literary republic, all over the world, and are used as text-books in schools and universities. But the greatest German works in this department, the history of those productions of the human mind, which are peculiarly its own, — the history of philosophy, of every branch of science and literature, — these highest efforts of the retrospective genius in man, only begin to be known in other countries by extracts and translations, and in this way these too will soon become a part of general civilization.

The last remarks which I have to offer on the intellectual productions of Germany, relate to that portion of the national literature to which every native clings with the fondest preference, because it is of all the most national, — the *poetic* literature. Among the various impressions and modes of influence, which different departments of literature exercise on the formation of the youthful mind, poetry is that which resembles most the heart-winning ministrations of maternal love. Science furnishes the mind with a competent outfit for the exigencies and trials of the world; poetry imparts to the unfledged heart the power to soar above it. There is no portion of our national literature which we feel so sure that we comprehend; we are confident of possessing the inmost meaning of its words; we are desirous to have them understood by others, particularly foreigners; and yet there are none respecting which we are more reluctant to meet their unexpected calls for information. Indeed, to enter fully into the idiomatic beauties of any foreign

poetry, to catch the faintest and highest notes of this wonderful instrument, vibrating with every pulsation of the heart, to enter into that melody of thought which has over the soul of a native a power he cannot resist or account for, — thus fully to comprehend and feel the poetry of another country, like one of her own children, requires a forgetfulness of self and a devoted sympathy, rarely to be found. And yet without such an intellectual metempsychosis, you cannot enter into the very soul of another nation, which is revealed in its poetry. The judgment of parents, when speaking of the best qualities of their children, is sometimes set aside as partial; and the eulogiums, by natives, of their own national poetry, are often undervalued for the same reason. And yet this imputed partiality is, perhaps, only their deeper knowledge, the result of a penetration which love alone can give. At the risk, then, of being thought partial, I would profess my faith, that there is no thought or emotion that moves with dread or delight the æolian harp which God has placed in the bosom of man, that has not found an expression, if expression it can find at all, in the effusions of German poetry.

Among the first-fruits of German poesy, I mention the productions of the poets of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, known by the name of the Love-Singers, ("Minnesinger,") and particularly the great epic poem, of nameless origin, called the Song of the Nibelungen. It is a work, inferior to Homer's Iliad in poetic keeping, finish, and ease, but superior in the great design of the whole; and, in the delineation

of character, matched only by the dramatic energy of Shakspeare. The unequal contest of the chivalrous Burgundians with the unnumbered hosts of Attila, is the historical basis of the poem. With this, however, tradition has mixed up many tales of Gothic and Scandinavian heroes. Courage, truth, honor, trust, and love, the angels of light in the soul of man, are at war with the powers of darkness, envy, hatred, perfidy. The legions of darkness prevail; yet only to prepare for their fallen enemies the highest victory, in manifesting a spirit superior to the power of death.

In the lays of the Love-Singers you still perceive what Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they recognised in the soul of woman something divine and prophetic; not by way of adulation or idolatry, but as a principle of wisdom by which they would be guided in all their undertakings, — that childlike wisdom, which, among a multitude of the most intricate ways of the world, always chooses the right one, simply because it sees no other. In the most ancient accounts of Germany by foreigners, this admiration of female excellence is designated as one of the elements in the national character; it is the inspiring theme of the lays of the Love-Singers, those tender and elevated efforts to represent the *beau ideal* of woman, in all the simple graces of nature, arrayed in the romantic coloring with which the spirit of chivalry loves to adorn the object of its devotion, and transfigured, as it were, by the worship rendered to the Virgin Mary, as the divine pattern of womanhood.

From the time of the Love-Singers until the middle

of the last century, the spirit of poetry received but few worthy offerings from German hands. Mighty impulses, incalculable in their consequences, agitated the old institutions of society, and the minds of men. The reformation of the church in the sixteenth century, was the first powerful manifestation of the principle of freedom awaking in man, and striving to liberate his highest interests from the tyranny of presumptuous, self-constituted authority. A growing acquaintance with the classical literature of Greece and Rome matured the judgment, and cleared and rectified the taste. From a combination of these intellectual impulses, the romantic spirit of the heroic age of Germany, the influence of ancient classical literature, and the principle of freedom, which vindicated the rights of nature and of man in the real as well as in the literary world, — from this happy alliance arose in the middle of the eighteenth century, the *modern* German literature. Borne up by the independent genius of Lessing, this young national literature soon rose above the self-imposed bondage of foreign taste and manners, not in order to exchange it for a vain self-complacency in exalting the peculiarities of German life and character, but to get wisdom from every teacher, foreign or native, ancient or modern; from reason and passion, prudence and enthusiasm; — to learn from all, but to imitate none. Of those illustrious men to whom this new republic of letters owes its existence and its glory, I mention only the names of Lessing, Klopstock, Wieland, Herder, Göthe, Schiller, Richter, and Tieck. It would be doing injustice

to these worthies to take so brief a notice of their literary character, as the nature of this occasion would require ; — even if their merits were not too generally known to render it necessary.

I have now set forth the principal grounds which seem to me to entitle German literature to general attention. I have spoken of its excellences, without claiming for it any preëminence over the literature of other nations. Besides these general grounds, there are special reasons why the study of the German language and literature must be important to one whose native tongue is the English. I will conclude with a few remarks on this head.

The ancient German language is the mother of the English. This is not merely an historical fact, and a result of comparative philology ; but those words and modes of expression, in which a nation signifies its first, simplest, and deepest conceptions and wants, those home-words, which constitute alike the elements of every-day conversation, and the language of poetry, remain to this day essentially the same in both languages. Such are the words which signify what we hold most dear in life, as *man*, *wife*, *father*, *mother*, *daughter*, *son*, *brother*, *sister*, *neighbour*, *guest*, *friend*, and *God*.* Of the same description are the words expressive of the most familiar objects around us, as *house*, *hearth*, *bed*, *garden* and *field*, *earth* and *sea*, *summer* and *winter*, *day* and *night*, *sun*, *moon*,

* Mann, Weib, Vater, Mutter, Tochter, Sohn, Bruder, Schweſter, Nachbar, Gaſt, Freund, Gott.

and *star*;* also the simplest articles of nourishment, such as *bread*, *water*, *salt*, *milk*, *beer*, and *wine*;† likewise most of the parts of the body, as *arm*, *hand*, *finger* and *nail*, *flesh* and *blood*,‡ as well as the properties of the inner man, *life*, *soul*, *heart*, *will*, *feeling*, *understanding*, *wit*, and *mother-wit*,§ and innumerable other words, which show that the ancestors of both nations must have been united, not merely under one military leader, but in daily life, under the same roof, at the same fireside. Tales and stories, the wonders of Red Riding-Hood, the Glass Slipper, and many others, handed down by those learned and faithful chroniclers of the wide empire of little men, the nurses, while they lead the American child back to the home which his fathers left, carry his little cousins in England over to their father-land, even the old Saxon nursery. Proverbs and "golden sayings," the good old household furniture, and family jewels of the nation, have not yet gone so entirely out of use or fashion, as not to remind all, whose mother tongue is either English or German, of the common ancestors, from whom they are inherited.

There is a resemblance and affinity not only between the two languages, and the literary productions, of each nation, but in the very mode of perceiving and feeling them. I believe that those who have re-

* Haus, Herd, Bett, Garten, Feld, Erde, See, Sommer, Winter, Tag, Nacht, Sonne, Mond, Stern.

† Brod, Waſſer, Salz, Milch, Bier, Wein.

‡ Arm, Hand, Finger, Nagel, Fleiſch, Blut.

§ Leben, Seele, Herz, Wille, Gefühl, Verſtand, Witz, Mutter-witz.

ceived a genuine English education, are, more than other foreigners, prepared to enter fully and intimately into the idiomatical strength and beauty of the German classics ; and the further they advance, the more they perceive that in studying German, they are grounding themselves in their own language and literature. On the other hand, the mere fact that the Germans alone possess a translation of Shakspeare, which makes him, if I may so say, a native poet, and have a critical exposition of his dramas, which his own countrymen read with advantage and pleasure, — this fact alone would be sufficient to show that those works which come from the very heart of English genius, find also in Germany kindred minds, and an understanding heart.

The reasons which I have now offered as entitling German literature to general attention and interest, and especially to the study of those whose native tongue is the English, are not transient, but permanent in their nature. The German literature of the day shows that it has by no means reached its point of culmination, but is continually rising. Even now, while the earth is bright with the rich harvest of classical works, the heavenly gifts of true genius, there are young powers and talents shooting up, and mingling with the golden fruits of earlier days, — fresh leaves and buds full of promise, the hopeful pledges of years of abundance yet to come.

To acquaint the students of this university with those German authors who seem best fitted to excite their attention, and to reward it by their enlightening

and inspiring influence, — this will be the object of my lectures; and in this way, I would cherish the hope that I may in some degree do justice to the office to which I have been appointed, and to my own feelings of grateful attachment to my adopted country, as well as to my native land.

FUNERAL ORATION

ON

GASPAR SPURZHEIM. *

"It is finished." — These were the last words of the only being on earth, who, when called off from the great work assigned to him in this world, could stand before his employer, and say, "The work which thou gavest me to do, behold, I have done it." Many, very many, who are born into this world, though fitted for extensive usefulness, leave it, without having so much as begun to understand and lay hold on the great object of existence; while the most gifted and most successful of men have to close their last account, with the sad consciousness, that they leave their work unfinished. At the close of life they look back on all the great undertakings in which they had engaged, with the same mournful anticipation with which a dying parent contemplates his uneducated children. Still, their parting look upon life is cheered by the conviction, that, although they

* Delivered before the citizens of Boston, assembled at the Old South Church, November 17, 1832, at the burial of GASPAR SPURZHEIM, M. D., of the Universities of Vienna and Paris, and Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians in London.

have not finished, they at least have begun to live, and have left the germs of life to ripen in the minds of an improved and grateful posterity.

Amidst innumerable instances of ample means and noble talents neglected and abused, it is a source of consolation and of hope to meet with an individual, who, being born to great intellectual riches, employs them, not in order to establish his own superiority over others, but rather to counteract the partiality of nature, by endeavouring to elevate the condition of his fellow-men, until his own greatness be lost in the general advancement of society. It is a source of philanthropic enthusiasm to meet with an individual, who uses his superior knowledge, not to eclipse, or to dazzle, or to enslave others, but to enable and to induce all men to see the truth, that the truth may make them free. It has been *our* privilege lately to become acquainted with such a true friend of human freedom and universal happiness ; to have our minds called forth by his invigorating and inspiring energy ; while our affections grew up around him to prepare a home for the solitary stranger. Our eyes have followed his noble figure in the streets of our city ; we have sought his presence in the crowded hall, to listen with interest and delight to the original thoughts, the generous sentiments, the practical wisdom, flowing forth in rich streams of native eloquence, from the pure fountains of his soul ; and there we have waited till the crowd had dispersed, to press his hand in gratitude, for our share of the general benefit. We have seen him sitting down to sumptuous meals,

provided in honor of him, and have seen him fasting for the want of food, adapted to his simple taste. We have welcomed him at our firesides, we have seen him surrounded by our children; and the hearty applause he drew from these little hearers who listen with their hearts, and judge by their affections, has convinced us, that the charm, which had attached us to the successful lecturer, was not the spell of a great name, or of talent, learning, or eloquence; that the light, which shone in his countenance, was not the reflection of many lamps, or of admiring eyes, but that it was the spirit of truth and goodness within, which lighted up his face, and gave life and meaning to every sound, and every motion.

And of all this power of eloquence, by which words became pictures to the eye, and music to the ear, of all those bright manifestations of a mind, that had searched into the kingdoms of nature and the institutions of man, that had studied the wonderful architecture of the human frame, in order to reach the more mysterious recesses of the mind; of all these powers and charms, which, but a few days since, excited, engaged, and delighted so many of us; of that fulness of thought and action, embodied in a frame which nature herself seemed to have designed to be a strong-hold of life and health, — is there nothing left of all this? — nothing but what is enclosed in the narrow case before us?

Our hands shall let down into the grave what our eyes have seen; but that which we have known with our hearts, what we have venerated and loved, no

eye has ever seen, no hand can ever touch. The disembodied spirit has joined the invisible company of brother-spirits above; while his memory remains with us, embalmed in grateful hearts, where it has power still to stir us up to the pursuit of truth, to generous actions, to universal love.

The solemn task, to speak the praises of our departed friend, has been assigned to me, as his countryman by birth, and by adoption and domestic ties, a citizen of this country. I wish to perform this duty in *his* spirit, not attempting to present what my own mind might invent, or my personal feelings dictate; but, from the scanty records I can obtain, to give you the simple story of his life, which is his best eulogy.*

Gaspar Spurzheim was born on the 31st of December, 1775, at Longvich, a village about seven miles from the city of Treves, on the Moselle, in the lower circle of the Rhine, now under the dominion of Prussia. His father was a farmer, and in his religious persuasion a Lutheran. Young Spurzheim received his classical education at the college of Treves; and was destined, by his friends, for the profession of theology. In consequence of the war between Germany and France, in 1797, the students of that college were dispersed, and Spurzheim went to Vienna. Here he devoted himself to the study

* This account has been compiled chiefly from the writings of Gall and Spurzheim, and from an article in No. III. of the "Foreign Quarterly Review," by Richard Chenevix, published in a separate pamphlet, with notes by Dr. Spurzheim. For a number of anecdotes, illustrating his character, I am indebted to the kindness of friends.

of medicine, and became the pupil, and afterwards the associate of Dr. Gall, who was at that time established as a physician at Vienna.

This extraordinary man had been induced, by an observation made by him when a boy of nine years old, to attempt a new mode of scientific investigation. While at school, young Gall felt mortified at seeing himself surpassed by a number of his schoolfellows, in all those exercises that required verbal memory. The mortified pupil tried to find out some reason to account for this fact, that boys, who, in their other exercises, were much his inferiors, yet showed better heads in committing lessons to memory. He was struck with the observation, that those boys, who learned so easily by heart, had remarkably large and prominent eyes. The connexion of this external sign and that mental faculty occurred to him; and he inferred, that prominent eyes were a mark of good memory. This observation, insignificant in itself, led Gall to study minutely, on the one hand, the prominent talents and individual characters of men, and, on the other hand, the form of their heads. Little by little, he flattered himself that he could perceive one constant shape in the head of every great painter, every great musician, every great mechanic; severally denoting a decided predisposition in the individual to one or the other of these arts. The study of medicine, and particularly of anatomy, to which he devoted himself, soon induced him to consider the peculiar form of the skull only as the evidence and the effect of that of the brain. This part

of the human body, which had always been considered as the principal instrument of the mind, became now the chief object of Gall's investigation; and, instead of considering the whole brain, as was formerly the case, as required for each of the different manifestations of the mind, he examined each part with special reference to those prominences of the skull, which he had before perceived to be indications of particular talents and dispositions. He considered each of these parts of the brain as the particular organ of each of the different faculties of the mind, in the same manner as the eyes are the organs of sight, and the ears of hearing. Thus, from two sources of observation, from the study of the variety of talent and character, and of the organization of the brain, there arose a new science, the physiology of the brain, that is, the theory of the different parts of the brain considered as the organs or instruments of the various animal, intellectual, and moral capacities.* The physiology of the brain, which first frequently went by the name of Craniology, or the doctrine of the skull, is now more generally known by that of Phrenology, or the doctrine of the mind, by which Spurzheim preferred to designate this new science.

It was at Vienna, in the year 1800, that Spurzheim first attended a private course of lectures, which Dr. Gall had repeated, from time to time, during the four

* Hence the medal that was published at Paris after Gall's death, in 1828, bears the inscription, "AU CRÉATEUR DE LA PHYSIOLOGIE DU CERVEAU." ("To the author of the physiology of the brain.")

preceding years, in order to explain, to a select audience, his new theory of the organs and functions of the brain. The dissection of the brain itself still remained imperfect until 1804, when Spurzheim became his associate, and undertook especially the anatomical department. From that time, in their public as well as private demonstrations of the brain, Spurzheim always made the dissections, and Gall explained them to the audience.

The great interest which was excited by these lectures at Vienna, and throughout Germany, roused the fears of that inveterate enemy of all innovations, the government of Austria. An imperial decree, which prohibited all private lectures, unless by special permission, silenced the two teachers, and induced them, in 1805, to quit Vienna. They travelled together throughout Germany, explaining and demonstrating their physiological discoveries, in the principal universities and cities; particularly in Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, Heidelberg, and Munich. Their anatomical demonstrations excited everywhere great interest and applause. The great German anatomist and physiologist, Reil, before whom Gall and Spurzheim dissected a brain, in 1805, at Halle, said to Professor Bischoff, who wrote an exposition of their doctrine, "I have seen, in the anatomical demonstrations of the brain, made by Gall, more than I thought that a man could discover in his whole life." Their peculiar physiological doctrines, on the organization of the brain being adapted to various innate qualities of the mind, found many opposers, but also

some warm adherents, and gave rise to a great number of publications, in which the subject was discussed.*

In the year 1807, Gall and Spurzheim went to Paris, where they demonstrated their theory of the brain in the presence of Cuvier, then the chief of the anatomical department of the French Institute, and before many other distinguished men and learned societies. Meanwhile their collections of skulls, and casts of heads, had much increased, so that they were able amply to illustrate their doctrines of special parts of the head, as indicative of mental powers. Cuvier showed himself, at first, well disposed toward the new doctrine, and expressed his approbation of its general features. But in the year 1808, when Gall and Spurzheim delivered their memoir, containing an account of their scientific labors, to the French Institute, Cuvier was appointed to draw up the report, in which he seemed to labor to diminish, as much as possible, the merit which he was forced to allow to this new mode of dissection. It is said, that Cuvier, whose firmness and independence were by no means commensurate with his great talents, was swayed by the haughtiness of the First Consul, who had seen with displeasure, that the French Institute had awarded a prize medal to Sir Humphrey Davy for his galvanic experiments, and "at a levee,

* The first expositions of the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim were published in Germany between the years 1802 and 1805, by Froriep and Walter, Bischoff, Knoblauch, Bloede; and in Paris, in 1806, by Demangeon.

rated the wise men of his land, for allowing themselves to be taught chemistry by an Englishman, and anatomy by a German."

In Paris, Gall and Spurzheim began to publish their great work on the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system in general, and that of the brain in particular. They also continued their public lectures and demonstrations. They remained and labored together in Paris till the year 1813. In the following year Spurzheim went over to England, and gave his first public lecture in London, in the amphitheatre of Mr. Abernethy. Mr. Abernethy, though he did not give full credit to the evidence brought forward by phrenologists, to prove, that special parts of the brain are the organs of certain innate qualities of the mind, fully acknowledged the superiority of Dr. Spurzheim's anatomical demonstrations over every previous mode of dissecting the brain. I have been assured by a gentleman, who, at that time, attended Mr. Abernethy's lectures, that he directed the attention of his class to Dr. Spurzheim's anatomical labors as most important discoveries.* Still, the truly scientific method of establishing phrenology by anatomical demonstration, though it secured the respect of learned men, did not render it popular.

* Mr. Abernethy, in one of his publications, speaks of Dr. Spurzheim as "a man who had made the motives of human actions a particular study, possessing also great intellectual powers, combined with benevolence and caution in decision;" he also expresses the "great gratification he had in being intimate with Dr. Spurzheim whilst he remained in London."

From London Dr. Spurzheim went to Bath, Bristol, Cork, and Dublin, where also he delivered lectures. He then proceeded to Edinburgh. His desire to visit that city was increased by a very abusive article on phrenology, which had appeared in the "Edinburgh Review," for June, 1815, concluding with the confident assertion of the writer, that his statement of the doctrine of phrenology could "leave no doubt in the minds of honest and intelligent men, as to the real ignorance, the real hypocrisy, and the real empiricism of the author."

Dr. Spurzheim procured one letter of introduction for that city, and but one; that was to the reputed author of the vituperating essay. He visited him, and obtained permission to dissect a brain in his presence. He succeeded in convincing some of his hearers of the truth of the results of his researches. A second day was named. The room was crowded to overflowing. There, with the "Edinburgh Review" in one hand, and a brain in the other, he opposed fact to assertion. The writer of the article still believed the "Edinburgh Review," but the public believed the anatomist. Dr. Spurzheim now opened a course of lectures on the anatomy and the functions of the brain, and its connexion with the mind. He used to say to the Scotch, "You are slow, but you are sure. I must remain some time with you, and then I will leave the fruit of my labors to ripen in your hands. This is the spot from which, as from a centre, the doctrine of phrenology shall spread over Britain."

Edinburgh, the city from which the great anathema had issued against phrenology, actually became the principal seat of it. There, in 1820, a phrenological society was formed, at the head of which stands Mr. G. Combe, extensively known by his interesting works; and there a phrenological journal continues to be published.

After a residence of seven months at Edinburgh, Dr. Spurzheim returned, in 1817, to London, where his doctrine had meanwhile made many converts, and where he was made Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians. During the three years of his residence in England, he published several works on phrenology, particularly one under the title, "The Physiognomical System," of which he afterwards published an abstract, ("Outlines of the Physiognomical System.") He also wrote in defence of his principles, his "Examination of the Objections made in Great Britain against Phrenology."

Dr. Spurzheim returned to Paris in 1817, where he gave lectures on the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the brain. He also devoted himself to the practice of medicine, and visited, in this capacity, several American families then residing in Paris. Still the medical profession did not seem to be his favorite occupation. At the same time he published some new works in French, and became Doctor of Medicine at the university of Paris, in 1821.*

* He published a work, "*Sur la Folie*"; another, "*Sur la Phrenologie*"; another, "*Essai philosophique sur la nature morale et intellectuelle de l'homme*"; besides his medical dissertation, "*Du cerveau sous les rapports anatomiques.*"

In Paris Dr. Spurzheim married a lady of great merit. She was a widow, and had three daughters when he married her. Dr. Spurzheim had no children of his own. Several ladies of this city, who were introduced to Mrs. Spurzheim in Paris and in London, remember her with the highest esteem and delight. Her whole manner expressed a union of true humility, tender attachment, and conscious power, which excited at once affection and confidence. She entered fully into her husband's pursuits, and aided him by her uncommon skill in drawing. To her pencil we are indebted for a number of those excellent drawings used by Dr. Spurzheim in his lectures. But far more important to him was the aid which he derived from the unseen and inexhaustible treasures of a true and devoted heart. It was often observed how well their characters seemed to be fitted for each other. They were both adepts in that profoundest of all sciences, and most pleasing of all the fine arts, — Christian benevolence shown forth in beautiful manners. It is characteristic of Dr. Spurzheim, that one of the reasons which influenced him in the choice of his wife, was the knowledge that she had undergone great suffering, which he thought essential to the perfection of human nature. An ancient philosopher thought that no one could become a good physician, who had not himself endured many diseases. Whatever be the merits of this speculation as regards the medical profession, it is certainly true in morals, — that no one can so readily perceive and deeply understand, and so successfully alleviate the

sufferings of others, as he who is himself a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. Dr. Spurzheim was devotedly attached to his wife, and he remained so after her death to the end of his own life. While he was in this country, though surrounded by many whom he had soon made his friends, he often mourned the loneliness of his situation, particularly when indisposition, or fatigue, made him long after those small services of domestic affection and ever watchful care, of which those who devote themselves wholly to one of the great general interests of mankind, be it the cause of religion or of science, stand in special need, — that wholesome atmosphere of constant love, the absence of which seems to be felt more painfully the more unconscious we are while we inhale it. In his last sickness, he, in a mournful manner, ascribed his illness to the want of warm linen on his return from his lectures, saying, with a sigh, that if his wife had been living, it would have been before the fire ready for him. The disease of his heart he ascribed to his loss of her, saying, his pulse had intermitted ever since her death.

The death of his wife, which took place about three years since, seemed to remind him more strongly that his life and his labors belonged to all mankind, whose vital interests he thought most effectually to promote by developing particularly the principles of education, morality, and religion, to which his studies of human nature had led him. He had visited England again in 1825, and was engaged partly in lecturing, and partly in the publication of different books. The first

work he had published in England, "The Physiognomical System," contained several summary views of different branches of anthropology, which he now endeavoured to make more generally appreciated, by extending the principal chapters, and making them separate books. In one of them, "Phrenology," he treats of the different powers of the mind, and their cerebral organs, in general. A smaller book, "Outlines of Phrenology," is an abstract of that work. The two principal doctrines of Phrenology, that of the brain, and that of the mind, were carried out in different works.

In his "Anatomy of the Brain," he laid down his and Gall's investigations of the brain and the nervous system. On the other hand, the doctrine of the mind, with its practical bearings on religion and morality, is carried out in his "Philosophical Principles of Phrenology." The same principles, in a more condensed and practical form, are set forth in his "Philosophical Catechism of the Natural Laws of Man." The subject of education, on which he rested all his philanthropic hopes, was treated of in his "Elementary Principles of Education," a book full of the most important information, and excellent counsel. The deranged functions of the brain is the subject of his interesting work on "Insanity," for which his frequent visits at the Insane Hospitals afforded him a great number of important observations. All the works which Dr. Spurzheim edited after his separation from Dr. Gall, in the year 1813, show a spirit of free and indefatigable inquiry. The improvement in the anatomy of the

brain was chiefly Spurzheim's work ; he also discriminated more minutely between different faculties of the mind which Gall had confounded, and he endeavoured to point out their relation to the developement of the brain ; he moreover brought method and order into the scattered doctrines of phrenology.

So great was the interest excited by his lectures, on his second visit to England, that in 1826, when he delivered his course in London, " not only the large lecture-room of the London Institution, but all the staircases, corridors, and passages leading to it, were filled with hearers. Still, from the nature of the science itself, which requires constant, extensive, and minute study, it was to be expected that many of those who had been induced to embrace it either by the eloquence of the celebrated teacher, or by a partial success in their own phrenological divinations, relaxed in their scientific pursuits ; and a number of phrenological societies, formed during the full tide of popularity, dwindled away until they wholly disappeared. Still, in Edinburgh, which city Dr. Spurzheim again visited in 1828, the study of phrenology is pursued with unabated ardor and diligence. From England Dr. Spurzheim returned to Paris, where he continued to lecture, and where he had collected a large phrenological cabinet.

In the summer of the present year, Dr. Spurzheim came to this country, where lectures on phrenology had been delivered long before his arrival, and a phrenological society formed at Philadelphia. On board the ship he proved himself a friend in need to

a number of poor emigrants; many of whom being taken sick on their passage, experienced his kind and successful medical assistance. Dr. Spurzheim arrived at New York on the 6th of August, in the heat of summer, while the cholera was raging there, and immediately went on to New Haven, where he stopped a few days. A letter from one of the most eminent men of Yale College, in whose family Dr. Spurzheim spent much of his time, speaks of the "amiable, winning simplicity of his manners, and his unpretending good sense and good feeling." From New Haven he came on to this city, with which he felt already familiar, through a number of Bostonians with whom he had become acquainted in Europe. He intended to stay in this country about two years, to lecture in the principal towns, then to visit the different tribes of our Indians; and at last to return to Paris. The easy access which that city presents to so many treasures of science, and its being the place of residence of some of his most intimate friends, gave rise, now and then, to feelings of homesickness; which were soon merged, however, in that universal benevolence, which made him consider any portion of the human family with which he happened to be connected, and to whom he could do some good, as his nearest relatives.

The time of Dr. Spurzheim's residence amongst us, is familiar to so many of my hearers, that I shall confine myself to those points which, if they be rightly improved by us, will be a lasting benefit to this community. Permit me to make some remarks; first,

on his lectures, and then on his private life and character, and his death.

He delivered in Boston one course of lectures on the anatomy of the brain, principally for medical men; and two courses of popular lectures on phrenology, one in Boston and another in Cambridge, which he had nearly completed, when death overtook him in the midst of his labors. In his anatomical demonstration of the brain, he endeavoured to unfold the design of nature in the complicated structure of this organ, by tracing its gradual developement from its lowest and simplest beginning in the spinal marrow, to its continually increasing, various, and harmonious ramifications. This scientific demonstration of the brain, which was made without any reference to the peculiar doctrines of phrenology, together with his discoveries of some of the constituent parts of this organ, obtained for Dr. Spurzheim here the same high respect as an anatomist of the brain, which had been accorded to him in Europe, by the eminent men in that department.

Of his lectures on phrenology, which were attended by large numbers of our fellow-citizens, it would be vain to attempt to give an account that would in any degree satisfy those who enjoyed the high privilege of hearing from his own living lips the results of his original and vast inquiries. Who but he, whose lips are now sealed in death, could set forth his ideas with that natural eloquence, which seemed to annihilate the difference between words and things, with those accents, so full of impressive earnestness, and per-

suasive sweetness, which made natives listen to the broken English of a foreigner with the same intense delight with which a stranger, far from home, hears the sounds of his mother-tongue, and the voice of a friend.

Instead of entering into a minute criticism of the peculiar opinions advanced in these lectures, I will only set before you the general character, and the ultimate object of all his teaching. His mode of reasoning was that which Bacon pointed out as the only way to arrive at truth. He rejected all metaphysical speculations which turned only upon nominal distinctions; for his maxim was to seek things, not words, (*res non verba.*) Theory, he thought, could teach nothing but what is taught by nature. Nothing but facts, the results of actual observation, he considered as established truths; — all doctrines contrary to observation, he rejected as false; every other supposition he thought more or less probable, as it was more or less confirmed by observation.

From the first observation made by Gall, which gave rise to the new doctrine of mental functions and their cerebral organs, it was natural that the inquiries of phrenologists should be directed chiefly to three subjects. Their studies were directed, on the one hand, to the actual structure of the brain, as ascertainable by anatomical demonstration; and on the other, to the variety of dispositions and talents among men. The conformity between certain forms of the brain and particular dispositions and talents, was the third object of inquiry, strictly designated the *physiology* of the brain.

The importance of Gall's and Spurzheim's anatomical demonstrations has been recognised by competent judges, though not all have allowed them the same degree of merit. The observations upon different dispositions and talents, which are laid down in their works, are highly interesting and instructive; and their merit will be acknowledged by all observers of human nature, and experienced judges of character. The remarks of Gall and Spurzheim on the conformity between the manifestations of the mind and the developement of the brain, have been received with more or less credit by able and fair-minded inquirers; while some, who are ready to approve or condemn without troubling themselves with a previous strict examination, have either blindly adopted, or wantonly ridiculed, the doctrine. Many have abandoned the study altogether, either because they saw that it required more time and effort than they were able to bestow upon it, or because they were disgusted with the blind zeal of some, and feared the sarcasm or supercilious compassion of others. Still the fear of being classed among the "second rate" men in science, will not prevent the true student of nature from thoroughly examining a theory which pretends to be derived from no other source, and has a right to be tried by no other standard, than a careful observation of facts which are in the reach of every inquirer.

Whether the system, in consequence of repeated observation, be generally approved or rejected, it may be presumed that the consequences of its triumph, or its defeat, will hardly verify all the predictions of

its friends, or its enemies. If Gall's and Spurzheim's theory of the conformity between the brain and the mind, should be found substantially true, it will occupy the highest place among the different branches of physiology, and will present a new and most important evidence of the providential adaptation of matter to mind. It will also open a new way of studying human nature and individual character. Still its results will never amount to more than probable conjectures, and will, consequently, not supersede, or render less important, the common mode of ascertaining that which is in man, by the light of experience and history, particularly by observing the operations of our own minds, by means of which we are enabled to understand and estimate the actions and professions of others. With regard to moral philosophy, the works of Gall and Spurzheim will convince all of the great importance of the study of nature, and particularly of physiology, in order to arrive at sound views of morality. But the influence of the peculiar doctrines of phrenology upon ethics will hardly be so great as its authors anticipated. Though the works of Spurzheim abound in noble and salutary views and precepts, yet the great subject which lies at the foundation of moral philosophy, the moral free-agency and responsibility of man, cannot be determined by the physiology of the brain, however true to nature.

On the other hand, if a deeper study of nature should lead to a general rejection of phrenology, still all those important facts and principles which, though advanced by phrenologists, are independent of their

peculiar doctrines, will endure ; and among them Dr. Spurzheim's principles of education will ever hold a distinguished place. The merits of Gall and Spurzheim as anatomists and observers of man, will not be forgotten ; nay, they will probably be more freely acknowledged, since death has removed both the master and his more eminent disciple from the field of strife, and thus put a solemn veto upon all personal and party excitement, which has hitherto intermingled with the discussions about phrenology.

The speculative and practical inferences which Dr. Spurzheim has drawn from his view of the innate powers of man, would require more time to discuss, than the present occasion allows. I shall confine myself, in this summary account, to the general tendency, and the ultimate object, of his teaching ; together with such practical inferences, and moral precepts, as were illustrated by his own conduct.

There was one thing which he thought most needful for us, and for all men, to learn and study ; and another, which of all things he deemed the most important to accomplish or to strive after. If we sum up all that he taught us of the harmony and variety of our physical organization, of the temperaments, the animal, intellectual, and moral faculties ; was not all this instruction given for the single object of teaching us, or rather inducing us to study, the *nature of man* ? And if we think over all he taught of education, of natural morality and religion, we find that the practical end of all his inquiries was the *improvement* and *happiness of man*. Whatever be the merit of some

of his positions, it is certain that the great final object of his life and his labors was no other than to promote the knowledge of human nature, and the improvement and happiness of mankind.

Universal benevolence, entire self-devotion of each individual to the whole family of man, was the burden of his life and of his philosophy. Thus he says concerning the relative excellence of different virtues; "That which interests the whole human kind is eminently superior to all the rest. True it is, indeed, that this is generally lost sight of altogether. In the appreciation of the virtues, the scale of their worth is commonly reversed. Most men think first of themselves, then of their families, then of their country, and seldom expend a thought upon humanity at large. There are even few who recognise the happiness of the species as the aim of man's existence, and the subordination of all else to this. Yet nature shows most evidently that she does all for the species; she universally sacrifices individuals to its preservation. Moreover, desire of self-preservation inheres in all animals, love of family and of country in a smaller number, but love of the entire species is a distinguishing character of man in his best state."

Being asked what peculiar effect he thought his system had on his own mind, he said, that without it he would have been a misanthrope; that the knowledge of human nature had taught him to love, respect, and pity his fellow-beings. Those who have attended his lectures, will never forget, how his countenance was lighted up with joy, whenever he spoke

of a trait of kindness, evinced by any being, whether he was looking up at the noble head of Oberlin, or pointing at the skull of a little dog, that had been remarkable for his kindly disposition; and how the light of his countenance suddenly changed into darkness, and his voice almost failed him, when, with averted looks and hand, he pointed at the portrait of the man who murdered his own mother.

In going out to Cambridge to lecture, he occasionally forgot what he owed to himself in the care of his health; but he never forgot the horse that carried him there; his first care was to see it warm and safe under shelter. He expressed both pity and indignation, when he saw horses forced to draw a load that was beyond their strength.

If he saw a child, whose head or conversation indicated extraordinary power of intellect, he would not rest until he had found the parents, and warned them against the danger of exciting the mental faculties, and urged upon them the importance of attending chiefly to the physical and moral education of their child.

In his visits to our schools, he always dwelt, with great satisfaction, on the method of those instructers who made love the guiding principle of education; and he strongly disapproved of authority and ambition being made to take the place of a sense of duty and enlightened benevolence.

He was always anxious, perhaps over anxious, not to give trouble to any one. His considerate and tender regard for the feelings of others, made him

peculiarly alive, not only to the present, but even to the future sufferings to which their individual character and sensibility might expose them. To a young friend, whom Dr. Spurzheim found enthusiastically devoted to the cause of education, he said, "My friend, let me give you an advice. You are full of enthusiasm. I too, when I was young, was a great enthusiast; so that I could not comprehend how any person could question or treat with indifference what I believed important and true. Learn from my experience how to preserve your enthusiasm. Do not let it go abroad; otherwise you will diminish the influence of what you hold sacred and dear; because people will set you down as an enthusiast. So when you go to lecture, or in society, be a calm and reasoning man; but when you return home to your study, there set your enthusiasm free, and let it be to you a mighty impulse to strong and high exertion."

To the end of his life he showed himself grateful for every kind service; and his own sufferings seemed to remind him more strongly of those of others. "Poor human nature," he exclaimed, a few days before his death, "how I pity them." His sympathy was equally hearty, whether it was called forth by the sorrows or the joys of others. Still, his interest in the sufferings, seemed more keen and lively, than his feeling for the joys, of others; and sometimes, when surrounded by domestic happiness, a shade of sadness would pass over his delighted countenance, as if the sight of happiness reminded him of what he had lost.

The benevolence of Dr. Spurzheim was not a

matter of favor, that covets favor in return, but an enlarged sense of justice, a heartfelt recognition of what was due to every being, to every creature of God. This sense of justice is remarkably displayed in his work on education. It is not confined merely to an impartial treatment of children ; but he aimed at doing justice to the individual talents and character of each child. He wished that all should be equally instructed in the rudiments of learning ; but that each individual should be educated with especial care for that profession or occupation for which nature herself had endowed him. He urged the importance of doing justice to the animal nature of the child by a judicious physical education ; and, above all, of cultivating the moral nature, as being of far greater importance than the intellectual or the animal properties. He found fault with many of our establishments of instruction, partly on account of the want of a sound physical education, and an exclusive attention to the cultivation of the intellect, and partly because the general standing and character of a scholar was judged of by a partial standard, be it his memory of words or places, or his attainments in mathematics or foreign languages. This enlarged and enlightened sense of justice was manifest, not only in laying down general principles, but in his every-day conduct and manners. He knew that men are much more inclined to be kind than just ; and he always chose for himself, in preference, the performance of that duty which required the greater effort and self-denial. It is certainly not going too far if we say, that his anx-

ious desire to fulfil his engagements in Boston and in Cambridge was the chief cause of his death. Though oppressed by indisposition, and contrary to the intreaties of his medical friends, he continued to lecture ; and once, in his last sickness, he started up with the intention of dressing himself to go to Cambridge.

All, who have attended his course, remember the unwearied kindness with which he was wont to hear and answer any question that was put to him at the close of his lecture, by any one of his hearers, even when he was quite exhausted. It sometimes happened, that, while he was attending to the inquiries of some person unknown to himself, and not distinguished in society, he was addressed by another, a great and distinguished man. But he never attended to the second inquirer until he had satisfied the first, as though he were the great and distinguished man.

He never would allow any one who was truly desirous of studying his system, to be excluded from his lectures by poverty ; and was always glad, in such a case, to give tickets. He intrusted several of his friends with a number of tickets for such persons as they knew to be desirous of studying phrenology, and too poor to attend his lectures ; and he added the special request, that their names might not be mentioned to him, lest their feelings should be hurt by the favor he had bestowed. At one time, just before he began his course in Boston, he presented a ticket to one of his friends, who would not accept it, because he thought Dr. Spurzheim should have the full

benefit of his lectures; but he advised Dr. Spurzheim to give a ticket for the first lecture to a gentleman then in Boston, who belonged to another town, which Dr. Spurzheim proposed to visit. Dr. Spurzheim objected, that this gift might seem to be a means of anticipating a favorable reception for himself in that place.

Another distinguishing trait of Dr. Spurzheim's mind and character was his sole regard for truth, from whatever sources it might be derived, and to whatever results it might lead. In one of his works he proposes the question, "What should be the aim of every description of study?" He answers, "The establishment of truth, and the attainment of perfection"; and he quotes the saying of Confucius, "Truth is the law of heaven, and perfection is the beginning and end of all things." Some of us may remember the words with which he began one of his lectures: "I do not want you to believe what I propose to you; I only want you to hear what I have to say; and then go into the world, and see, and judge for yourselves, whether it be true. If you do not find it true to nature, have done with phrenology; but if it be true, you cannot learn it one minute too soon." At another time he said, "Error may be useful to a few, but truth is beneficial to all; and I prefer the good of the many to the advantage of the few."

As his own views, whether true or erroneous, were the results of a long and faithful study of nature, he also desired his hearers to adopt them on the authori-

ty of no other teacher. He heartily disliked what he called "sheep-converts." He wished that his science should be studied as a part of physiology; and anxiously endeavoured to prevent its becoming an instrument of quackery and soothsaying, in the hands of the ignorant and presumptuous. He therefore constantly refused the requests of those, who wished him to point out their own characters, or those of others; and earnestly advised his too ardent disciples to learn and reflect, before they set out to teach and practise.

All the writings and the lectures of Dr. Spurzheim were marked by the decidedly religious tendency of his mind. One chief distinction between his and Gall's doctrine, upon which he laid great stress, was this, that Gall admitted an organ and innate propensity for theft, and one for murder, whilst Spurzheim expressed his conviction, that the good Creator could not have given an organ for evil; that all powers were intended for good, though by abuse they might become instruments of mischief. Whatever particular form of faith he may have preferred, he firmly believed in the essential truths of natural and revealed religion. He adopted Christianity as a divine system, chiefly on the ground of its great internal evidence, its perfect adaptation to human nature, and the spirit of truth and divine philanthropy which gives life to all its precepts. All morality, he thought, was contained in those two precepts, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbour as thyself. All prayers, he thought, were comprised in this one, — "Father, thy will be done."

The great aim of all his inquiries into human nature was to search out the will of God in the creation of man. Obedience to his laws he considered as the highest wisdom and the most expansive freedom. In speaking of theories of men's invention, he remarked, "We say a great deal, and we think we do a great deal; we would be wise above what is given, and work upon the works of God; but it is all nothing. Thy will be done! The Father is always overlooked. We look to him, perhaps, amid great trials and on great occasions; but not in smaller things. We say, 'they are too little.' It is this in which we err. Can any thing that concerns his children be too little for a *Father?*"

Religion, he thought, must be the result of the freest and most exalted use of our reason. To those who would exclude reason from the dominion of religion, he said, "Reason is the noble gift by which the Creator has distinguished man from all other animated things. God, who is all wisdom and all reason, could never create man in his own likeness, as it is said he did, and then forbid the employment of the very faculties which must form a principal feature in the resemblance."

I cannot refrain here from quoting a passage from a manuscript, to which, on any other occasion than this, I should not feel authorized to recur. It is a letter from an aged lady, now residing in Paris, an old and faithful friend of Dr. Spurzheim, which he received a few days before his death. What she writes in confidence to her absent friend, will best

show the opinion of those who stood nearest to him, concerning his religious character.

Speaking of the poor emigrants, who came over in the same vessel, she says, "That you, my dear friend, have rendered yourself, on board the vessel, so useful by your talent as a physician, ought to reconcile you to the medical science. Many of these poor men would, perhaps, have perished without your aid; and the fact, that all were saved, is for you no small blessing." She then goes on expressing her compassion for the situation of the poor emigrants, and only wishes that their souls might have been ministered to by pious and enlightened preachers of the Gospel, as their bodies were, by his watchful care. "You, my friend, who are so well acquainted with Holy Writ, must confess, that, by not receiving the divine Word, many men have been made wretched."

While Dr. Spurzheim resided in Boston, he spent his time chiefly in preparing and delivering his lectures, and in visiting our public institutions, our hospitals, prisons, house of industry, churches, and schools. He was also present at the public exhibitions of our university, and showed a hearty interest in every effort at improvement, in individuals and in the community. His heart was with us in every attempt at improving our laws, at keeping up the purity of morals in the community, reforming the vicious, raising the condition of the poor, and particularly in the education of the young, in which he was desirous of aiding us by the results of his own observation and reflection. His modesty and his habits of patient in-

vestigation prevented him from judging hastily of what he noticed in this country ; he preferred waiving his decision until further observation and experience should enable him to form more correct notions. Still, he was always willing frankly to express his own opinion of what he had observed, whenever he thought that the light in which he viewed it, might be of some use to others. Whenever he expressed an opinion on the characters of men, he always showed an uncommon power of discerning, not only the striking points, but even the nicer combinations of different moral and intellectual qualities.

He was pleased to find that our wealthy men generally had made their fortunes by their own industry, and that the laws of the land prevented the accumulation of wealth in the same families. The free institutions of our country gave him great satisfaction, and he frequently spoke of the advantage of a residence in the United States for bringing up children, presenting as it did the encouraging prospects of repose and freedom from political tumult, at least during the present generation. But he said, unless self-esteem and the love of distinction were checked, and unless, in the place of ambition, conscientiousness and feelings of respect and veneration were called forth and cultivated in the young, we should end in fighting.

The great exertions which Dr. Spurzheim made during his residence in Boston, proved at last too powerful even for his strong and vigorous constitution, which seemed more energetic in proportion to his labors, while it was actually sinking under them. Be-

sides his course on the anatomy of the brain, which he delivered at the Medical School, he lectured every day, alternately, at the Boston Athenæum, and at Cambridge. The great physical and mental effort during the delivery of his lectures, was obvious from the large drops that rolled down his face, forming a striking contrast with the easy, calm, systematic, persuasive, and sportive character of his delivery. But these efforts brought on an exhaustion of his system, which was rendered dangerous by his frequent rides at night, when returning home from his lectures. At one of his last lectures in Boston, (the beautiful lecture on charity and mutual forbearance,) while he was diffusing light and warmth among his hearers, he was seen suddenly shivering. From that time his illness increased, he grew more feverish, but he continued to lecture, contrary to the entreaties of his friends, saying, that he would not disappoint his hearers, and that the exertion would help him to throw off his indisposition. From the beginning of his course, the number of his hearers had been continually increasing with every lecture; at last he exchanged his lecture room, the Athenæum, for the large hall in the Temple. He had finished his course of lectures in this city with the exception of one; and in order to prevent any uncertainty with regard to the place where he was to give his concluding lecture, and desirous of consulting the wishes of his hearers, before he left the hall, he inquired of them, "In what place shall we meet next time?" — He knew not that there was no human voice that could rightly answer this question.

He returned from this lecture to his lodgings, not to leave them again. All that medical aid and the devoted services of friendship could do for him was faithfully performed. He was constantly attended by a number of our most eminent physicians, and by friends from Boston and Cambridge, who took care of him day and night. His faith in the medical aid of nature was stronger than in that of men, and he refused repeatedly to use the remedies proposed. He manifested at times great impatience at little disappointments, which he had not evinced in health; and this state of mind passed almost insensibly into delirium, particularly in the night. But, as long as he was master of his faculties, he gratefully acknowledged the kind assiduity of his friends; and though he occasionally showed irritability when his wishes were not strictly complied with, he never murmured at his sickness, but awaited its issue with entire submission.

When his sickness began to grow more dangerous, he said to one of his best friends, "I must die." The other said, "I hope not;" and he replied, "O yes, I must die; I wish to live as long as I can, for the good of the science; but I am not afraid of death." Two letters, which he received a short time before his death, from some of his intimate friends in Paris, so entirely overcame his feelings, that he could read only a part, and then laid them down, weeping.

The delirium, which had been continually increasing during the first part of his illness, gradually gave way to a stupor settling upon him toward its close, from which he however occasionally revived; partic-

ularly once, a short time before death, when a friend of his addressed him in his mother tongue.

On his death-bed, the same day on which he died, I saw him with his hands folded upon his breast, while deep tranquillity was resting on his uplifted countenance, as if saying within himself, "Father, thy will be done." He died without a groan or a misgiving.

Such were the life, death, and character of Gaspar Spurzheim. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his life, on the tenth of this month, at eleven o'clock in the evening. He died, as his pious friend has said, supported by the tenderest care of earthly friends, in the arms of his heavenly Father. He died far from his native land, in the midst of strangers, — strangers who are now weeping over him as a brother that has left them, and whose face they shall see no more, until they join him in their Father's house.

Among the friends who, on the morning after Dr. Spurzheim's death, met at his lodgings, there were some artists, earnestly engaged in copying the outlines of his face. If they were anxious to rescue from the hand of death, and to save from oblivion, at least some traces of that noble and benign countenance, should we not cherish the living image, the impress of himself, which he has left in our own grateful recollection? It is the recollection of a man without rank, or wealth, or power; not a native of this country, in whose merits patriotic pride could find a cause of self-admiration; but a foreigner, who came to this country not in order to fight its battles, or to open some new source of wealth, but solely to aid us in achieving our

intellectual and moral independence. Whatever be the merit of the system he taught, though it were nothing more than a warning against seeking truth in the same path which he struck out and pursued, yet he has done all that can make a man a helper and an example to his fellow-man; he has descended deep and worked hard and long in the mines where he hoped to find the hidden treasure, and where he saw his light, and followed after it until it vanished.

His death, then, is a source of deep sorrow to all; while those who were intimate with him, have each a special share in the common sorrow. There are not a few who, on looking back on the short time that this man walked amongst us, and upon the power of thought and affection which he called forth, will view his labors amongst us as a series of moral miracles, the age of which, God be thanked, has not yet passed. Then let us cherish the remembrance of the lively and intense interest with which we once thronged around the living, and the just and sacred sorrow which now unites us around the dead. Let us prove ourselves the true followers of him whose life was a pilgrimage after truth, and who died in its service. Let us be his followers indeed; not blindly adopting his doctrines, or his authority, for he himself would disown such disciples. Let us not resemble the crusaders of old, fighting for the sepulchre, instead of striving after the spirit of him who was risen; but let us take up the fallen standard from the hands of the dead, and follow the leader in our own breast. So

let us work together, and worship, though it be with a veil upon our minds, until He who knows the end from the beginning, shall say, "It is finished," and the veil of the inner temple be rent in twain; and He himself shall show us when and where we shall meet again.

ADDRESS

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY.*

With all the deference which is due from individuals to society, to the great union of free and intelligent beings, on whose sympathy, respect, and protection they depend; with all the confidence inspired by the defence of a cause which requires, for its complete success, nothing but an impartial hearing; with all the fervent hope, all the fearful solicitude for the destinies of mankind, wrapt up in the fate of this country, we, the humble and devoted advocates of the oppressed, address you, our fellow-citizens, in behalf of more than two millions of men, our countrymen, whom we, the people of these United States, have doomed to absolute and perpetual bondage.

What is the burden of our address, — the object of our petition? Is it to provoke or offend; — is it to wrong, or to desire to wrong our neighbour; —

* An Address to the People of the United States on the Subject of Slavery; as reported by a Committee of the New England Anti-Slavery Convention, held in Boston on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of May, 1834.

is it to slander; — is it to set ourselves up above others, as if we were better than they; — is it to disturb the peace, or to loosen or to dissolve the Union; — is it to promote divisions, and to stimulate our different classes to discord, — the North against the South, — the East against the West, — the enslaved American against the free American, — or the colored man against the white? No, it is none of these.

It is our object, in the first place, to set before you the nature and consequences of slavery; not in order to convince you that slavery is an immeasurable evil, for this would be as useless as an attempt to persuade you that liberty is an inestimable good. But we wish to impress you with the idea, that we cannot hold this simple and incontestible truth with impunity, that we drink the cup of freedom to our own condemnation, — unless we are willing to confess and repair our wrongs; unless we resolve to act in obedience to the law of liberty which we have proclaimed, and by which we must be judged.

Every Fourth of July is to us a day of exultation for what we have done, and a day of humiliation for what we have left undone. The Declaration of Independence, which is read throughout our land, bears record to our glory, our shame, our inconsistency. It proves the unlawfulness of the government established over the slave, in the same terms in which it justifies the self-government of the free. For it asserts, that all government among men derives its just powers from the *consent of the governed*; that it is in-

stituted to secure the *inalienable rights* of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, with which all men are endowed *equally* by their *Creator*.

These self-evident truths, set forth in that document of philanthropic wisdom and heroism, are borne out by the testimony of inspiration. Let us place, side by side, the law of the white man, concerning his colored fellow-man, and the law of God, concerning all his children.

God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Negro slavery denies God in man; the children do not recognise their Father's likeness, because it has pleased Him to set it in a dark frame.

The Son of God says, "Be not ye called masters; for one is your Master; one is your Father; and all ye are brethren." This universal brotherhood, established by the God of nature, the Father of spirits, has it induced the white man, the professed Christian, to see, in his colored fellow-man, a child of God, to be respected and loved by him as he respects and loves himself? Look at the history of negro slavery. All its authentic records, all its unpublished volumes, may be summed up in one sentence. The white man, the professed Christian, has treated his brother, the colored man, first, as a beast of prey, and then as a beast of burden and of draught.

The Son of man further says, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." And "with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." To do unto others

as we would have them do unto us, — if this be the great law of justice by which we shall be judged, — what must we think, we do not say of the *men*, for we would not interfere between them and their own consciences, — but what must we think of the *laws* of our slaveholding states and territories, which the white inhabitants have made, and which the whole country has sanctioned? The law secures to the white man, the poorest as well as the richest, whatever property he inherits, or gains by his own industry, or by exchange with others. The earnings of the slave, the fruits of his life-wasting industry, are not his own; he inherits nothing but slavery, he bequeaths nothing but slavery; he himself is the product of slave-breeding industry, a marketable and hereditable commodity. Is this doing unto others as we would have them do unto us? The ties of domestic affection, the covenant of nature, which binds to each other husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister, are acknowledged by public opinion, by the enlightened sentiments of mankind, as the highest incentives to individual industry, the richest source of social enjoyment, the main support of order, mutual good will, and improvement in society. The voice of nature and of reason has sanctioned the privacy of domestic life, and has placed the law of the land, like a cherub with a flaming sword, before the garden of life. But the law of the land, which declares the house of the white man his "castle," and guards it against the threats of intruders by imprisonment and death, — the same law, like a faithless

sentinel, admits to the unguarded dwelling of the colored man, every selfish and brutal passion, if it bears the color of legalized oppression; it licenses the profanation of all that is sacred and dear to the wretched victim of avarice and prejudice. Though conjugal fidelity, parental and filial affection, and brotherly love, be all placed in one scale, it seldom, if ever, fails to kick the beam, if the market price be put in the other. Is this doing unto others as we would have them do unto us? All civil and political power is in the hands of the white man; the colored man has none. He is compelled to live under rulers in whose election he has no voice, under laws in whose enactment he is permitted to take no part, and under the verdict and judgment of courts which are constituted wholly by others, and where he is not allowed to defend himself by his own oath, or that of those of his own color. Is this doing unto others as we would have them do unto us?

The foundation of all rights, the right of personal independence and self-ownership, by which every human being is invested with the free use and disposal of his own body and his own soul, is denied to the slave. Resistance against violence, the natural right of self-defence, the right of the husband and the father to protect the virtue of his wife and child, — if it be exercised by the colored man against the white, is deemed worthy of death. The right and duty of every human being to improve his mind, for which schools and associations for the advancement and diffusion of knowledge are established throughout our

land, the cultivation of the intellectual nature of man, is secured only to the free man. The simple art of reading, which enables every one to appropriate to himself what other men have done for the elevation and happiness of mankind, is withheld from the slave. The law, in some parts of our country, threatens death, even to the master himself, who should persist in teaching his slave to read. The safety of the slave State is thought to require this prohibition. The knowledge of the alphabet might enable the slave to find out, from the Declaration of American Independence, and from the word of God, that, by Divine right, and by the fundamental law of this country, every man is a freeman. If, indeed, the master should give his consent, which he may refuse or retract at any time, that Christianity should be taught to the slave, it is only such Christianity, rather such a religion, as is consistent with slavery. Is this doing unto others as we would have them do unto us? In the only case of importance, in which the law acknowledges a crime committed against a slave, as a crime, and threatens punishment to the offender, the case of murder, it affords but feeble protection to the life of the slave. The law enables the master to free himself from punishment, by showing that the slave came to his death in consequence of moderate castigation. Nay, the law secures impunity to the offender in almost every case of offence committed by a white against a colored man, by *rejecting black testimony against white crime*.

If doing unto others as we would be done by, is

indeed the eternal standard of natural justice between man and man ; what right have we, the freemen of this country, to our property, our families, our political privileges, to the possession of our own bodies and souls, while we persevere in denying the same privileges and blessings to our colored fellow-men ? In strict justice, he who strips his unoffending fellow-man of his natural and civil rights, forfeits his own.

Enough has been said on the simple truth, that slavery is in itself unjust, that it is a crime against human nature, a moral impossibility. That the effects of slavery are no better than the cause, would be readily believed on supposition, even if experience and history did not supersede all speculation on this subject.

The evil consequences of slavery have been most deeply felt and forcibly set forth by slaveholders themselves. Its influence on the various branches of industry, particularly on agriculture and manufactures, is plainly delineated on the face of our country. The condition of our slaveholding States, compared with that of the free, the contrast between the two great States on the banks of the Ohio, and between the western and eastern portion of Virginia, are facts too obvious and conclusive to require an elaborate treatise on the comparative advantages of free and slave labor.

And what are the natural effects of slavery on the mind and disposition of the master and the slave ? A restless dissatisfaction, or a brutal contentment with his lot ; aversion to all labor, because he labors

not from the hope of a just reward, but from the dread of punishment at the hand of arbitrary power; addictedness to low and sensual enjoyments, because others are withheld; these are some of the natural effects of slavery on the slave. On the other hand, constant fear of insurrection; disdain of useful labor as associated with the condition of slavery; love of power, nourished in the master from infancy, with freedom to gratify all his passions and whims in relation to his unprotected slaves;—is it probable, that these circumstances should be favorable to the growth of private virtue, or of true republicanism? For true republicanism does not consist in maintaining equality of rights among oppressors, but in honoring all men as equals in all their natural and inalienable rights.

When we say that freedom has a salutary, and slavery a hurtful, influence on the mind and disposition both of the master and the slave, we mean that this is the natural result of that unnatural relation. Among the innumerable cases which have been brought forward in confirmation of this truth, there are undoubtedly some which have been exaggerated, if not invented, by those who have published them. But if we confine ourselves only to the official and authentic accounts of slavery, and its offspring, the foreign and domestic slave trade, there is enough to rouse every dormant feeling of humanity, and to inspire the most timid and indifferent to active and enterprising benevolence. It is true, there are virtues, such as frankness and generosity, which are found

among slaveholders as well as among consistent freemen; and we rejoice to acknowledge them in our Southern brethren, without entering into an invidious inquiry concerning the comparative difficulty of practising the virtue of generosity in different portions of our country. It is upon the belief in the existence of those generous sentiments, that the friends of abolition rest much of their confident hope, that the slaveholders of the South will take this great work into their own hands, and force an acknowledgment of their magnanimous love of liberty, not only from their rivals at the North, but from the forsaken slave. On the other hand, we rejoice that there are many instances to prove, that the state of degradation imposed upon the slave has not obliterated every feature of the divine image. That the spirit of man, however darkened, is not extinct in the slave, is evident from the occasional wild eruptions of the smothered fire of indignation and resentment, as well as from the striking instances of that fidelity, which is the moral support of an immoral power, and which has often saved the unsuspecting master from the fury of the revolting slaves. The same truth is confirmed by numerous instances of voluntary death preferred to a life of bondage, and by the still more cheering and elevating example of those, who, after having worked out their own freedom, have not ceased to toil and to starve, until they have redeemed their friends from servitude.

Whether the slaves are treated well or ill, whether they are contented or not, these are circumstances which do not affect the duty of emancipation. The

very existence of laws against runaway slaves would be sufficient to prove that many of them, surely, are not contented. We have no right to assert that the slave is happy, in a condition, the least particle of which, if it were imposed upon us, would be resisted unto blood, until we have offered to him freedom. We mean freedom in good faith; not the pitiful and precarious allowance of human rights that is settled upon the unenslaved man of color in most parts of our country; but liberty such as we have it, other than which we ought to be ashamed to offer. The state of ignorance in which we have placed him, may indeed render it inexpedient to call the slave to an immediate and unlimited exercise of *every* privilege. Yet we certainly are not justified in asserting that the slave is content with his present lot, until we have offered to him the immediate enjoyment of all those rights for the possession of which he is now qualified, together with the means to fit himself, as soon as possible, for the exercise of every privilege enjoyed by the white freeman.

But suppose it true, as has been asserted, that the vast majority are contented and happy; — this contentment and happiness should be considered not as the best, but as the very worst and most deplorable effect of slavery. If human beings, stripped of all the rights and attributes of humanity, are contented and happy, it is a proof that the hierarchy of nature, which has placed man, the moral agent, at the head of all living creatures, is broken; that the animal has survived his spiritual nature. If it be true, then, that

the slave has fallen so low as to rest satisfied with his own degradation, and forget that he is a man, then slavery has indeed done its worst on him, and it becomes our most sacred duty to break the spell that has converted human beings into brutes.

Many objections to the immediate abolition of slavery have been brought forward, which, like the one already mentioned, the alleged contentment of the slaves, only require a fair and thorough examination, to be defeated or converted into auxiliary arguments for emancipation. It has been said, the slaves are not prepared for liberty. But it is clear that the first step toward civilizing and christianizing the negro is to acknowledge that he is a man, whose confidence we have to gain by confessing that we have wronged him, and endeavouring to repair the injury by abandoning for ever the inhuman principle that man can hold property in man. It has been said that the slaves, if suddenly emancipated, would use their liberty for avenging their past sufferings upon the masters. But it would be strange indeed, if the standing army and the militia, the whole power of this country, which has hitherto secured the unrighteous authority of the master over the slave, should not be able to uphold the rightful dominion of the law over the freeman. It seems stranger still to suppose, that by an unaccountable perversion of the most natural feelings, the colored man, who has no cause for hatred and desire of revenge against the white man, except the fact that he holds him in slavery, should hate, and desire to revenge himself upon him, for restoring him to liber-

ty. Whatever strange kind of speculation may lead men to expect that love should beget hatred, this surely is not the logic of the human heart.

Neither the history of the past, nor the experience of our days, records one instance in which the immediate abolition of slavery has stirred up the freed man to violence, outrage, and war. Within the remembrance of this generation, slavery has been abolished in St. Domingo, in the republics of South America, and recently throughout the vast empire of Great Britain. Different modes and forms of emancipation have been tried. In some cases, the enjoyment of perfect liberty on the part of the slaves has been preceded by an apprenticeship; in others, full liberty has been granted at once; in some instances, portions of land have been allotted to the negroes; in others, they have been left without any means of support but their personal liberty; in others, a part of the produce, or certain days in the week, have been secured to the free laborers remaining on the plantations. In all these instances, in which a whole State has abolished slavery, and in many others, in which the comparative value of free and slave labor has been tried on a smaller scale, the safety and superior advantages of immediate abolition have been fully established. Great light has been shed on this subject by the Report of the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, on the extinction of slavery in Great Britain. The confident anticipations of many of the witnesses, who were examined by the Committee, as to the safety and desirableness of that

great national measure, for both masters and slaves, have already been verified, so far as the short time that has elapsed, since the actual enfranchisement of the British West Indies, has enabled us to judge of the results of this great measure. Already several islands have petitioned the government, and have obtained permission to substitute full and immediate abolition for the system of apprenticeship, which had been devised as an intermediate step from servitude to freedom; because it soon became evident, that the full advantages of a free-labor system cannot be realized by any scheme of demi-servitude.

A thorough investigation of the much-disfigured history of St. Domingo, which has been so often held out as a fearful warning against all attempts at immediate abolition, bears the most decided testimony to the safety of this philanthropic measure. Indeed, the history of Hayti speaks more strongly in favor of this cause, than the most sanguine abolitionist could have expected. For it is proved by competent eyewitnesses,* that, after the fearful contest which raged in that island from 1791 to 1793, and which from a civil, soon became a servile, war, and ended in a complete abolition of slavery, the slaves, as soon as they were declared freemen, instead of trying to avenge the cruelties they had suffered, quietly returned to their plantations. There they continued to work, as free laborers, for a fourth part of the produce, besides having two days in the week entire-

* See particularly the French works of La Croix and Malenfant.

ly to themselves. And this cultivation of the land on shares proved so successful, that the island was fast advancing towards its former prosperity, when, in 1801, Buonaparte conceived the inhuman and insane plan of reducing the enfranchised islands again to slavery.

In Guadaloupe, which had been quiet and prosperous in her freedom, as St. Domingo was, the ruthless conqueror succeeded in restoring slavery, after the most fearful and bloody resistance. But he failed in St. Domingo. And if we would rightly estimate the *result* of this great struggle from servitude, discord, and anarchy, to liberty, law, and union, we must consider, that, during the continued warfare, which did not wholly cease until, in 1820, the whole island became one republic, the arts and habits of peace were almost entirely abandoned, and the expensive works for cultivating the land, on which the amount of exportable property greatly depends, were destroyed. We must consider also, that the natural dispostion of the people inclines them to secure, by moderate labor, the necessaries and comforts which the cultivation of a rich soil easily affords, rather than to strive and toil for wealth and commercial eminence. Again we must consider, that the industry of that island is kept down by the support of a large standing army to prevent invasion, and by an enormous national debt to France. Under all these circumstances, which have necessarily reduced the produce, the exports, and imports of St. Domingo, and affected the character of its inhabitants, if we consider, that the popu-

lation, which, in 1804, amounted to about 400,000, had increased, according to the official census in 1824, to 935,335 ; and if we look upon the amount of freedom, security, and prosperity, enjoyed in that island, we cannot help seeing, in the whole unprecedented history of St. Domingo, a most satisfactory evidence of the safety and expediency of immediate abolition, even under the most unfavorable circumstances.

That the Africans will not work from any better impulse than the cart-whip, is an assertion so often refuted, that it is not worth while to dwell upon it. It is indeed not improbable, that the long continuance of slavery has degraded many so deeply as to require some impulses besides those of self-interest, honor, and family attachment, to stimulate them to honest industry ; some legal restraints to prevent those, who, by a sudden act of abolition, are made masters of their time, from abusing it to the injury of others as well as of themselves. Laws may be necessary, like those existing in Hayti, which compel idlers and vagabonds, all those who cannot show that they possess the means of an honest subsistence, to cultivate the earth for their living ; as, in many parts of our country also, paupers are compelled to labor for the sustenance provided for them by the community. But the practical importance of these laws will continually decrease, as the natural effects of freedom supplant the artificial resorts of slavery.

The loss of property, growing out of immediate emancipation, has been urged as another objection to

this measure. The general ground of this question, the comparative advantages of free and slave labor, have been so clearly demonstrated by scientific and experimental investigation, that few, if any, remarks are required on this subject. It would seem superfluous to prove in detail, that the master, the planter in particular, must be benefited by the exchange of a slave-labor for a free-labor system. It frees him from the necessity of purchasing cultivators for his land, the price of which must rise in proportion to what he saves by not being obliged to buy *men*, in addition; he is not at the risk of losing part of his capital by the sickness, or death, or escape of his slaves; he has not to provide for the sick, the children, the aged, except so far as they may have to be taken care of by the community. Instead of depending on laborers, whose interest it is to do no more work than the fear of the whip can induce them to perform, and to pass themselves off for being as unprofitable as possible; the employer of free labor has the choice of laborers, whose interest, whose heart and will are in their business, and whose reputation for efficient usefulness is at stake. Instead of finding it for his advantage to debar his slave from all knowledge, save what concerns him as a domesticated animal; instead of doing violence to his own nature by degrading that of his slave, the master or employer will be prompted, both by his earthly and his spiritual interests, to promote intelligence, self-respect, the love of truth and justice, and the religious principle, in the free laborer.

These considerations are sufficient to show that universal and immediate emancipation must, in general, prove eminently beneficial, both to the slaveholder and the slave. Cases of individual suffering, which are incidental to every general plan of reform, will be easily remedied. But, although the economical advantages of this reform are evident, it should never be overlooked that justice demands the immediate abolition of slavery, whether it be for the advantage or disadvantage of the slaveholder. Instant and persevering exertion to remove from the present, and to avert from every future, generation, the crime and the misery of oppression, is all that we can do to atone for the past, and to wipe off a part of that fearful reckoning, which awaits us all at the bar of eternal justice.

There is one more objection to the promotion of anti-slavery principles, which operates as a powerful check upon many of our fellow-citizens; although we confidently believe that if they would subject it to a thorough examination, they would see, in this very objection, the strongest argument for promoting the abolition of slavery in our country. It is said that the constitution and the laws of the Union acknowledge and secure the existence of slavery, in every State in which it is not prohibited by the State itself, as well as in the District of Columbia, and in several of the Territories. Hence, it is argued, that the agitation of this question in the free States, is an improper and dangerous interference.

It is true indeed, that the constitution, as it is generally understood, though it nowhere speaks of slav-

ery, is made to read so as to secure a power, which, according to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, cannot be rendered just, by any decree or act of government. It is true, that the slave, escaping from bondage in one State, finds in every other, even in those States in which slavery is by law prohibited, a powerful coadjutor of his master, in every judge or competent magistrate of the Union, who is obliged to deliver him up to the pursuing owner, however his own conscience may revolt against this official support of legal tyranny. It is true, moreover, that a standing army is kept and paid by these United States, chiefly for the protection of that special branch of industry, in one part of our country, which is proscribed in every other. It is true, that in case the slaves should assert and insist upon the rights solemnly ascribed to them, in common with all other men, by the Declaration of our Independence, not only the army, but, in case the army should prove insufficient, the militia, the whole people of these United States, are bound by law to assemble under the very banners under which they once achieved liberty for themselves, to put to the sword men who dare to claim the same inalienable rights. It is true, that a bargain, agreed to by the free States, entitles the slaveholders to send, in addition to the representatives to which their own number entitles them, twenty-five others, to represent a portion of their population, which by their own laws are accounted a part of the *live stock*, together with horses and cattle. It is true, that in some of the Territories as well as in

the District of Columbia, over which Congress has an absolute and exclusive right of legislation, slavery has a legal national existence and support. It is true, in fine, that Congress, being invested with constitutional power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States," although it has branded as piracy the foreign slave-trade, still tolerates the domestic traffic in human beings, which is characterized by the essential attributes of the middle passage. By means of this traffic, the produce of the slave-breeding, is conveyed to the slave-consuming, States, and the various wants of the slaveholding community are continually supplied. Nay, the seat of Congress, the capital of the United States, is the centre, the very heart of this traffic, drawing fresh supplies from different quarters, and sending them to every part, to nourish and support the system.

The fact, then, on which the forementioned objection to anti-slavery movements is grounded, is incontestable. It is true, that slavery, as it exists in our country, is supported by law, and by the constitution as it is generally understood. But can this be considered as a reasonable objection? Ought it not to be to us the most powerful inducement to use every means which the constitution has left us, to remove this fatal inconsistency with the vital principle of our social institutions?

It is not our object now to inquire whether a law can be deemed valid, if it is contrary to the first principles of natural justice, and contrary to the inalienable rights of man, particularly when these principles and

rights are solemnly acknowledged, by the sovereign will of the people, as the supreme standard and test of the validity of any law. We only ask the people of the United States to consider what bearing that clause in the constitution which authorizes slavery, has upon the Declaration of Independence. The words of the only article which is understood as securing the claims of the slave-owner (Art. IV. Sec. III. 3.) are these; "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Now it is evident that these words of the constitution are not inconsistent with the acknowledgment of the inalienable rights of man, in the Declaration of Independence, if they are understood as having reference to such service or labor as may be due from one person to another, on any sufficient legal ground, except slavery. They are inconsistent with the Declaration of Independence, only if they be understood as applying to slave labor and involuntary servitude, as well as to free labor and hired services. Suppose we had no other knowledge of the actual intention of the framers of the constitution, than the words of the law itself; would it not become a subject of grave consideration, whether the common understanding of that article in the constitution, according to which, a slave escaping into a State whose laws do not acknowledge slavery, is delivered up to the pursuing master, is not inconsistent

with *correct* principles of legal interpretation ? Even if we do not look upon the Declaration of Independence as the acknowledged standard and test of the validity of any law ; even if we consider the constitution simply in the light of a more recent law, which, on this account, ought to take precedence of the Declaration of Independence, in any point on which they are decidedly at variance ; yet it is an undoubted principle of legal interpretation, that whenever there is an apparent collision between two laws, the later of the two ought to be interpreted *strictly ;* that is, if the words admit of a wider and of a stricter acceptation, they should be taken in that sense in which they are not at all, or in which they are least, inconsistent with the principles contained in a previous law. Now it is certain that the words of the constitution, in the article alluded to, have, and always will have, an exact practical meaning, whether slavery is continued or abolished in this country ; since, in their widest acceptation, they secure the claims both of the slaveholder, and of the employer of a freeman, or the master of an apprentice. It is evident, moreover, that if taken in their widest sense, they are opposed to the Declaration of Independence, inasmuch as they are understood to secure the right of property in man. It seems, therefore, more conformable to correct principles of legal interpretation, to understand them in that stricter sense, in which they do now and always will secure the right of the employer to the *hired* services of the laborer, and particularly that of the master to the services of the apprentice. When thus understood,

there is a propriety in using the words "to whom such service or labor is *due*." But to whom else is service or labor "*due*," but to the man who in some way *pays* for it? We, in fact, see no other alternative than either to adopt this stricter interpretation of the forementioned article of the constitution, or to admit that the fundamental principles of the Declaration of Independence, which acknowledges the inalienable rights of man, as the only just foundation of government, have been repealed by a single clause of the constitution of the United States, — a repeal which would amount to an abrogation of justice itself.

It may be said, that these principles of legal interpretation, however just in other cases, are not applicable in this, as the forementioned article of the constitution was certainly intended by its framers to secure, under terms of a more general import, the legal claim of the slaveholder; and that this has been acknowledged and acted upon, as the true and practical sense of the law, by all the courts and magistrates of the Union. We would not interfere with the application of the law thus interpreted. We would rather forego any advantage that our cause might derive from a different interpretation, than in any way lessen the binding power of that solemn compact which holds together the several branches of this great family of republics. We would adopt, ourselves, and urge others to adopt, the sentiment of the Farewell Address of the Father of his country: — "The basis of our political system is the right of the people to make and alter their constitution of government. But the

constitution which at any time exists, until changed by the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."

We acknowledge that there is sufficient reason to believe that the forementioned article of the constitution was designed to secure the legal claims of the slaveholder, as well as the master of an apprentice. But it seems as if its framers had couched their intention in such general terms, in order that the article might remain applicable, in case that slavery should be abolished in the different States. They seemed to be looking forward to a time, when the principles of the Declaration of Independence should have removed every species of government that is not derived from the consent of the governed, and has not for its object the establishment of the inalienable rights of man. To carry these principles into effect, the authors of the Declaration had pledged their "sacred honor," —a pledge which yet remains to be redeemed by their descendants.

The same spirit and prospective policy are manifest in the early history of congressional legislation; particularly in the ordinance for the government of the great territory northwest of the Ohio, from which three States, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, have taken their origin. This ordinance was passed in 1787, by the unanimous voice of all the States present at its passage, viz. Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The six fundamental articles of this ordinance, which still form the basis of the territorial governments of the United States, were intend-

ed, according to the preamble, "for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which for ever hereafter shall be formed in said territory." The sixth article declares, "that there shall neither be slavery, nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall become convicted."

But, unfortunately, in some later acts of Congress, this great principle was lost sight of; and the slave-holding States have promoted opposite principles, in order to open new slave markets in the territories, and support their own system of policy by similar constitutions of the neighbouring States.

But our belief does not rest on human legislation, nor on the interpretation of any document of human device, however venerable. It is enough for our purpose, that the constitution and the laws have left to us means to spread and to carry into effect the doctrine of human rights, of universal liberty. The law, at least in the free States, allows the use of all means, except those which our own conscience would forbid. The constitution of the New England Anti-Slavery Society permits no others than such as are sanctioned by *law*, *humanity*, and *religion*. It is enough, that we have freedom to speak and to print; freedom peacefully to assemble and associate, to consult, and to petition the government of the Union, as well as the legislature of every State, and thus, by individual and united exertion, to act upon the public

mind. Thus armed with all the legitimate weapons of truth, we feel bound in conscience never to lay them down, until the principle, that man can hold property in man, is effaced from our statute books, and held in abhorrence by public opinion. After the most careful examination, we are convinced that slavery is unjust in itself, and cannot be justified by any laws or circumstances; that it wars against Christianity, and is condemned by the Declaration of our Independence. We are convinced, that it is injurious to every branch of industry, and more injurious still to the mind and character both of the master and the slave. Its existence is the chief cause of all our political dissensions; it tends to unsettle the groundwork of our government, so that every institution, founded on the common ground of our Union, is like an edifice on a volcanic soil, ever liable to have its foundation shaken, and the whole structure consumed by subterraneous fire. The danger of a servile and civil war is gaining every year, every day; for the annual increase of the slave population is more than sixty thousand; and every day about two hundred children are born into slavery. As the more northern of the slave States, seeing the advantages of free labor, dispose of their slaves in a more southern market, and by degrees abolish servitude, the whole slave population, and with it the danger of a terrible revolution, are crowded together in the more Southern States. Under all these threatening circumstances, what have the Southern States, what has Congress done, to avert the impending ca-

lamity from the Union? Congress, which has full and exclusive power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and in the Territories, and to abolish the domestic as well as the foreign slave-trade, shrinks from touching the subject. The fear of instant difficulties to be encountered overcomes the more patriotic fear of the ever-increasing evils, engendered by improvident delay, which reserves to our descendants, if we should escape them, the inevitable consequences of our own culpable neglect.

And what has been done in the slaveholding States to prepare the great change from a corrupt, to a sound and vigorous, state of society? There are, indeed, benevolent individuals endeavouring to elevate their slaves by oral instruction, and by allowing them to cultivate portions of land for the joint profit of the master and the laborers. But the law and the general practice, so far from endeavouring to diminish, are calculated rather to increase the evil in order to render it more secure, to imbrute the slave more and more, and extinguish in him every aspiration and pretension to be a man. Hence the laws against teaching a slave have become more numerous, and the penalties more severe, particularly in those States in which the colored population is continually gaining upon the white.* They refuse to free the slaves, on the ground of their not being fitted for the proper use of their freedom; and they refuse to prepare

* Let it be remembered, that those laws were enacted many years ago, and before the Anti-Slavery Societies were thought of.

them for it, because the preparatory course would induce them to throw off the yoke instantly.

In this hopeless state of things, a few individuals, deeply impressed with the great and increasing evil of slavery, have thought it their duty to unite their efforts to undeceive the public mind, to rouse the fortunate heirs of freedom to a sense of their own obligation to extend and secure the blessings they possess. They saw that the most powerful men in the nation were inactive, either because the magnitude of the evil led them to doubt the possibility of finding an adequate remedy, or because they feared to disturb the political or commercial connexions between the North and the South, or because they were prejudiced themselves, or thought it a hopeless attempt to conquer the prejudice of others. The disinterested devotion of the few, who went forth to prepare the way for the gospel of universal freedom, by teaching that slavery is a sin, of which all the people of this country are more or less guilty, and ought immediately to repent and to reform, — the generous efforts of a few ardent minds have kindled the philanthropic sympathies of many.

The hostility, and still more the indifference, with which the sentiments of the first champions of immediate abolition were received by the majority of influential men in this country, may have betrayed some of them, occasionally, into unguarded and intemperate expressions. Still, the people at large begin to feel that the object, as well as the motives, of the friends of the oppressed are right; and as soon as the con-

viction of a good cause has once unsealed the deep fountains of the heart, and has engaged the energies of a free people, it is as vain to attempt to check or divert their onward course, as to coax or force Niagara to roll back its mighty waters from Lake Ontario to Erie.

But the dissemination of anti-slavery sentiments, it is said, will be productive of a servile and civil war, and terminate in the dissolution of the Union. Now if there is any thing in the theory of government that can be considered as an unquestionable truth, it is the principle, that *free discussion* of every thing that concerns the constitution and government, is the indispensable condition, the conservative principle, of every republic. The constitution of our country has fully recognised this conservative principle, in ordaining that no law shall be enacted, "*abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.*" And what more have abolitionists done, what else do they aim at, than *free discussion* of a part of our social system? To collect and to disseminate correct information, to argue, to answer objections, and to advise, — these, and no other means, are authorized by the constitution of any Anti-Slavery Society in the United States. However strongly and urgently the sin and misery of servitude have been set forth in the writings that have appeared with the sanction of these Societies, yet they have never countenanced, but always most earnestly disapproved, the use of force, and the desperate recourse to insurrection. They have appealed to the conscience and the self-interest both of

the slaveholder and the slave ; and on the ground of religion, as well as of worldly prudence, they have urged the masters to give up, of their own accord, their despotic power, and the slaves to be subject to their masters, with a religious trust, that the voice of reason and Christianity will ere long overcome the partiality of the law, which makes the enjoyment of the rights of man to depend on the color of his skin. From the mouth of an abolitionist, the doctrine of subjection to his master is a solemn truth to the injured slave ; and the words, Peace ! Be still ! when coming from the friend of freedom, are sufficient to assuage the wildest storm of revolutionary passion. From the mouth of an advocate or apologist of slavery, Christianity itself, the Gospel of eternal freedom and universal love, appears to the defrauded slave only a solemn pretext for oppression. Slavery is the true and lasting source of insurrection ; it is the avowed or secret cause of all the serious differences between the members of this Union. Those, therefore, who directly or indirectly strive to secure the existence of slavery in this country, are nourishing the seeds of a servile and civil war ; and their efforts to avert it from themselves only serve to insure its breaking in upon our descendants, with increased violence. The fact, that, in those States which depend most especially on slave labor, the colored population is continually gaining upon the white, is too obvious an indication of the future to require any explanation.

Some, indeed, have attempted to prove the secu-

rity of our slave States, by quoting the experience of the States of antiquity, in some of which one fourth or fifth part of the population were able, for a considerable time, to keep the rest in bondage. But those, who thus quote the example of the ancient world in order to quiet the apprehensions of the present, overlook the fact, that in antiquity slavery was a part of the law of nations, in the enforcement of which, each State was supported by the practice and political sympathy of every other. Not one of the ancient republics was founded, as ours is, on the solemn acknowledgment of the inalienable rights of man, with which the existence of slavery is absolutely inconsistent. All the nations around us, particularly those with whom we are most closely connected, our republican neighbours in South America, and England, from which we draw a constant supply of new ideas, as well as articles of merchandise, have abolished slavery. Our own example, which has stirred up the nations to a determined search after liberty, reacts upon us; the reproachful feeling of our inconsistency is growing continually more general and intense, both abroad and at home. Thus, all the circumstances and unavoidable influences under which we are placed, the spirit of our time manifested by its history, the growing conviction of the injustice and impolicy of this part of our social system, aggravated by the reproach of moral and political inconsistency, serve to impress us with the fallacy of every remedy for the evils and dangers of slavery, except universal and immediate emancipation. There are

dangers connected with any scheme of partial or gradual emancipation. For, if you emancipate only a certain number, or declare that all shall be free after a certain time, the partial justice, which you show to some, is an acknowledgment of the justice due to all, which cannot fail to rouse the indignation of those, whose rights have been set aside by this arbitrary arrangement. As soon, therefore, as the personal antipathies and prejudices, which have arisen from a passionate and unsparing attack and defence of anti-slavery principles, shall have given way before the power of free and calm inquiry, we feel confident, that this great cause will unite all the friends of order, peace, and union, in our country.

Fellow-citizens! The subject of our appeal, if rightly understood, is not calculated to rouse the jealousies of one part of our country against the other. We have all sinned together. We entered into the crime together, when tempted by the British government in our infancy. At years of discretion, when we became free, we deliberately preferred power to righteousness, and made the crime our own. In our vigor we have continued to cherish it. The South has said, "Let slavery alone"; and the North has, till recently, replied, "We will let slavery alone." Nay, all the freemen of this country are pledged by laws of their own enacting, to support the slaveholder in trampling upon all the native rights of man, which we recognise as the foundation of our social institutions.

The fact, that, in almost every part of our country,

the mere difference of color is sufficient to exclude the unenslaved colored man from public hotels, stage-coaches, and steam-boats, from profitable and honorable professions, from public schools and colleges, from the elevating and refining influences of society, — these facts are strong indications that the confinement of slavery to a certain part of our country, is owing to a difference of circumstances rather than of principles. We all have sinned against the spirit, if not against the letter, of the law of liberty; for every social system bearing the name of a republic, unless it is founded on a profound and impartial respect for human nature, and the essential equality of human rights, is but a more or less successful counterfeit of true republicanism. It may pass for sterling coin among those who have given it currency, but the world at large will not fail to detect the base alloy mixed up with the pure metal.

What is the duty of the freemen, and more particularly the duty of the citizens of the free States, with regard to the existence of slavery in our country? It is our duty to use all our power and influence, individually and by association, directly and indirectly, to abolish a system that is absolutely inconsistent with the fundamental principle of our government, and must, sooner or later, if not removed, prove destructive of our Union. Congress has power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the territories, as well as the domestic slave trade. We, the citizens of this country, have a right to petition Congress to use this power; we, the constituents of Con-

gress, have power to direct our agents to execute what the sovereign will of the people shall deem conducive to the permanent welfare, the true glory, of these United States. Every session of Congress, every opportunity of exercising our political privileges for the extinction of slavery, so far as its existence depends on our own will, is a trial of our love of justice, our patriotism, our philanthropy; every neglect is a proof of our unworthiness of the privileges we possess. The direct political power of the citizens of the free States over the existence of slavery in this country, is confined to the constitutional rights of Congress; but their moral influence, their duty as men, as patriots, as Christians, have no limits but the free power of their fellow-citizens to listen or to turn a deaf ear to the conscientious fears, the well-meant advice of those, who are pledged with them for the welfare of our common country. We feel bound in duty to plead the cause of the oppressed with our brethren at the South, who have authority to abrogate the State laws on which the existence of slavery depends. We have no legal or constitutional authority to support our plea; but we have a draft upon their hearts, which will not be protested. Much as we wish that the words of the constitution might be so defined as to preclude the possibility of slavery in this country, yet we believe that the means which the constitution has left, are sufficient to accomplish this purpose. We believe that the moral action of truth and love, on the hearts and consciences of slaveholders, are fully adequate to the complete and speedy over-

throw of our nation's crying sin. We would speak to the minds and the hearts of our southern friends; to their earthly interests and their patriotic virtues. We would speak to them, not in the tone of vain self-complacency, which ill befits those whose prejudices against the people of color are a strong offset to the fact that they are not actually slaveholders. Nor do we address them as interested, political rivals; for it is evident that, if the slaves were invested with all their social as well as personal rights, their interests being essentially the same as those of the rest of the inhabitants of that region, their emancipation would not diminish, but greatly increase the political influence of the South.* We would improve our more fortunate condition, to judge deliberately and calmly of the cause of the slaveholder and the slave. We acknowledge that among the slaveholders, there are many, who are prevented from immediately liberating their slaves, not by base and sordid motives, but some, by the state of the laws which discountenance emancipation; others, by inadequate or mistaken views of duty, or conscientious though groundless fears. On the other hand, we look upon the slave as a man, having all the rights of a man, which no one has any right to

* Some northern opposers of our cause have raised a serious objection from the fact, that if slavery were abolished, the representation of the South in Congress would be increased, inasmuch as the enfranchized colored man would be counted as a *whole* man, whereas the slave is accounted only *three fifths* of a man. But what has the North to fear from such an increase of representation in the South, when, in order to it, slavery, the chief cause of jealousy, will be done away?

withhold from him, either from bad or good motives. It is urged in vindication of the present owners of slaves, that they are not the authors, but the innocent heirs, of a great evil, superinduced upon their ancestors by the influence of a foreign government. But even if it could be shown, that the present generation were forced to accept the unhallowed inheritance, the origin can in no way justify the continuation of the evil. For it is in the power of the people of each slaveholding State, at any time, to abolish slavery, — and no hereditary claim, though approved by all the sovereign powers on earth, and confirmed by long immemorial practice, holds good against the certificate of freedom which every human being brings with him into this world, from the hand of the living God.

Fellow-citizens! the Anti-Slavery Society, which is now growing so rapidly in every part of our country, although its seeds were sown among the weeds and thorns of popular prejudice, the Anti-Slavery Society is not a new sect or party coming forward to mingle in the strife of politics, or the controversies of religion. It is intended to engage the friends of justice in every party; and it is actually composed of men of almost all the different religious and political denominations in our country. Its sole object is, to bring about, by all lawful and moral means, the immediate abolition of slavery in our land; to raise the colored man to that equality of rights with the white man, which the Declaration of Independence secures to all. Without objecting to any transient legal restraints and encouragements, which the influence of

past servitude may render necessary, we claim for the colored man the immediate possession of personal independence and safety, the right to hold property, to be protected in all his family connexions, to choose his own employment, to give valid testimony in any court of justice; we claim for him the free exercise of religion, the free expression of his sentiments, the use of every means of education by which he may fit himself as soon as possible for the exercise of every right enjoyed by the white man. This is what we mean by *immediate abolition*.

It may have become necessary, on account of misrepresentation, to disclaim as a sentiment utterly foreign to abolitionists, any desire for the intermarriage of the whites and blacks. Neither we nor they wish it. The report of such a sentiment being cherished by us, originated with our opponents, not with us. On the contrary, as the past and continual amalgamation, of which the mulatto race is the offspring, must be imputed to the criminal bonds of slavery, so we are confident that abolition, as it leaves the two races free to form their domestic relations according to their natural inclination and taste, will tend to prevent amalgamation.

We have laid before you, our countrymen, the object of our society; we invite every friend of justice, every patriot, every philanthropist, to engage with us in an enterprise, which, considering all the physical and spiritual wants of the slave, will be found to comprise the essence of every benevolent society in our country. If the manner in which our society has

pursued its great object has been worthy of it, we have a right to expect the sympathy and coöperation of every wise and benevolent man. If our measures seem to you ill calculated to accomplish the object of our society, this great and holy object itself should induce the wisest and best men of our country, if they recognise our good intentions, and approve our principles, to join our ranks, in order to guide our steps in the right way.

You who believe in the Gospel of redemption, you who believe that the day will come when we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, how will you stand before Him, who tries and judges the heart? "Then shall he say unto them on the left hand, I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye clothed me not; sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not." And when a band of those, who in your day and generation were kept in slavery, shall rise on the right hand of the Judge, to witness against you, do you think that the testimony of the colored man, rejected here, will be rejected also, in the court of eternal justice? Or do you believe you may evade the sentence of the Judge, by pleading that you attended to all the bodily wants and comforts of the slave, — when you refused food and clothing, freedom, respect, and love, to the immortal soul? Or, do you think yourselves safe under the plea that you yourselves were not slaveholders, — when in any degree it depended on your exertions to put an end to the very existence of slavery in this world?

You who discern the signs of the time, and are guided by them, — do you remember how your forefathers left their father-land, to seek liberty among strangers and savages? Do you remember how the sons of the pilgrims rather ventured their lives and their all in desperate fight, than consent to pay a paltry tax, because imposed by unlawful authority? Did not your fathers sign the Declaration of American Independence and human liberty? And did not the same spirit that gave you strength to overcome the bands of oppressors and mercenaries in your devoted land, — follow the fugitives to their own homes, and wake the nations of the old world? France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Poland, England, have felt the touch of the redeeming angel. A spirit of keen inquiry is going through the world, to examine every creed and every charter; it does not believe in the "divine right of kings"; it will not pass over the flaw, the fatal defect in the title of a State, that under the specious name of a republic uses the authority of the law and the sword of justice, to seal and secure the oppression of more than one sixth of its inhabitants. The world has heard the tocsin of truth, and is awaking. Man is felt to be man, whether European prejudice frown upon him on account of his station, or American prejudice because of his color. Europe, which had rekindled the extinguished lamp of liberty at the altar of our revolution, still nourishes the holy fire; England goes before us as a torch-bearer, leading the way to the liberation of mankind. The despotism which our forefathers could not bear in their native

country, is expiring, and the sword of justice in her reformed hands, has applied its exterminating edge to slavery. Shall the United States, the free United States, which could not bear the bonds of a King, cradle the bondage which a King is abolishing? Shall a republic be less free than a monarchy? Shall we, in the vigor and buoyancy of our manhood, be less energetic in righteousness than a kingdom in its age?

You to whom the destinies of this country are committed, Americans, patriots in public and private life, on you it depends to prove, whether your liberty is the fruit of your determined choice, or of a fortunate accident. If you are republicans, not by birth only, but from principle, then let the avenues, all the avenues of light and liberty, of truth and love, be opened wide to every soul within the nation, — that the bitterest curse of millions may no longer be, that they were born and bred in "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

FRANKLIN LECTURE.*

In endeavouring to do justice to the honor conferred on me by those who have invited me to this place, it has been my first object to select a topic that might worthily and profitably engage the attention of the audience which the present occasion has called together. As the course of lectures, to which this is to serve as an introduction, is designed chiefly for the workingmen of this city, particularly those who are not engaged in literary pursuits, I beg leave to present some views which seem to me calculated to promote the common interests of artists and artisans and laboring men of every description.

As I am addressing an assembly of workingmen, I should do violence to my feelings, were I to refrain from giving expression to the grateful emotions called forth by this occasion, heightened as they are by the remembrance of a different state of things in which I have passed the greater part of my life. The contrast I speak of is the natural result of the political condition of this country, which excels that of other

* An Address, introductory to the fourth course of the Franklin Lectures; delivered at the Masonic Temple, Boston, November 3d, 1834.

communities inasmuch as it is not an arbitrary contrivance, nor the random cast of fortune, but a deliberate acknowledgment, and positive insurance, of the natural rights of man. In a state of society in which the standing armies of military and civil mercenaries and courtiers not only consume the best fruits of the productive laborer, but actually convert a great portion of those who should have contributed to the common stock, into mere consumers, — in such a state of society, in which man himself is but a wheel in the great social machinery contrived for the sole benefit of its owners and overseers, it is not to be expected that human labor should have its legitimate value. But in a state of society in which the price of every thing is determined by its real usefulness, it is impossible that that which of all the various means of happiness is in itself the most important, and from which every other valuable possession derives a great part of its worth, — it is impossible, I say, that in a country like this, human labor should not be considered as the all-sufficient and unfailing capital of the nation, as well as the foundation of all personal respectability. I rejoice that at least in a part of my adopted country, labor is not the attribute of servitude and the prognostic of a servile spirit; that the workingmen take a place in society, not merely as laborers, furnishing for others the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life, but as *men*, claiming an equal share in all the domestic, civil, and religious privileges of freemen. I rejoice in the privileges they possess, and that they are

conscious of their rights, and intolerant of the slightest attempt at fixing upon them any mark of inferiority to any other class of men. Still more do I rejoice in the belief that the advantages they possess are to them a source, not of selfish, but of generous, satisfaction; that there is not anywhere on this earth a laboring man deprived of his just wages and his just influence in society, who does not enjoy the hearty and active sympathy of the workingmen of Boston.

But it is not my object, on this occasion, to consider the individual and social rights of the workingmen, in which I feel the deepest interest. I wish to speak on some important conditions of their success in their own peculiar calling, and to point out some circumstances that impede the rapid and steady growth of the various branches of industry in this country.

Much has been done in our country, and especially in this part of it, for the promotion of the arts, and of all kinds of useful labor. The manufactures which have enriched this part of our country, and still more the ingenious inventions which have helped to build up the prosperity of others as well as our own, — bear an unequivocal testimony to the habits and the genius of industry that characterize the inhabitants of New England. Human labor has been wisely and successfully employed; and what is of still greater value to the philanthropist, human labor has been superseded and saved for higher employments, by the invention of labor-saving machinery. Human talent and industry are no longer wasted in occupations

which may be performed as well, and better, by inanimate matter. And we are happy to believe that in general this great change, which has allotted servitude to matter and freedom to man, has been a real saving of the most valuable capital. We believe that human energy has been saved from senseless occupations, not in order to be wasted in unproductive ease, and sensual enjoyment; but to be vested in higher pursuits, in the acquisition of moral and intellectual wealth. The old prejudice that manual labor unfits man for intellectual action, has found a complete refutation in New England experience. It is proved false by the active interest that is taken by the workingmen in every thing that affects the welfare of man and of society, in education, law, and religion. Among other evidences of this encouraging truth, we rejoice to notice their attendance on these and similar lectures. The free, strenuous, and well-directed exercise of the physical powers, — such is the constitution of human nature, — excites and invigorates the faculties for the promotion of the general interests of man, as well as for the particular occupation to which they are devoted.

When we contemplate the history of this country, the manner in which this new world of civilization arose from the chaos of barbarism, and how this process of creation is still going on, not only in extending itself over those vast regions upon which our setting sun is rising, but in continually improving upon the improved condition of man, and striving upward to higher regions of civilized life; — when we consider

how the old hunting ground which a few scanty tribes of savages once divided with the beasts of the wilderness, has become the ample, secure, and comfortable habitation of thousands and millions of civilized men,—we can, without national vainglory, assert that great difficulties have been overcome, and great attainments made, in every thing that constitutes, adorns, and elevates civilized life. Still, the greatness of a nation consists not so much in the achievements which it looks upon with proud satisfaction, as in the spirit of dissatisfaction with any thing it has accomplished, and a perpetual striving after higher attainments. National vanity is satisfied with looking back, but true patriotism consists in pressing forward. There are obstacles in the progress of society from a high to a still higher state of improvement, which are as great, if not as palpable, as those which obstruct the path of the pioneers of civilization in the wilderness. The branches and roots of the primitive forest can be more easily removed than the passions and prejudices, whose thick and extensive ramifications, overspreading every path of life, keep off the light of truth, and whose roots strike firmly into the deep soil of the heart, and absorb its healthful powers. It is my chief object in addressing you on this occasion, to point out some of those obstacles which seem to me particularly effectual in preventing our active and civilized community from rising more rapidly and safely to a still higher state of cultivation, particularly in the arts, and the various branches of national industry.

A frank exposure of some of the prevalent errors

which retard the progress of civilization amongst us, is an undertaking which any public speaker, whose chief desire is popularity, would hardly be disposed to meddle with, and which no one, even if he have no other object than to render himself useful, would wish to present to a popular audience without an assurance that no preconceived notions or misgivings will prevent those whom he confidently addresses, from granting him a patient and impartial hearing. For my part, I know of no better way of proving my sincere respect and confidence in my hearers, than by using the most perfect plainness of speech.

The first thing I would mention as prejudicial to the cause of improvement, is a fault into which many have fallen, from a temptation that is incident to the very attainments we have made in all the arts of civilized life. The rapid progress which characterizes this country, has induced many to count upon the accomplishments which are yet to be gained, and the conquests yet to be achieved, as certain possessions; and to look upon every thing that is done or manufactured in this country, as in all probability superior to any thing that has been or can be accomplished anywhere else in the world. This barren self-complacency impairs the first condition of all progress in excellence, the desire of learning, which constitutes the true glory of a young man, not more than that of a young nation, when comparing its own attainments with those of other countries, which count their thousands of years for every hundred of our civilized existence. With all the wonderful achievements of

which our country is justly proud, there remains yet a great deal to be learned, in farming and gardening, in many branches of manufacture as well as in the fine arts and sciences, and the various fields of literature, which the civilized nations of the old world have stored up for ages, and of which we must first possess ourselves, before we may attempt to take the lead in the course of improvement.

The next point I would bring before you, is a fault of an opposite character, — a disposition to underrate the productions of domestic industry, from a blind partiality for foreign goods. I well remember the impression made on my mind by the first article of American manufacture I met with. It was at Havre, in France, the first time in my life that I beheld the ocean, a few days before I was obliged to cross it. I was walking along the quay with a French gentleman, and as, among the crowd of vessels before us, there were but few that had hoisted their national colors, I requested my companion to point out to me some of the American ships. He told me, that I might, without any one to tell me, know any American vessel in the port from any other by its perfect neatness and order in every part of it. The ship, in which I embarked for the United States, — the same that a short time before had carried to these shores the faithful friend of this country, the immortal Lafayette, — that ship was the first article of American manufacture that met my delighted eyes. The whole of my voyage confirmed my first impression. Insignificant as it may be in itself, we know that personal

experience, as it brings home to us the reality of things that we before knew only from hearsay or from books, helps us greatly to form a just estimate of the most complicated, comprehensive, and important objects. When I saw, during a heavy sea, the whole crew, like the well-trained members of one athletic man, obey without confusion or delay the orders of the directing mind ; when I saw the sailors, at the word of command, climbing and clinging to the further ends of the yards to lash the sails, singly and calmly intent upon their task, and as unmindful of the cold December bath, into which every roll of the ship plunged them, as if they were playing seesaw in the shipyard, — when I saw this perfect management of one well-manned and well-commanded American vessel, I found in it a natural solution of the wonderful growth of this country. And when I approached the noble harbour of New York, with its forest of masts, I entered more deeply into the spirit and destiny of this land of promise, that in time of peace throws forth its merchant vessels, like bread upon the water, for a plentiful harvest ; while in time of war, like the Athenians of old, it seeks and finds salvation in its " wooden walls."

There is, then, at least one species of manufacture, one great department of art, in which this country is, unquestionably, not surpassed by any other. And if we take into account how many hands and heads, how many different trades and occupations must contribute to build and to navigate a ship, we certainly have some specimens of domestic genius and industry

to point at, which are sufficient to shame the narrow-minded and supercilious fastidiousness of those who will allow no excellence of workmanship unless it be warranted by an English or a French stamp. I fear it is with many productions of the arts, as I know it to be the case with literary compositions, being the works of American authors, that are not appreciated, and will not sell in this country, until their worth has been acknowledged abroad, and the tongue of American criticism has been loosed by an English reviewer. Some instances of this Anglomania or Gallomania, that have come under my observation, remind me of an anecdote of Frederic the Second of Prussia, whose exclusive partiality for French literature and French manufacture and art had a discouraging effect upon the efforts of German industry. One day, it was his birthday, the magistrates of Berlin waited upon the king, to present to him a snuff-box of very curious and beautiful workmanship, just received from the best artist in Paris. The king accepted the present with a high encomium on French genius and taste, and with contemptuous animadversions on German industry, as utterly incapable of producing so perfect a work. Whereupon the magistrates craved the king's forgiveness, which they hoped he would not withhold, when they informed him of what his patriotic heart would receive with pleasure, that this article, which had gained his admiration, was not made in Paris, but in his own loyal city of Berlin. The king took up the snuff-box once more, looked at it, and then threw it on the floor, saying, "It is tasteless and good for nothing."

Is it not true, that, in many instances, a similar predilection for foreign productions, the remnant of a colonial spirit amongst us, has neglected and starved American talent and industry ?

If those amongst us, whose means enable them to exercise the high privilege of encouraging talent and industry, would regard the thorough workmanship, the beautiful form, more than the costly material, and if they would study, and watch, and cherish the indications of talent around them, they would often find in their own neighbourhood what they may seek in vain far off; and the consciousness of calling forth noble energies, which, without them, might have dwindled and perished, would more than repay them for any additional trouble.

There is another impediment to the growth of the arts amongst us, which it gives me pain to mention. It is the existence of a mercenary spirit, which incites some workingmen to presume upon the ignorance or indifference of their employers to furnish the cheapest articles for the highest price; and which, on the other hand, induces some employers to take advantage of the necessities of the laborer, to make him perform the best work for the meanest compensation. The dishonesty of one party, of course, provokes the other to similar dishonesty, and one serves as an excuse for the other. If the common-law maxim, "*Caveat emptor*," (let the purchaser look out for himself,) be sufficient to justify almost any immorality of the seller, it seems fair also, that the opposite maxim, "*Caveat venditor*," (let the seller

look out for himself,) should excuse an equal degree of immorality on the part of the purchaser. Thus, the morality of a whole people is corrupted ; and the perversion of the moral sense always tends to degrade the taste and lower the standard of art and workmanship in the community.

There is another point, another strong tendency in the community, which has an essentially injurious influence on the arts. This tendency, however, is so frequently attacked by moralists and divines, but with so little effect, that it requires either a strong sense of duty, or a somewhat romantic confidence in the final triumph of an unsuccessful cause, to present it to a popular audience. The influence of fashion, the willingness of men to be governed by the taste of others, the fear of being thought singular, — is known to exercise its power over those who most strenuously oppose it. The studied plainness of some men is as truly the result of the love, or at least of the *fear* of fashion, as the fastidious elegance of others. Even in this land of freedom, the arrival of a new fashion from England or from France, however the people of taste, or the people of sense, may protest against it, operates upon both the praiser and the fault-finder like the enchanted horn in Wieland's "Oberon," that sets all the company, old and young, grave and gay, dancing. The scissors of an English tailor, or a French milliner, exert, even in this land of Independence, as great a power as a celebrated pair of scissors in the hands of a German king, a part of whose daily devotion is said to consist in mustering a

collection of puppets accoutred in the different uniforms of all his troops. Whenever his experienced eye detects a way in which the uniform of one regiment might be improved by curtailing, and that of another by slanting or rounding off the regimentals, the king with his scissors straightway performs the desirable alteration. And then the court tailor is directed to execute the new puppet-coat on a larger scale; and the royal factories are ordered to multiply the new creature of the king's fancy. However grievously the impoverished nation may cry out against the expensive folly, all the trouble is charmed away, by the self-complacent look of the monarch, on the first day when the improved regiment files off before him on the parade ground.

The commandments of that tailor-king are not more arbitrary, and not more strictly executed, than the latest decrees of fashion, from Hyde Park and Long Champs, are obeyed in many a foreign land; and the everchanging looks of the drawing-rooms and public walks in our cities remind me strongly of that royal parade-ground in Germany.

In speaking against a blind obedience to fashion, I would not by any means encourage a sickly desire to originate new and singular forms and fancies in dress, or architecture, or the style of living. On the contrary, I would recommend the adoption and imitation of any thing that is truly convenient and beautiful, in whatever part of the world it may have been invented. But it is evident, that *such* imitation requires the exercise of individual judgment and taste, as truly

as the creation of new forms. Any form or fashion, in order to be truly beautiful, must, in the first place, be suitable to the object for which it is intended, as well as to the circumstances of the country and the individual; and only when these first demands of sound taste are satisfied, the imagination may have a free range. It will then be guided by nature, whose wise economy, whose beautiful forms, though they are not published in the "*Journal de Modes*," are sufficiently clear to serve as models for the fine arts, and matters of taste of every description. So far as the kingdom of fashion is governed by the influence of these principles, it is probable, that, in the long run, good taste will prevail over indifferent and bad taste. Those, who feel authorized to set the example, will act under the restraint of a wholesome apprehension, lest those who are ready to imitate, only so far as they approve the pattern, should not follow suit. But if the authority of any place, or class of society, is taken as the standard to which all must conform for fear of being outlawed from the kingdom of fashion; if the poor imitate the middle classes, and these the rich, and if the rich ape foreign manners and fashions, it is plain that the right of private judgment in matters of taste is surrendered. Our dress, our furniture, our buildings, our amusements, conversation, and literature, must be cast in a factitious mould; our workingmen, our artists, must become mere copyists in order to live. All originality, all individuality of taste and talent, on which the progress of the arts depends, are sacrificed at the altar of fashion.

The last impediment to the progress of the arts amongst us, for which I would engage your candid and earnest reflection, is but of recent date in this community. I mean the decline of religious faith, the progress of atheism, in the cities and populous towns of this country, where a spirit of skepticism has spread, particularly among the workingmen, and societies of professed atheists have been formed.

Allow me, before I proceed, to meet two objections, to which the very statement of this last topic of my discourse may seem liable. It may seem unfair to single out the workingmen, as a class, as aiding the progress of infidelity, while there are among them so many examples of unwavering, heroic faith, under the most trying circumstances, to which those, who enjoy the questionable prerogative of living without labor, are strangers. It may seem unfair, on the other hand, to pass over the essential irreligion, that is frequently found among what are called the higher classes of society ; the idolatry of pleasure, of wealth, of circumstances. I fear, that, in many instances, the church-going infidelity of the rich idler is more essentially at war with the spirit of Christianity, than the patent atheism of the laboring poor. A French philosopher has said, that, if there were no God, one should be invented, because of the eminent usefulness of religion. There are men who think religion unnecessary for themselves, but indispensable for the mass of the community. According to them, the mass of the people must be made to look upon all the established evils in society, as ordinations of

Providence ; and their cravings for the good things of this world must be soothed by liberal draughts upon the inexhaustible treasury of an endless futurity. No wonder that the less favored children of society, as soon as they have come to the great conclusion, that men, after all, are neither more or less than men, — should question the reality of a doctrine that is made to teach humility to those who have no rank, and self-denial and charity to those who have nothing to lose, or to give. When I look upon the history of religion, and consider all the absurdities that men have been taught to believe and worship, and still more, when I think of all the contrivances, by which religion has so often been made the minister of the basest passions, and the support of the most pernicious institutions, — I see no reason to seek for any other cause, to account for the existence of skepticism among the workingmen, than that which they themselves assign, — the spirit of free inquiry. When I speak, then, of the decline of religious faith among the workingmen in particular, I do not mean to deny, that irreligion exists and abounds among those who can live and enjoy without labor ; nor do I assign any immoral motive to what I conceive to be a great error. The man, who cherishes and supports religion, not for its own truth and excellence, but solely for its subserviency to other ends, and he, who rejects it as untrue and injurious, are both unbelievers, though the one may be called a religious man, and the other an infidel. Both may be men of unexceptionable character, and their very unbelief

may arise from a free and honest, though unsuccessful search after truth. I intend to speak of this unbelief, arising from free inquiry, which I conceive to be a far more hopeful state of mind, than the irreligion of the sensualist, who supports religion for its tendency to maintain what he calls the good of society. My arguments will be more especially addressed to the mechanics and workingmen, not only because this course of lectures is chiefly intended for them, but because I think that the existence of unbelief among their number is owing, in a great measure, to a principle, which, if it be followed out, will lead the free and faithful inquirer to the conclusion, that perfect freedom is to be found only in religion. Nay more, he will see that religion is the essence, the life-giving principle, of every art and science, without which not one of the various pursuits which constitute and adorn civilized life can attain perfection.

I have said that history and experience confirm the assertion, that, in many instances, religion, instead of being the chief promoter of social and individual happiness, has been made the most effectual engine for retarding and misguiding the course of improvement. But if the occurrence of error and abuse should be thought sufficient to make us give up a branch of theoretic or practical knowledge, or any social institution, is there, among all we hold true and good, any thing that would stand the test? If we were to judge of the character of a science in its maturity, by the follies of its youth, should we not fall

into endless skepticism? Even those branches of information, the accuracy of which seems to depend wholly on the simple use of the senses, are affected by that imperfection of intellectual culture, which, in a state of perpetual progress, must necessarily characterize every stage and period of human improvement when compared with that which follows. Thus we find that the simple study of natural history has brought men who pretend to the character of observers, to very different results in different parts and ages of the world. The writers on natural history in China, for example, gravely assert, as incontestable facts, the strangest fancies with regard to the transformation of divers beings into one another. One Chinese philosopher who is less credulous than his colleagues, indulges in satirical remarks at the expense of another, because he believes in the transformation of the cherry-bird into a mole, and of grains of rice into fishes. "These are ridiculous fables," he says; "nothing is proved except the transformation of the rat into the whip-poor-will. It is mentioned in all the journals; and I have myself constantly observed it; for the transformations have their certain course, as much as the births. In spring the rat is changed into the whip-poor-will; and in the eighth month," (October,) "the whip-poor-wills again become rats." Should we, on account of these fancied observations of nature, however confidently asserted, doubt the reality of those transformations which we have ourselves observed, such as the metamorphosis of the egg of an insect into a caterpillar, of this into a chrys-

alis, and of the chrysalis into a butterfly ? Or would it be right to underrate the character of the natural sciences, because, like other branches of learning, they have their mythology as well as history ?

Thus we find that the history of every department of knowledge records instances of error and imposition, which nevertheless do not affect the credit of the science itself; and the mistakes are, of course, great and numerous in proportion to the magnitude and intrinsic difficulty of the subject. If this be thought natural and fair with regard to every other branch of information, why not with regard to religion, a science which, whatever be its claims to certainty, surpasses every other by the immensity of its object ? For if there be such a thing as a science of religion, its object is no other than the origin and end of all knowledge, all existence ; it embraces the destinies of man, and the government of the universe.

From all the observations I have made I would infer no more than this, that if it can be shown that religion has a foundation which the freest inquiry does not undermine, but establish beyond all reasonable doubt, and if it can be shown that, instead of being unfavorable to the promotion of the arts and sciences, true religion is the vital principle of all improvement, it would be as unwarrantable to attribute to religion all the mistakes and misdeeds committed in its name, as to charge astronomy with the dreams and soothsayings of astrologers, or chemistry with the profound trifles of alchymy, or to impute to the medical science

all the deleterious draughts administered by dishonest or deluded quacks.

But what is true religion, and how can it be distinguished in a general manner from false religion, when every sect of religionists pretends to be the sole possessor of the truth? This objection can be raised with the same propriety against every department of knowledge, the professors of which are divided into parties defending opposite systems. But to my present purpose it is immaterial whether those whom I address profess one or the other of the established forms of religion, or neither. I do not speak of creeds and forms of religion, but of the principle, — that fundamental principle of human nature which leads some men to believe in the Bible, others in the Koran, and others in the Veds. It is this principle which I consider as the very "spirit that giveth life" to all the arts and sciences; to poetry and philosophy, as well as to the simplest manual occupations and trades.

What is the source and essence of religion? If you examine the infinite variety of forms and sentiments of religion among civilized and savage nations, you find, indeed, many incompatible opinions and discordant practices sanctioned and insisted upon as standards of orthodoxy and true piety. But if you press your inquiry further, to ascertain what it is that leads men to embrace sometimes the most sublime, and sometimes the most absurd, notions, as the bread of life to the craving soul, you find in each of them an expression of the same tendency to supply, as far

as possible, the same permanent want of our common nature. Whether you consider the faith of the savage in the ability of his sorcerer to bend the elements and powers of nature to his purposes, or the aspirations of the mystic at holding converse with the spirits of the departed, or the faith of the Christian philosopher in the moral government of the universe, and the destination of the soul for endless progress in wisdom, goodness, and happiness, — you find in all these different religions the same tendency of human nature to something infinite, something unattainable by an ordinary exercise of our faculties in this life, something that demands the highest possible exertion and an endless and ever-enlarging sphere of existence and action.

That religion is not a stationary but a progressive principle, nay, the very principle of endless advancement, — this is most clearly and powerfully set forth in Christianity. As Christians, we are commanded "to call no man master"; "to judge of ourselves what is right"; "to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good"; and the faithful seeker is encouraged by the promise that "he shall know the truth, and the truth shall make him free." We know from experience that the best things in this world, when perverted, become causes of the greatest evil. And thus the history of Christianity records many instances of reckless fanaticism, led on by clear-sighted ambition to proclaim a blind faith and dumb obedience to the infallible authority of a man, or the paper constitution of a sect, as the only legitimate terms of sal-

vation, and to denounce all free inquiry, every attempt at rising beyond the past and present attainments of man, as the pride of rebellious reason. But this surely was not the creed of St. Paul, who, in drawing the likeness of a religious man, a true Christian, describes the character of one devoted to the cause of truth, and to the advancement of knowledge, whether it be sanctioned or not by the professed advocates, and acknowledged oracles, of religion. "Brethren," he says, "I count not myself to have apprehended, but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark." And what is the mark of the Christian? It is the "stature of perfect men"; we are called to "go on to perfection," nay, to "be perfect even as our Father in heaven is perfect."

Civilization is founded on the desire of man to improve his present condition; religion consists in the tendency of human nature to infinite improvement. The principle of progress in man is the fountain-head of both; it is the connecting link between the life that now is, and that which is to come, the mediator between time and eternity. Civilization begins the course of improvement by raising man from the helpless state in which it found him, to a secure, comfortable, and refined condition; religion leads him onward and ever onward in a course of endless progress. It is obvious that if this view of religion, this tendency to go on to perfection, pervaded the whole character of individuals and of society, it would have a de-

cided influence not only on the mind, the intellectual and moral powers of men, but on their every-day employments, and all the arts of civilized life.

What is the effect of religion on the *arts?* The history of civilization shows that although the religious opinions of men, in all countries and ages of the world, have been disfigured by ignorance and superstition, yet the highest productions of the arts were inspired by a desire to embody in sensible forms their ideas of infinite perfection. It was this desire, (which is itself but a manifestation of the fundamental principle of religion,) which in ancient Greece breathed life into stone. The temples arose, and the statues of the gods appeared, in which the Greeks endeavoured to bring to light the prototype of the human form as it exists in the mind of the Creator.

And what was it that in the period which we choose to denominate the dark ages, raised those wonderful structures, the monuments of Gothic architecture, of which we, in our self-styled enlightened age, can produce but imperfect imitations? It is difficult by a brief description to do justice to the true character of these works of art. If you look at the outside of these old cathedrals, the walls consisting of half-projecting united columns, and running up in innumerable turrets, and lanterns, studded with buds, and flowers, and statuary, all sculptured in stone; and if you behold the interior of the building, the ground plot uniting in the form of a cross, the lofty ranges of clustered pillars, rising perpendicularly until they bend to meet and blend in endless ramifications with the

highest branches of the opposite columns ; the walls covered with paintings and statuary, the windows of stained glass, glowing with all the romantic hues of the forest in autumn, in which flowers, and pictures of saints, and legend history are represented, — if you look upon this magnificent whole, so simple in its great proportions, so infinitely various and finished in its details, — you feel convinced, that no other idea than that which irresistibly fills the soul of the beholder, could have laid out and accomplished these wonderful works of human hands. The Gothic cathedral stands yet as a symbol of the cross first preached in the forests of Germany.

In painting, what works of the pencil can compare with those which represent the sentiment of devotion, the pictures of the holy family, of the saints and martyrs, — subjects which, in Italy, Spain, and Germany, have engaged the most gifted minds. If you would find out how far the highest conceptions and aspirations of the soul can be made manifest on the canvass, look at those divine works, which have at all times filled every beholder with pious delight, and have called forth kindred talents, and inspired them to similar undertakings.

It is religion that has endowed poetry and eloquence with divine power to open the eyes of the blind to the wonders of the spiritual world, to initiate man into the mysteries of nature and of his own soul, to trace, in every part of this vast system of worlds, the features of the divine likeness, and to fill every mind with a desire to strive after godlike perfection.

Religion is the very soul of music. The highest compositions of musical Italy and Germany, the most heart-melting and inspiring strains, have streamed forth from this source; and the most powerful and wonderful of all musical instruments, seems profaned by any composition that is not characterized by solemn earnestness, by a feeling of sad or cheerful devotion.

Such is the influence of the religious principle over the fine arts; its effect upon the useful arts is essentially the same. It ennobles and sanctifies the performance of the smallest duty, the exercise of the humblest occupation. Not only he who generously lays down his life for his friends, but he also, who, in the spirit of kindness, offers a cup of cold water only, are partakers of that blessing which attends the meanest as well as the greatest work of love. The God of nature, who has endowed man with power to imitate him in his wonderful works by the creations of art, shows forth his perfection, not only in the magnificent elm and the graceful lily, but in the meanest moss, the scanty clothing of the solitary rock, and in the undistinguished multitude of blades of grass that cover the valley. It is the religious principle, the earnest endeavour to make the work he undertakes, whatever it be, a perfect work of its kind, which clothes with dignity and honor the occupation of every workingman. Every laboring man may be guided by religious principle, whether he be employed in preparing garments for the body, that shall afford security against the cold or the heat, without impeding the easy motion of every limb; or whether

he be engaged in building houses, that shall shelter the inhabitants from the inconveniences, while they secure to them most of the advantages, of living in the open air ; or whether he be employed in building vessels, that shall give to the traveller on the deep the security of a land conveyance, or in constructing railroads, that shall enable the loaded car to move with greater rapidity and ease on the solid ground, than the vessel with full sails on the yielding waters.

In short, whatever be our line of business, or mode of employment, it is the earnest desire to impress upon every work of our hands the likeness of that image of perfection that lives in the soul of the religious man, which is the spring of success, and constitutes the true glory of every occupation. It is this which imparts to the performance of every workingman a merit which finds its adequate reward, not so much in the higher price of the work, and in the praise of the employer, as in the approving conscience, the elevated self-respect of the faithful laborer.

I have presented the considerations which I wished to offer to you with a view to contribute my mite to what I have most truly at heart, the progress of the arts, and of every branch of industry, in this country. I have withheld nothing that I thought useful, without sparing the prejudices, and, I hope, without wounding the feelings of any one. I have endeavoured to show, that American industry, in order to advance in the way of perfection, must be free from that narrow-

minded, exclusive patriotism, which can see no excellence except at home, as well as from that haughty partiality for foreign productions, which slights and starves native merit. It must drive out that mercenary spirit, which corrupts and injures both the employer and the laborer; it must rise above the love and the fear of fashion, which cramp individual talent, and kill, in the germ, originality and independent striving after excellence. Above all, if American industry aspires after perfection, it must drink deep of the living waters of religion. The idea of infinite perfection must inspire every workingman; the day laborer, the mechanic, as well as the artist. We should all bear in mind the saying of the Chinese philosopher, Confucius, "Those who strive after perfection commence a long way. They strive after the highest, but they start from that which is nearest."

RELIGION AND THE CHURCH.*

Preface.

THE views of RELIGION and the CHURCH, which I intend to publish in a small number of Tracts, of which the present is the first, are the result of long meditation. More than twenty years ago, when I was pursuing my studies in a German University, I felt strongly impressed with the inefficacy of the established forms of faith and worship. Their unfitness to satisfy the spiritual wants of my own nature, and to quicken the religious affections and energies of the people, called up to mind the image of a Universal Church, a church of mankind, having no other foundation and support than the *natural interest of men in religion.* The true interests of the church, that is, the religious interests of man, seemed to me most effectually secured by relying wholly and solely on the principles of individual freedom, and intimate spiritual intercourse among men, and the tendency to infinite progress in human nature.

* It was the design of the author to publish a work under this title in numbers. But before his death the first number only had appeared (published in 1836), containing the first two chapters. An unfinished portion, beginning with the third chapter, was left in manuscript. This is now added.

This early philosophic vision, mixed up with some extraneous and heterogeneous notions, has never faded from my mind, but continued to grow clearer, and more inspiring to action; although unfavorable circumstances, and a conscientious apprehension of the unripeness of some of my views, prevented any attempt at carrying it into effect. Many stray thoughts, and some continuous arguments, were committed to writing at different times. Some of the leading ideas in the first chapter of this tract were published in 1823, in the "Annals of Basel," in an article on the Destination of Man. Twelve years ago, when crossing the Atlantic, to commence life anew in a new world, that long-cherished scheme of religious philanthropy was ever before my mind, as the only star of promise amidst the gloom of disappointed hopes, baffled exertions, and broken bonds of affection. Many passages, now first published, were composed on that voyage.

During my residence in this country, religion and theology have been the principal objects of my studies and exertions. My early impressions of the inefficacy of the present state and forms of religion, owing in a great measure to the disproportionate progress of men in other pursuits, have been revived and strengthened by what I have since witnessed and experienced. The great work of Benjamin Constant, on religion, enabled me to see the opinions which I had formed, exhibited and exemplified on a larger scale; and in an article in the "American Quarterly Review," (March, 1832,) I endeavoured to show the importance of this new view of religion, as a principle of our nature, more or less perfectly manifested in every part and age of the world, essentially akin to freedom and civilization, and capable of endless progress.

A growing indifference to religion among men who are engaged in practical pursuits, admitting of exact calculation, induced me, in an Address, introductory to the fourth course of Franklin Lectures in Boston, (December, 1834,) to point out the intimate and influential connexion between religion and the arts. From that address a number of passages have been inserted in this tract. But I should mention what, more than any thing else, encouraged me to attempt a full expression of my thoughts on the subject of religion. Pure and elevated minds, in whose friendship I have found new and ever-flowing sources of quickening sympathy and spiritual enterprise, prompted my desire to go forward, or join them, in the great task of reform, and in the greater attempt at establishing the religious intercourse of men, upon a principle having in itself the capacity of endless improvement.

The thoughts, which I had, at different times, committed to writing, were intended for a more extensive and connected work than the present. But numerous avocations obliged me to give up that plan. Besides, it seemed to me, that the most important topics, published by themselves, might be more effectual than elaborate volumes in making this a subject of general interest and reflection. The tracts, in which I intend to treat of the most prominent points, will appear in a suitable form to make it easy to bind them together in one volume.

One thing I desire the reader to remember in perusing these pages. My object is to trace religion to its foundation in man; and to judge of religious institutions according to their adaptation to human nature. In my reasoning, therefore, I appeal to no external authority, however important, but solely to such facts as are within

reach of the observation of every one, making use of his senses, and attending to the operations of his own mind. Those records, which, by different portions of mankind, are considered as of divine origin, have been consulted so far as they contain any revelation of human nature; and no further than the facts, thus brought to light, can be ascertained and proved, at any time, by the consciousness of each individual, — no matter whether the same truths could have been discovered or not, by the unassisted exercise of our own faculties. My inquiries and reasonings are addressed to observing and thinking men and women, whatever advantages of information they may have possessed, and to whatever results their own experience and investigation may have led them. Whatever assertions I advance, they must appear before the judgment-seat of every independent mind. Whether the facts I assert relate to the outer or the inner man, the senses and the consciousness of every one are the competent judges of the facts. Whatever inferences I draw from them, his own reason, acting upon the verdict of his senses and his consciousness, must pass sentence on my conclusions.

CHAPTER I.

Religion.

THE following views, on the subject of religion, are not meant for a particular class of persons, clergymen or laymen, skeptics or believers. They are

intended for all to whom the subject of religion seems a matter of interest, whether they look upon it as a source of good or of evil, as a reality or a delusion, or as a remarkable phenomenon in history, or as a peculiar feature in the character, or as a principle implanted in the nature of man.

I do not come forward as the advocate, or the opposer, of any particular creed, or form of worship. Having received, early in life, a religious education, and taken upon trust the faith of my parents, I have learned to feel for those, and with those, who believe in whatever they are taught, simply because they implicitly believe in their teachers. At a later period of life, my mind passed through the trial of a complete intellectual skepticism ; and I learned to sympathize with every one, who, for reasons known to himself, refuses assent to any system of faith, because he does not find one that satisfies his inquiring mind. My reason may compel me to reject the peculiar religious opinions of others ; yet my heart unites in worship with the Roman Catholic as truly as with the Protestant, the Trinitarian and the Unitarian, the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Heathen. I own a fellow-feeling, a religious sympathy, with every one who recognises something, for which, as an object of infinite value to himself, he is willing to lay down his life, — be it his family, his country, his duty, or his passion. As the Apostle Paul, in preaching to the Athenians, did not scruple to quote the words of their own heathen poets, in confirmation of Christian truth, and to own them as fellow-believers in Him

whom they ignorantly worshipped, so I diligently seek, and am delighted to find, in every form of religion, in every flight of enthusiasm, nay, in the fearless freedom of sincere skepticism, a more or less perfect manifestation of the same vital element of faith. I feel an intense and ever-growing desire to see all the various issues of spiritual life united, — without feeling in the least concerned, whether the great river, formed by the confluence of so many living waters, receive its *name* from one or the other of its fountain-heads.

Professors of different systems of faith find it easy to fix upon and defend, against each other, the points on which they disagree ; while they find it difficult to render a satisfactory account, even to themselves, of the very essence of religion, which is the common foundation of all those various superstructures. Points of controversy lie within the reach of superficial reasoning, while the fundamental principle requires a depth of inquiry, to which not many are willing to descend. This circumstance strengthens the disunion, and prevents a fair and full understanding among contending sects. Hence, there seems to be but one way to bring men of different persuasions to a better understanding of themselves and of each other, and to effect a union for mutual spiritual improvement. We must endeavour to find a satisfactory answer to the question, — not what is true Christianity, or Judaism, or Mahometanism, — but first of all, what is religion ?

What is religion ? The Jew will probably answer

this question by referring you to the Law and the Prophets; the Christian will turn to the New Testament, the Hindoo to the Veds, the Mahometan to the Koran. The worshipper of the elements and the stars will raise his hand to the sun; the philosopher will place his hand on his head, or his heart, referring you to the luminary within. But however they may differ with regard to the sources from which the knowledge of true religion is to be drawn, or the means by which it may be established, men of all sects agree with him who is of no sect, in believing, that it is something *in* man, a want, a tendency of our common nature, which leads the Hindoo to the Veds, the Mahometan to the Koran, the Jew and the Christian to their sacred Scriptures. From whatever sources our various ideas and forms of religion be derived, the first impulse, the thirst that leads us to the fountain, is clearly something that exists not without, but within our inmost being, and is essentially the same in all men. It is with religion as it is with joy and sorrow, love and hatred, and other elements of our nature. Those things, which, to some men, are causes of joy, objects of love, do not call forth the same, they perhaps excite the very opposite emotions in others; yet joy and sorrow, love and hate are essentially the same in every human being.

Religion is a *common* tendency of our nature; this is evident from the fact, that some form of faith, some kind of worship, are found among all nations, in the savage, the barbarous, and the civilized state. The history of the world shows forth, and the con-

sciousness of every individual bears testimony, that there is in human nature something, a principle, or disposition, which we may not be able to define, yet, by which all men are enabled to understand what is meant by such words as religion, worship, and piety. Again, religion is a *peculiar* tendency of *human* nature, inasmuch as it belongs to no other than human beings. Our very language forbids our attributing religion, or piety, or worship, or superstition, or fanaticism, to the most gifted and docile animals, or to any other creature besides man. The philosophy of religion may show us that this exclusive appropriation of a certain class of words to human beings, is not an arbitrary or accidental use of language, but an unconscious recognition of a fundamental truth. Religion, whether it be a truth or a delusion, an innate principle, or the result of laws, customs, and education, is evidently a property which belongs to no other animate or inanimate things, but to man alone. This property or capacity by which man is distinguished from all his fellow-creatures; what is it? A comparative view of the various kinds and orders of creatures may help us to ascertain, what place in the hierarchy of nature belongs to man as a *religious* being.

The mineral, the plant, the animal, — who can look at these different objects without seeing in them not only divers kinds, but distinct orders, of things, showing forth a scale of perfection, in the works of nature, by which the lowest, in regular progression, is united with the most perfect being? The plant is a more perfect being than the mineral, inasmuch as by spon-

taneous growth it frees itself, in some measure, from the law of gravitation, which draws every material thing to a level with the mass; and as it puts forth leaves, flowers, and fruits, containing the seeds which, while the individual passes away, secure the perpetuity of the species. Still higher on the scale of perfection we see the animal, a self-moving, sentient being, endowed with powers and susceptibilities, which are fully developed, and most harmoniously blended in man.

We say, then, that the plant is more perfect than the mineral, and the animal more perfect than the plant, inasmuch as we perceive in the one qualities or powers, of which the other is either destitute or but imperfectly possessed. Man is more perfect than his fellow-beings, not because he possesses any one of those faculties which he has in common with them, in an extraordinary degree, but rather by a fit combination of powers; and still more by one property of his nature, which constitutes him not only the most perfect of animals, but a being of a higher order.

The mineral substance passes from a shapeless liquid into the regular, solid form of a crystal. It is, as it were, the first imperfect attempt of nature to form a plant. But the mineral, when it has attained its most perfect form in the crystal, can no do more; it cannot pass beyond the boundaries which nature has assigned to all creatures of the same kind. The plant reaches its destined height; and when it has borne flowers and fruits, the fruits do not contain seeds of a more perfect being than the parent plant. The animals, too,

even those most gifted with intelligence and art, never exceed the limited sphere of existence assigned to their kind. The workmanship of the bees and the ants is not improved by the experience of past generations, or by the free exertions of any individual. We may tell from the seed what the plant will be; and from the egg of the bird what sort of nest he will build. But what attainments in science and art, what strength and elevation of character, may be wrapt up in the human infant, — who can foresee and calculate? We assign to every creature its appropriate rank in the scale of being; to the plant above the mineral, to the animal above the plant, inasmuch as the germs of perfection which lie in every one, attain in each a different height; and we assign a rank above all other creatures to man, because in him alone we discover the elements of perpetual growth; to him alone the spirit of improvement is given without measure.

Man is capable of an infinite variety of pursuits, and every one of his pursuits, every art, every science, is susceptible of infinite progress. And the history of civilization shows that the power and the love of improvement increase in proportion to its attainments. It is the principle of progress in man that has enabled him to explore the earth, and the sea, and the starry heavens; and to make the elements, and all kingdoms of nature, tributary to his support and comfort. Every useful invention, all the blessings of civilized life, are derived from this source. But the strength, the incalculable energy, of this principle is apparent, not so much from the greatness of its attainments, as from

the feeling of dissatisfaction that attends our most successful efforts. In every active pursuit, in every art, it induces men to project and attempt works that have never before been accomplished or conceived; in every science it directs the inquiring mind to that which is unexplored and unknown. Not satisfied with the obvious teachings of experience concerning himself and the world around him, the mind of man strives to enter into the hidden things of nature, and the unfathomed depths of his own being. He attempts the solution of unexplained and untried problems, forming scheme after scheme, experiment after experiment, until actual experience convert conjectures into discoveries. Nay, this ever onward principle in man impels him to venture into regions of thought, which experience, at least in this life, cannot enter, but which are of such importance, that any conjecture supported by analogy, is deeply interesting to man. In the mind itself there are desires and capacities for acquiring knowledge, for moral effort, and self-sacrificing benevolence, which require an endless existence for their full developement and legitimate use. The most thorough and extensive acquaintance with nature forces upon us the conviction of the littleness of all we know, and the greatness, the immensity, of that which is still unknown. We are not satisfied with ascertaining the causes of the events which we behold, and the purposes which they seem intended to answer; the inquiring mind is pressing ever onward to the cause of causes, and the final purpose of all things. It is when impressed with the shortness of

human life, and its insufficiency for the boundless aspirations of the mind, we long for an endless existence as indispensable to continual improvement; it is when tracing back and following onward the series of causes and effects, we inquire into the end and the origin, the creating, directing, and sustaining power, the self-existent essence of all things; it is when our strongest affections, not satisfied with transient and imperfect objects, rise in search of an eternal, and all-perfect object of devotion and love; it is then that the principle of endless progress in man stands revealed clearly and fully as the principle of religion.

Religion is *the tendency of the human mind to the infinite.* Religion is often said to consist in those thoughts, feelings, purposes, and actions, which befit the relation of man to the Deity, or to invisible powers. But this definition is not wide enough. There are nations which, according to the accounts of travellers, adore neither one God, nor more than one. Yet they believe in the magic powers of their priests over those of nature. They offer sacrifices to the souls of the departed; they tie shoes to their feet for their journey to another world. Now, the simple anticipation of a life after death, which is the end of all earthly things; the belief in faculties or arts, which can check and bend the laws of nature by which all finite power is controlled; the faith in any thing that transcends the horizon of the senses, is essentially of a religious nature; it is a manifestation of the same tendency to the infinite, which leads man on, from

the worship of powers supposed to be infinite, to the conception and adoration of one God.

It is obvious that my object is not to determine which of the numerous systems that are, or at any time have been, professed by men, must be considered the true faith. I speak of the fundamental principle which is invariably the same in all these systems, however various and irreconcilable in many, perhaps in all other points. Some tribes of savages suppose that the souls of the deceased are hunting in unknown forests, and are still subject to heat and cold, to hunger and thirst, and fatigue. The Platonic philosopher, and the majority of Christians, believe that the soul, surviving the death of the body, is destined to be more or less happy, or miserable, as in this life it has been more or less virtuous or vicious. The savage, in this case, agrees with the Platonist and the Christian, in extending his contemplation and his faith beyond this life, which, without the principle of endless progress in the mind, must appear, on the mere evidence of the senses, as the whole of human existence. Even the unbeliever in a life after death agrees with the believer, in ascribing to the individual human being in the course of this life, and to the human race through the interminable succession of generations, a power of unlimited improvement. The faith of him who feels assured of the immortality and constant progress of each human being, and the faith of him who admits only the immortality and endless perfectibility of the race, are both the offspring of the religious principle in the soul of man, which enables and

prompts him to extend his thoughts and purposes, his hopes, and his fears, continually *beyond* those things and attainments which are bounded by present experience and calculation.

In the same way, the believer in one God agrees with the worshipper of many gods, in recognising, in the various phenomena of nature, the effects of some designing power or powers independent of man. The atheist, too, sees in nature an immeasurable field of observation, the boundless domain of concordant and inimical powers, whose conflict and coöperation fill the contemplating mind with amazement, and excite in it an unquenchable thirst after a more extensive and intimate acquaintance with the undeniable miracles of nature. The devout contemplation of nature, which the conscientious atheist has in common with the polytheist, and the Christian; the worship of many gods, and the adoration of one, are but three different manifestations of the same principle in man. Thus, if you examine the endless variety of forms and sentiments of religion among civilized and savage nations, you find, indeed, many incompatible opinions and discordant practices sanctioned and insisted upon as standards of orthodoxy and piety. But if you press your inquiry further, to ascertain what it is that makes men to embrace sometimes the most sublime, and sometimes the most absurd notions, as the bread of life to the craving soul, you find in each of them an expression of the same tendency to supply, as far as possible, the same permanent want of our common nature. Whether you consider the faith of the sav-

age in the ability of his sorcerer to bend the elements and powers of nature to his purposes ; or the aspirations of the mystic at holding converse with the spirits of the departed ; or the faith of the Christian in the moral government of the universe, and the destination of the soul for endless advancement in wisdom, goodness, and happiness, — you find in all these different religions the same longing of soul, the same reaching forward to something beyond our limited experience, something unattainable by an ordinary exercise of our faculties in this life ; something that demands the highest possible exertion, and an ever-enlarging sphere of existence and action.

That religion is not a stationary but a progressive principle, nay, the very principle of endless advancement, — this is most clearly and powerfully set forth in Christianity. Christians are commanded to "call no man master"; to "judge of themselves what is right"; "to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good" ; and the faithful seeker is encouraged by the promise, that "he shall know the truth, and the truth shall make him free." We know from experience, that the best things in this world, when perverted, become causes of the greatest evil. And thus the history of Christianity records many instances of reckless fanaticism, led on by clear-sighted ambition, to proclaim a blind faith and dumb obedience to the infallible authority of a man, or the paper constitution of a sect, as the only legitimate terms of salvation ; and to denounce all free inquiry, every attempt at rising beyond the past and present attainments of man,

as the pride of rebellious reason. But this surely was not the creed of the Apostle Paul, who, in drawing the likeness of a religious man, a true Christian, describes the character of one devoted to the cause of truth, the advancement of knowledge, whether it be sanctioned or not by the professed advocates and the acknowledged oracles of religion. "Brethren," he says, "I count not myself to have apprehended; but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark." And what is the mark of the Christian? It is the stature of perfect men; we are called to go on to perfection, nay, "to be perfect even as our Father in Heaven is perfect."

I have observed that the true nature of religion is manifest, not only in those systems of faith which are supported by experience and sound analogical reasoning, but in those also which are not consistent with facts established by observation and history. The imagination may create and multiply signs and wonders without end; dogmatical assertion may insist upon the belief of things which are not only beyond but contrary to reason; fanaticism may contrive innumerable ways of mortifying, not only the flesh, but the intellectual and moral nature of man. Yet in all these unnatural and unreasonable theories and practices, which have their origin in a disordered state of the principle of religion, you discern the same essential features; the same striving to look beyond those

things that are seen, and temporal, in search of those that are not seen, and eternal.

It must be evident from these observations, that all arguments against religion, derived from the errors and superstitions which have been held sacred by men, are vain; since these errors and superstitions themselves bear evidence to the reality of the principle of religion. Besides, we think it unfair and unreasonable to charge the science of astronomy with the dreams of astrology; or mathematics with the magic power ascribed by some mystics to certain mysterious combinations of numbers; or chemistry with the solemn trifles of alchymy; or medicine with every nostrum and panacea concocted by superstitious quackery; or philology with the etymological discoveries of those who know how to derive "darkness from light"; or history with its fabulous beginnings. Every science and art has its mythology, as well as its history and philosophy; yet the errors, which mark the infancy of every branch of human knowledge, do not affect the credit of the science itself. The mistakes are of course numerous and great in proportion to the magnitude and intrinsic difficulty of the subject. If this be thought natural and reasonable with regard to every other department of knowledge, why not with regard to religion, a science, which, whatever be its claims to certainty, surpasses every other by the immensity of its object?

It has been asserted, that the religious view of the phenomena of nature is merely the first stage, the infancy of reasoning, which, with the increase of infor-

mation, is superseded by scientific investigation, consisting in the observation of facts, and reasoning from its results. The savage worships the rolling stone; he ascribes its motion to an indwelling power which his credulous fancy personifies. The man of science, who confines himself to a developement of facts, strips them of all that seems wonderful and supernatural to the savage. He explains the rolling of the stone as the necessary effect of the law of gravitation, or the centripetal tendency by which it is compelled to move to the lowest place on the surface of the earth, that is not preoccupied by some heavier body. Thus, many phenomena in nature, which, in ages of ignorance, were ascribed to direct divine agency, have been found, in more enlightened times, to proceed from natural causes, subject to scientific calculation. In this way the dominion of religion seems to grow smaller as that of science enlarges; and this has led to the inference, that ignorance is the mother of religion, and that its dreams or faint perceptions must vanish with the night that has given them birth, before the advancing light of science.

It is easy to understand how these and similar considerations may bring a superficial reasoner to the result, that religion is only the proof and the offspring of ignorance. On a somewhat stricter examination, however, we cannot but perceive, that this reasoning against the reality of religion proceeds on the obvious fallacy, that, because an object is not found where we first sought it, we have reason to infer, that it is not to be found at all, that it exists no-

where except in our own imagination. We know that the most enlightened, as well as the most ignorant, of our race, with comparatively few exceptions, have professed some kind of religion. Nay, if religion, as I have endeavoured to show, consists, not in the objects of faith, but in the principle of faith itself, in the boundless aspirations of the soul, it can hardly be said of any human being, whatever be his professions of belief or unbelief, that he is wholly destitute of religion. The mere fact, then, that the wise man does not find his God where the idolater thinks he finds him, surely does not prove that there is no God.

Still more, the difference between the religion of the ignorant and that of the enlightened man, is, in reality, not so great as may be supposed from the circumstance, that the one offers worship to a rolling stone, for which the other looks upon him as an idolater. It should not be overlooked, in the first place, that the act of personifying something that he cannot see or explain, though its existence is proved by its operations, — this act of the mind is not the fortuitous invention of a credulous imagination. It is the first essay of unpractised reason, not only to trace an effect to a latent cause, but to form and hold fast an abstract idea. The apparent worship of a stone implies the conception of a moving power, distinct from the thing in motion. A savage, who performed his devotion before a bull, being asked whether he worshipped the bull, answered, "No, but the manitou" (the spirit or the living principle and common original) "of bulls." And on further inquiry, he

asserted that there was a manitou of every kind of animals, and a manitou of men. As for the object of devotion, the savage and the sage worship in reality the same mysterious power, that is manifest in the rolling stone at our feet, as truly as in the systems of rolling worlds around us.

The sphere of religion, so far from growing smaller, is, on the contrary, continually enlarging with the increasing light of science. The worship of singular indications of superhuman and supernatural power gives way to a devout conception of one omnipotent and omniscient God. The fact, that the civilized man forsakes the worship of his savage ancestors, instead of being a proof of the precarious and transient nature of religion, is, on the contrary, the legitimate effect, as well as the clearest demonstration, of the principle itself in action. It is the progress of the unfolding mind from the finite to the infinite.

It has been rightly observed, that sincere skepticism, unbelief, and protestantism, though often stigmatized as infidelity and irreligion, are necessary stages in the progress of religion. We doubt, we deny a form of faith, an object of worship, when we perceive its finite nature and consequent inadequacy to satisfy the boundless aspirations of the mind. Still, unbelief and protestanism, as they consist merely in a denial of an imperfect faith, are in themselves finite and transient, and therefore no more qualified to satisfy the religious wants of man, than idol worship. It is an advanced state of religious education, which makes a man doubt and reject the worship of stones

and animals, or any other inadequate conception of the supreme object of faith. But when he arrives at a still more advanced period, he does not reject, but he comprehends and adopts, the essence both of skepticism and childish faith. For he perceives, that the child and the savage ignorantly worship, and that the protestant and the skeptic only strive to free from misconception, the same universal and eternal object of devout contemplation and love.

We are so apt to associate and to identify all our ideas of religion with certain tenets and forms, that we are apt to overlook the seed and the natural growth of faith and devotion in the soul. The various and ever-varying creeds and institutions of religion convey to the philosophic historian a far more important object of information, than the mere facts and events, of which the works on ecclesiastical history and the history of dogmas are generally composed. These changing forms reveal what may not improperly be called the natural history of the principle of religion in man. In early childhood, and throughout the infancy of intellectual cultivation, the principle of religion is manifest in the sentiment of wonder; a restless and boundless curiosity; a vague striving after unattainable objects, and unknown sources of satisfaction; childlike trust in the all-sufficiency of childish theories to clear up difficulties and remove doubts; and similar indications of the minority of the human understanding. No information can satisfy the curiosity of the child, no experience can equal his expectation. Not content with what he knows, and

does, and is, he continually tries to find new objects of interest and wonder, without being able to distinguish those things which open to the mind a truly infinite range of thought and action, from the wonders of the day, which derive their magnitude from his own ignorance and credulity.

The enlargement of man's knowledge is gradual and slow; yet his comparative ignorance does not prevent him from searching after objects that shall satisfy infinite desires. It is natural, therefore, as he by degrees extends the circle of his ideas, that he should ascribe a superhuman and supernatural character and origin to things which transcend only his own limited knowledge of the powers of nature and of man. Nay, he will spoil and pervert his own sound powers of observation, and judgment of common events, by a fond and confident anticipation of wonders. He will carry uncertainty into the safest calculations of science by taking into account something that lies beyond all calculation. He observes the stars, not with a view to comprehend their appointed courses and eternal laws, or to find an unalterable standard for the division of time, and regulation of human affairs; he studies astronomy, in order to penetrate the meaning of all those points and figures which cover the dome of heaven with their mysterious splendor, — to find the key to these brilliant hieroglyphics, in which He, who sees the end from the beginning, was supposed to have recorded the future history of man. Thus the profound calculations of astronomy give way to the magnificent

dreams of astrology. In the same manner he enters upon the study of chemistry as a noviciate for the wonders of alchymy. In the medical science and profession he is not content with inquiring into the natural causes of disease, and the powers of healing, which provident nature has laid up in her various works for her suffering children. He slights the simples used in ordinary, and resorts to magic antidotes and sympathetic cures, to remove the distempers brought on, as he believes, by unclean spirits or Circean draughts. In morals, the regular performance of every duty, amidst the changes and conflicts of life, does not come up to his ideal standard of holiness; in order to rise beyond nature, and above the world, he shuts himself out from the society of men, and subjects himself to the most unnatural and arbitrary abstinences and torments. The evidences of design in all the works of nature soon strike the awakening mind of man; but not being able to comprehend the whole series of means and ends in this vast system, and not sufficiently cultivated to take into account his own ignorance, he is apt to think that every event which has an influence upon his condition, is designed wholly or chiefly for himself. Hence he will cast the lot, or observe the flight of birds, and the instinct of animals, in order to find out the designs of Providence, and his own destiny. His mind not being enlarged and profound enough to trace to the Infinite One, all the evidences of designing power in nature, he seizes upon its most striking manifestations. He personifies, that is, he considers those powers of

nature which have a favorable or injurious influence on himself, as designing beings; he pays them honor, strives to gain their favor and avert their displeasure, by supplications and gifts, under the idea that the gods can be propitiated by the same means by which his superiors among men, kings and their satraps, the gods of this earth, are influenced.

Who does not see in all these vague strivings and imaginings, the first unfolding of the seeds of infinity in the soul of man? These seeds only need a tender and judicious treatment, the influence of a religious education, to grow up into a rational, spiritual, and practical faith. All errors in religion, all mistakes as to the true object of worship, arise, not from the principle itself, but from ignorance and false conceptions of other things; they are owing to a want of correct general information. Information, science, as I have before observed, instead of encroaching on the legitimate domains of religion, open to the awaking eye of faith an infinite instead of a finite sphere of contemplation. Thus the prediction of eclipses, the knowledge of the calendar, have been objects of religious awe to the ignorant multitude of men as long as they were kept from them by selfish priests. But as the light of science puts to flight the visions of a deceived imagination, the religious principle, no longer dazzled by striking appearances, and engrossed by things and events that can be measured and calculated, presses on to the great first cause of change and harmony in the universe. The workings of a fond, credulous, and wonder-loving imagination seek refuge,

and find a legitimate sphere, in poetry; while the principle of religion, no longer satisfied with the objects of childish awe and rapture, lives, and moves, and has its being, in the infinity of truth.

We have seen that in every form of religion, whether true or delusive, we recognise the well or ill-directed operation, or the unconscious expression, of the same principle. We see the same striving of the mind to go out of itself, to enter beneath the surface of things; to go back to the cradle, and look beyond the grave, of all created things, and commune with the Creator. We recognise the manifestations of that native tendency of the mind to the infinite, which we denominate the principle of religion.

After these considerations it cannot be difficult to determine, whether any thing, be it a matter of duty, or of affection, or of taste, a truth, or a fiction, is a subject of a religious nature. If our virtue has no higher aim than to fulfil certain engagements, or imitate the example of another man, it is virtue still; but it bears a religious character only when it recognises an infinite standard of duty. If we love in our friends not only what we see, and the attainments they have made, but their immortal nature, and striving after perfection, our love then has for its object something infinite, and is truly a religious affection. If a picture, or a picturesque scene in nature, by the harmonious variety of its forms, impresses us with the idea of beauty, this does not of itself connect it with our religious emotions; but if this beauty bear the impress, and be suited to call forth in the mind, the idea of that

harmonious variety which pervades the universe, the picture then is to be considered as a sacred picture, whatever be the particular object which it represents. And thus music, poetry, and the other fine arts, derive a sacred or religious character from the infinity of the object or idea which they aim at representing. It is the same with our conceptions of truth. Every special truth, indeed, as well as every particular beauty, being, on a small scale, an exhibition of universal truth and beauty, is apt to call forth religious ideas and emotions. But it is the thought of infinity that constitutes their religious character.

The influence of religion, when thus considered, on the arts and sciences, on all the means and efforts employed for improving the condition of men, is evident. Civilization and religion are intimately connected with each other, in their origin, and in their aim. Civilization is founded on the desire of man to improve his present condition; religion consists in the tendency of human nature to infinite improvement. The principle of progress in man is the fountain-head of both; it is the connecting link between the life that now is, and that which is to come; the mediator between time and eternity. Civilization begins the course of human education by raising man from the helpless state in which it found him, to a secure, comfortable, and refined condition; religion leads him onward, and ever onward, in a course of endless improvement. Religion continually raises the standard in proportion to the strength acquired by previous efforts and attainments; it recognises no highest mark of human progress, but bids us strive after godlike perfection.

What is the effect of religion on the arts and sciences? The history of civilization shows that although the religious opinions of men, in all countries and ages, have been disfigured by ignorance and superstition, yet the brightest revelations of human intelligence were the fruits of an ardent striving to solve the mysteries of divine wisdom; and the highest productions of the arts were inspired by a desire to embody, in sensible forms, some idea of divine perfection. The theosophic speculations of the Hindoos, the wisdom of the Hebrews, the philosophy of Plato, and the Grecian temples and statues of the gods, the Gothic cathedrals, and the pictures of saints and martyrs, the sacred music, poetry, and eloquence of the Christian world, — are manifestations of that tendency of the human mind to the infinite, which leads us, first, to the investigation of finite things, and then induces us to consider the results of our labor only as an earnest of greater discoveries. The useful as well as the fine arts are susceptible of the propitious influence of religion. It ennobles and sanctifies the performance of the smallest duty, the exercise of the humblest occupation. The religious principle, the earnest endeavour to make the work he undertakes, whatever it be, a perfect work of its kind, is the spring of success, and constitutes the true glory of every occupation, and of every working man.

As for the influence of this principle on the social condition of men, it is clear, that the most truly religious state of society is that which secures to every human being the freest exercise of all his powers for

the endless progress of mankind. Every office, every service, that is intended to promote this great aim of social life, is a holy office, a divine service, which invests with sacred orders every one who devotes himself to its performance.

In each human being the principle of religion manifests itself by its influence over all the powers of the mind. It forms the religion of the intellect, the religion of the heart, the religion of the will. As a principle of *intellectual* life, religion enables us to form ideas of universal and eternal truth, of infinite beauty, and absolute goodness. As a principle of the *heart*, a matter of feeling, — religion inspires us with the lofty faith in the immortality of our affections. By the sacrifices which it enables us to make, it assures us of the ever-enduring, ever-expanding nature of true love. As a principle of the *will*, it prompts us to form the most enlarged conceptions of duty, and by the greatest possible efforts to fill the measure of our conceptions. It makes us look upon our highest moral attainments only as beginnings and starting points in an endless course.

I have endeavoured to show that religion is the highest manifestation of that principle of progress which we observe throughout creation, in the different orders of beings. In the three kingdoms of nature, in minerals, plants, and animals, the principle of progress appears as a finite power, inasmuch as, even among the most gifted of animals, no individual, by any exertion of its own, can rise above the limited sphere of action which nature has assigned to all be-

ings of the same class. In man, this principle appears as an element of endless progress, as a power by which an individual may rise above every degree of wisdom and excellence ever attained or conceived of by his fellow-men. It is the principle of endless progress, as revealed in man, it is the tendency of human nature to the Infinite, which we call religion.

The principle of religion manifests itself by a constant striving after perfection in the exercise of all our faculties, in every kind of occupation, from the most ordinary to the most exalted. As an element of civilization, religion must be considered as the soul of improvement, the life-giving principle of the arts and sciences, the genius of social liberty. In each individual mind, religion manifests itself by the tendency of all its powers, the intellect, the affections, and the will, to conceive, cherish, and act out the idea of perfect wisdom, excellence, and love.

CHAPTER II.

Theology.

WHAT is Theology? This question, considering the prevalence of partial views among theologians, will call forth as many different answers as the leading question of the preceding chapter, "What is Religion?" The exclusive religionists of different

sects will assert, that true theology consists in a perfect knowledge of the Bible, or of the Koran, or of the Veds, or of some other form of faith and worship. And as the great families of worshippers are again divided into different households of faith, so we find discordant systems of theology, each one claiming to be the only just exposition of a common standard of religious truth. Thus, among Christians, we find a catholic theology, and a protestant theology; each of which consists of a number of different creeds, every one forming the basis of a separate body of divinity. But, as all the various religions among men are only different manifestations of the same principle in human nature, so all the divers theologies, great and small, are but parts and particles of one fundamental and universal theology. Religion is the tendency of human nature to the Infinite; theology is the science of religion.

Theological learning deserves the name of a science only so far as it possesses these three essential requisites, — truth, universality, and order.

First, the sole object of scientific divinity is *truth*, religious truth. Honest superstition and honest skepticism both lie within the range of scientific theology. Honest superstition, such as we find it in the mythologies and cosmogonies of the ancients, is important to the philosophic theologian, as it displays the workings of the principle of religion through the day-dreams of the imagination, and the hazardous conjectures of infant reason. Honest skepticism, though it should yield a false result, or no result at all, lies

within the range of the science. The time-hallowed records of theology, more than others, require the searching action of skepticism, which, by expunging gilded errors, brings to light the original handwriting of truth. It is also a matter of common experience with unprejudiced inquirers, that the study of works opposed to religious faith, instead of undermining, has often done more to establish it .than volumes of evidences, exhibiting the zeal and skill of the advocate, rather than the discrimination of the judge. Both skepticism and superstition, then, may become sources of truth to the theologian. But the ingenious endeavours to induce men to adopt and profess any principles of religion, however just in themselves, merely on account of their usefulness, are as unsatisfactory in a scientific, as they are unsound in a moral point of view. Whatever be the external, practical, or historical value of a system of faith, its intrinsic worth consists in its conformity with the religious nature of man.

We say, theology aims at the developement of religious truth. Truths are assertions, or conceptions, susceptible of proof. By proof, in this case, we do not mean mathematical demonstration, or immediate perception, either by our senses, or by that self-perceiving power of the mind, by which we observe, or are conscious of our own thoughts and other operations of our minds. Religious truths are conceptions of objects of an infinite nature. Our senses and our consciousness, which are the only powers of immediate perception we possess, are capable of present-

ing to us only finite objects, things, or events, such as forms and sounds, thoughts, feelings, or other particular impressions and operations of our minds. Whether the events which we observe be of a natural or of a miraculous character ; whether a man be seen swimming in the water, or walking over its surface, the fact itself, apart from the consequences that may be drawn from it, is of a finite nature. When we speak, therefore, of religious ideas susceptible of proof, we mean such proof as a being capable only of finite perceptions can have of objects of an infinite nature. We are capable of forming ideas of something infinite ; we can imagine, that there may be something that will not and cannot cease to exist. And we can examine, by using our reason, whether any of those objects, of whose actual existence or operation our senses or our consciousness bear witness, are likely or not to continue to exist ; that is, whether they possess those qualities, which, in all other cases we know of, have proved sufficient to secure the existence, or are liable to be affected by what, in other cases, has proved a cause of the destruction, of things. If, on strict examination, we find an object, say the soul of man, possessed of all the conservative, and exempt from the destructive influences we know of, it appears of the highest probability to us, that such an object will not and cannot cease to exist, that it is infinite in its nature ; and this conception of it constitutes a religious truth.

The degree of certainty belonging to the results of this kind of investigation, is the highest of which the

nature of the case admits. It does not amount to mathematical or ocular demonstration; we cannot see the Infinite One as he is, or measure out our own mind's immensity. But it is clear, in the first place, even if our inquiry do not lead us to perfect assurance, that, so far as our conceptions of *duty* depend on religious convictions, so far, for example, as our present conduct ought to be influenced by our belief or unbelief in a life to come, the least degree of greater probability in favor of either, is as decisive for all practical purposes, as absolute certainty if we could attain it. Moreover, mature reflection will convince us, that if a future life of just retribution, and endless progress, and the existence of an all-powerful, all-wise, and all-loving God, were a matter of mathematical certainty to man, there would be no moral elevation in our striving after truth, in our benevolent affections, and virtuous efforts. The confirmation, which our conceptions of infinite realities can derive from facts, that is, from finite perceptions, is just that degree of certainty which the developement and growth of our moral character require; it is a moral certainty, a matter of *faith*. It is evident from these considerations, that faith, or the acknowledgment of religious truth, is not grounded on imagination, or arbitrary volition, or a mere wish; but on the observation of facts, and a strict inquiry of reason into the fitness and sufficiency of these facts to establish the reality of any religious supposition.

The sole object of theology, then, is truth; and hence there is no other difference between theology

and religion, than the obvious difference between the knowledge of an object and the object itself.

The second requisite of theology, as a science, is *universality*. It should not be confined to the study of particular books, or the tenets of a certain church; but, having for its object the truth of religion, it should endeavour to trace the principle in all its manifestations. There is no creed or form of worship, however blended with fanciful or immoral ingredients, in which the soul of religion, the tendency of human nature to the Infinite, may not be recognised. There is not one, that, either by its resemblance or its dissimilitude, may not throw light upon other systems of faith. All religious tenets and rites, every fact in universal history that betokens the existence of the principle of religion in man, should be investigated, and the merits of each should be tried and determined by the standard of spiritual truth in the mind of the investigator. It is this extensive and impartial inquiry which constitutes the great science of *universal, comparative theology*. The advantages of this study are obvious, and too manifold to be enumerated. Every one, who is acquainted with the history of the science of the human body, its parts and their functions, knows that it owes its advancement chiefly to the study of *comparative* anatomy and physiology. And thus, for the same obvious reasons, theology, the study and teaching of religion, must become more free from prejudice, more certain in its results, if they are grounded on an impartial investigation of the various systems of faith which are, or at any time have been, professed among men.

The third requisite, to make theology a science, is *order*, or systematic arrangement. The manifold forms of faith, and modes of reasoning on religious subjects, present divers points of resemblance, according to which they may be classified under appropriate heads. Some systems of faith recognise one Supreme Being; others acknowledge a plurality of divine beings, the personified representations of powers of nature, or of human faculties and passions. Some religions rest their claim to adoption and observance on mere authority, others on the capacity of man to "judge of himself what is right." By marking these and other grounds of resemblance and points of difference, between various creeds and modes of worship, the whole vast extent of theology may be laid out in provinces and departments; and thus, by a systematic arrangement of all the various materials, assume the perfect form of a science. The provinces and departments, into which this science may be divided and subdivided, are pointed out by the various subjects included in a comprehensive knowledge of religion. In order to give to those who take only a general interest in the structure of the science, a correct idea of its contents, it is necessary to divest them of the scholastic nomenclature, by which, in this as in other branches of learning, many subjects of general interest have been withdrawn from the intellectual and moral sympathy and coöperation of the people. Nor is it less important for professional men than for others, to view all the parts and proportions of the science or art to which

they are devoted, free from the disguise and encumbrance of artificial, conventional language.

Theology, like every other science, takes its origin from the observation of facts, that is, of things and events, and their various qualities. Among the manifold objects of our external and internal experience, we find some human actions, some thoughts, feelings, and purposes, marked and distinguished from others by a quality, a principle, which we denominate religion. To ascertain this principle, to answer the primary question, what is religion? is the main object of the first department of divinity, the philosophy of religion, or philosophic theology. It is by a philosophic investigation of this kind, that I have endeavoured to show, in the preceding chapter, that religion consists in the tendency of the human mind to the infinite.

Having ascertained the principle which forms the keystone of the science, we are enabled, on the one hand, to collect from our own observation, and the well-attested experience of others, all the various manifestations of this principle in every part and age of the world. To collect these facts, the character of which has been determined by the philosophy of religion, is the object of the second department of divinity, the history of religion, or historical theology.

We observe, on the other hand, that this principle within us, which we call religion, this tendency of the human mind to the infinite, not only has manifested itself in many instances which we can trace to no other cause, but that it is continually striving to manifest itself more perfectly, in thoughts, feelings, purposes,

words, and actions. Hence we are led to consider which of the various forms of faith and worship recorded in history, or devised by our own imagination, may be the most perfect manifestation of the principle of religion. To find among all the known and imaginable modes and means of religion, such as are best adapted to the religious nature of man, is the object of the third department of divinity, viz. Practical Theology.

All the minor branches of divinity may be classed under these general heads. A few remarks will be sufficient to show the special function of each of the principal departments of theology, as well as their intimate connexion and coöperation for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, and establishing the practice of religion.

History, which, in its widest sense, comprehends both the observation and the preservation of facts, is the foundation of all the sciences. Philosophy points out its various departments. The history of religion, in particular, embraces all the various tenets and systems of faith, and religious observances. This is the external history of religion. It embraces, moreover, some of the manifold workings of the soul, expressed or unexpressed, of which our own consciousness gives evidence ; I mean the thoughts, feelings, and purposes, which are characterized by a striving after infinity, and which constitute the religion of the intellect, the heart, and the will. These facts of consciousness are the subject of the internal history of religion.

In this department of divinity, those systems of faith which rest on the clearest historical evidence, and are in themselves the purest expressions of spiritual truth, claim the chief attention and devoted industry of the student. Yet even the most imperfect manifestations of the native tendency of the soul to the infinite, such as the religious notions and observances of savage nations, are not without philosophic as well as historical importance.

History not only furnishes to the philosopher the facts from which he infers, and by which he proves and illustrates, the principles of religion ; it presents also to the practical theologian a variety of forms of faith and worship, among which he may find, or according to which he may devise, such expressions and means of religion as are best qualified to meet the common and the individual wants of our spiritual nature.

Philosophy, or the exercise of reason, for the purpose of reducing the multifarious mass of our ideas to fundamental principles, and arranging the whole in systematic order, — ascertains and defines the nature of religion, as a principle, distinct from every other. If the principle we have laid down be true and fundamental, it must furnish the necessary evidence for all the just, and a sufficient explanation of all the mistaken, notions of religion. The same principle, when combined with right conceptions of human nature, and the constitution of the universe, must form a perfect system of rational and spiritual faith ; and when connected with misconceptions of the powers with which we are endowed, and of the circumstances under

which we are to exercise them, it must bring forth innumerable superstitions.

Having ascertained the principle of religion, philosophy determines what facts and events in the history of man are to be considered as manifestations of this fundamental principle. These, as I have shown, constitute the department of historical theology. The knowledge of that principle, moreover, enables the philosopher of religion to decide which of the various forms in which religion has existed, or may be imagined to exist, must be considered as a more or less perfect manifestation of the spiritual nature of man. Philosophy thus furnishes a standard of criticism for comparative theology, as well as an ideal prototype to guide the choice of the practical theologian. A system of faith that shall satisfy all the spiritual wants of human nature, the divine model of a church adapted to all mankind, can be conceived and realized only by bringing all the various faculties of men, and the circumstances in which they are placed, under the control of the *principle* of religion.

It is the object of practical theology to point out the means by which the religious nature of man may be unfolded and educated. The principal topics included in this province of divinity will be the subjects of the following tracts. The nature and value of prayer, preaching, and discussion; the influence of poetry, music, painting, statuary and architecture; the tendency of religious associations, established creeds, symbols, and forms of worship; and the advantages of a clergy distinct from the people, — will form the topics of free and candid inquiry.

CHAPTER III.

The means of Religion.

RELIGION, like every other principle of human nature, may be cultivated and perfected; or neglected and perverted. A rational and spiritual faith, childish superstition, and reckless fanaticism, are manifestations of the same parent principle in man. Religion is the tendency of the soul to the infinite; it is the principle of endless progress in human nature. Hence every human pursuit, whether good or bad, is characterized, when under the influence of religion, by a striving after perfection, which leads to the consummation either of wisdom and virtue, or of folly and crime. To our thoughts, feelings, and purposes; to every good undertaking of a private, or domestic, or public nature; to the arts and sciences, and every department of civilized life; religion imparts a higher character and aim, and prompts to endless advancement. On the other hand, religion, when connected with wrong conceptions of nature and of man, with a presumptuous trust in our own opinions, and a want of respect for those of others, begets innumerable forms of superstition, bigotry, and persecution. Thus religion, when rightly directed, becomes the source of the greatest blessings, and when ill directed, gives rise to the most fearful evils. The consideration of these inevitable consequences; the fact that so many heter-

ogeneous, beneficent, and noxious tendencies are the productions of the same soil, cannot but impress us with the importance of a wise culture of this part of our common nature.

It is evident, that the well-being of individuals and of society depends essentially on the healthful developement of the principle of religion. The question then is urged upon us by our interest in the truth, and by the momentous consequences dependent on the answer, by what means the religious nature is to be cultivated so as to secure all the legitimate blessings, and avert the possible evils, that may grow out of it. In my first tract, I have investigated the nature of religion, and of theology, or the science of religion ; and now, like the physician, after he has ascertained the faculties and wants, the liabilities to disorder and the powers of restoration contained in the human frame, I shall endeavour to point out the principal ways and means of promoting the healthful action, and of preventing or removing any derangement, of the system. The means of religion are the great topic of practical theology.

Some things and operations have a direct tendency to unfold the germs of infinity in our nature, such as sacred music and poetry, prayer, the study and the practice of religion. There are others, the direct object of which is something finite ; but the manner in which this object is pursued, is such as to call forth the infinite tendencies of the mind ; and thus they become indirect means of religion. Of these I shall speak first.

The religious principle in man manifests itself by an endless striving after perfection. Hence it is that every work of nature, inasmuch as it is perfect in its kind, as well as every production of human thought and industry which evinces a desire for giving it all the perfection of which it is capable, must be considered as an indirect means of religion. The study of the smallest work of nature, the minute analysis of a leaf, or wing of a bird, or insect, brings the contemplating mind into the presence of that power, which gives to every thing all the perfection whereof it seems susceptible, and which must itself be infinitely perfect. The same is true of works of human industry, a house, a ship, a book, inasmuch as they, though necessarily imperfect in their execution, show forth an aspiration after perfection, which bids us look down upon the highest actual, and strive after the highest possible, attainments. Accurate observation, forereaching conjecture, correct reasoning, pure emotions, conscientious effort, ingenious contrivance, skilful workmanship, though they should have no deeper cause than the wants of our animal nature, and no higher object than the comforts and luxuries of life, are conducive to the religious as well as physical progress of man. Whatever tends to multiply the means of supplying the wants of the body, enlarges the freedom of the mind. And if you would have men think rightly on religious subjects, you must induce them to acquire right notions of other things ; enlarged and accurate knowledge of all that exists and comes to pass around and within them. So intimately connected are the

material and spiritual elements of our being, that the same impulse which causes the earth-bound root to grow, serves to unfold the flower that seeks the sun. Civilization and religion, as I have already shown, are the twin offspring of the same vital principle of human nature. It is the principle of progress, that prompts man to better his present condition, and inspires him to attempt a course of endless improvement.

It is true, that civilization, though favorable to the growth, is not necessary to the existence, of religion. But the civilized state of man, — I mean that condition of society in which every individual power and talent finds the amplest freedom and the strongest inducement to exertion, is the genial clime of religion. If you examine the history of uncivilized nations, you will find that all attempts at communicating to them the highest truths of religion, have terminated in partial or complete disappointment, unless the heralds of salvation proved themselves fully qualified for their mission, by becoming the planters of civilization, as well as the sowers of spiritual blessings, among their savage pupils. Nay, the peculiar object of civilization, to better and elevate the present condition of man, cannot be fully attained without the impulse and guidance of religion, which prevents his finding satisfaction in looking back upon the length of the way that marks his progress, and bids him seek it in the ever-enlarging sphere of glorious effort before him. The history of civilization shows us, that all talent and skill, every attainment in science and the arts, every thing that constitutes and adorns civilized life, be-

comes the degraded and degrading instrument of refined sensuality and boasting wealth, unless religion induces man to look upon the highest achievements of civilization, as the mere rudiments of a higher, and never-ending education.

Religion without civilization is not sufficient to redeem men from a barbarous condition ; and civilization without religion degenerates into a refined barbarism. The endless progress of man is the highest object of all finite improvement ; and every thing that tends to benefit, to refine, and to elevate the character and condition of the individual and of society, must be considered as a means of religion. Besides those means which indirectly contribute to the religious improvement of man, there are others, which have a direct tendency to stir up and cultivate the divine principle within us. A clear perception of the object is necessary to a distinct perception and just estimation of these means. The object is to establish the empire of religion in the soul ; to bring and keep those faculties, which are in their nature capable of boundless expansion, under the influence of the native tendency of the soul to the infinite. The object is the conception of infinite truth, goodness, and beauty ; to kindle in the heart a fervent longing after perfection, joy in every advancing step ; penitent sorrow for every deviation ; to inspire the will ——

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Religion is the tendency of human nature to the infinite. Whatever is fitted to unfold the principle in its strength and purity, is comprehended under the

general name of means of religion. With a view to classify the various means, it may be observed that men have ascribed the awakening of their religious sensibilities, either to immediate and special divine agency, or to the general fitness of things to carry into effect the inherent tendency of human nature to the infinite ; or to human agency.

I shall speak of these sources and means of religious influence according to the principle laid down in the beginning, without reference to what history or tradition has declared to us ; confining myself to what is, or seems to me, a matter of actual experience.

Immediate divine agency is the first of the two classes of means which I have enumerated. Is there, within our own experience, any evidence of immediate divine influence either upon the mind of man, or in the course of events, which cannot with sufficient probability be traced to human agency, or the known laws of nature ? I shall speak first of the case of immediate divine influence on the mind ; and then of supernatural intervention in the ordinary course of events.

A scrupulous examination of my own mind on common occasions, and under trying circumstances, has brought me to believe that there have been times at which I felt sincerely persuaded of an increase of spiritual power, which did not seem to me only an unusual effort, or spontaneous effulgence of the faculties which I was conscious of possessing. I have had this impression when with the most intense desire to fulfil my duty, I believed my own natural strength

insufficient; I have experienced it in moments of devotion. There have been times when the contemplation of this vast world, so thickly peopled with innumerable tribes of beings, so uniformly governed by irresistible laws, filled my whole soul with a feeling of loneliness, such as a stranger is apt to have in a great populous city all whose movements are ordered by a watchful police; and then the lonesome heart went forth in search of a heart that could understand its language, a heart whose pulsations were not controlled by the immutable law that regulates the eternal round of events; at such times, when there was in my soul no other prayer than the irrepressible yearning after an inward satisfactory assurance that my prayer was heard, I have experienced an indescribable calm, an inspiring confidence, a life-giving and soul-quickening power, which did not seem to spring from my own conscious self, but from the very source of all being. I am persuaded that experiences of this kind have strengthened my disposition to believe in the recorded miracles of former times. It has seemed to me as if the age of miracles had ceased only in outward appearance, but not in inward experience, and that every one actually lives in it as long as his spirit is wont to commune with the Father of spirits.

But even-handed truth compels me to state my doubts as to immediate divine influence on the mind, with the same fidelity with which I have endeavoured to account for my inclination to believe in it.

The sudden light which sometimes dispels our

doubts when our over-exerted intellectual powers have sunk under the fruitless task; the wonderful discoveries of a philosophic, and conceptions of a poetic mind; the unaccountable energy by which persons of a feeble constitution feel themselves sustained in watching at the sick bed of a friend; the growing assurance of immortality in soul-trying emergencies, the sudden awaking of a deadened conscience, and revivals of virtue; the blissful peace that falls on the praying heart; all these and similar phenomena may be accounted for naturally, by considering them as proofs of the inexhaustible and incalculable power of our own minds, as revelations of the spirit that is in man, rather than as miraculous effects of immediate divine agency. Who can calculate the strength with which a loving heart can endow the feeblest hand? Who may divine what riches of truth, and beauty, and joy, lie hidden in the unfathomed depths of the soul? Add to this, the warning examples of persons remaining in a state of moral indifference, or persisting in vice, or driven to insanity, by a superstitious conviction of their own incapacity of a virtuous resolution, and a self-justifying, presumptuous expectation that God, by a miraculous interposition, would do for them the work which He, according to the testimony of our own consciences, has appointed each one of us to perform. And while the expectation of a miraculous conversion prevents some from a conscientious exertion of their own powers, we see others, after a sudden feverish awakening to virtue, supposed to be the work of irresistible grace, relapsing into the

former moral torpor, or plunging into untried depths of vice, because they have found themselves deceived in their belief, that, having been redeemed from iniquity, they had outgrown temptation, and could sin no more. There are, moreover, numerous examples of self-deluded individuals having flattered themselves into a belief, that they were the receivers of divine communications, the chosen bearers of heavenly commissions; pretending to be, as it were, on speaking terms with the highest Intelligence, while they were unknowingly consulting the oracle of self-love, whose ambitious illusions are by no means rendered harmless by an humble and sincere confession of unworthiness. I think these considerations must be sufficient to make every honest mind feel the importance of modest doubt, as to his own actual experience of immediate divine influence.

Still, these doubts do not invalidate the inferences which we may draw from remarkable impressions and states of mind, so far as they are matter of actual experience. The fact, that, in times of peril, the assurance of the believer in immortality grows stronger as the danger increases, may be considered as a practical declaration of the soul, testifying to its own nature and destiny, though it should not be an immediate concurrent testimony of the Creator. The unexpected discoveries of philosophy, the wonderful creations of poetry and art, may be looked upon as foretokening the destination of the mind for endless progress to unknown regions of truth and beauty. The sudden outbreaks of a smothered conscience, the wonder-

working power of virtue and love, declare the immortality of our affections and moral powers. The joy, that increases as the soul rises in devotion, evinces the religious nature of man, and thus becomes an implied, if not an express, evidence of divine acceptance.

This frank exposition of the doubtful state of my mind, on the question of immediate divine influence on the soul, is all that I can offer to aid the reader in coming to a decision on a point which each individual must settle for himself, according to his own experience. Immediate divine agency, considered as a means of religion, implies two cases; first, the action of the Divine mind on the human, of which I have spoken; and second, those extraordinary occurrences and deviations from the common course of events, which cannot, with a reasonable degree of probability, be traced to the known laws of nature, or to human interference, but seem to be the effects of immediate divine interposition. If these events are wholly irreconcilable with the known laws of nature, they are termed *miracles*; but if they, though not preternatural, are so extraordinary, and so singularly adapted to answer a particular purpose, as to make us disposed to ascribe them to the immediate action of a supernatural power, rather than to an uncommon junction of natural causes, we call them cases of special providence. He, who, with his staff, strikes a well out of a rock, performs a miracle; but the traveller, lost in the desert, who pursues a way pointed out to him in a dream, which leads him to a well; and the

mariners, who, on the point of being crushed by an iceberg, are saved by a sudden change of wind, would be disposed to ascribe their extraordinary rescue to a special act of Providence. Experiences of this kind have proved efficient means of religion, in cases in which every other way of affecting the moral and spiritual sensibility had been tried in vain.

To argue against the possibility of miracles, from their being contrary to the laws of nature, betrays ignorance of the fact, that what we call by this name is only the mode of operation, or sequence of events, which has been found constantly the same whenever it has been made the subject of observation. Our experience, being necessarily incomplete, we have no right to infer the necessity of an operation from its known constancy; or the impossibility of a change, from the fact, that none has ever been observed. No proposition can be set down as necessarily false, which does not imply a contradiction, that is, something which is said at the same time to be and not to be. From the fact, that, so far as our observation reaches, the earth has constantly revolved on its axis, we cannot infer, that the rotatory motion cannot at any time be interrupted; though it would be necessarily false to assert, that it was, at the same time, moving and standing still. The degree of constancy or uniformity, which has been observed in a certain process, determines the degree of improbability of any supposed exception. That a man should heal a sick person by his touch, is less improbable, than that he should raise one from the dead. The compara-

tive probability or improbability is determined, either by the intrinsic difficulty of the act, as in the supposed cases of healing the sick and raising the dead; or by the character, the object, and the circumstances, under which it is performed. The report of a miracle having been performed, in order to establish falsehood, or the authority of a despot, is less probable, than an account of miracles wrought for the religious elevation and intellectual enfranchisement of men who apparently could be impressed with the reality of spiritual things only by sensible demonstration.

It is evident, that, in proportion to its improbability, an event requires stronger evidence; but no mere improbability excludes the possibility of proof. This remark applies to alleged cases of special providence, as well as to miracles.

The historical evidence of miracles and wonderful events, supposed to have taken place in former times, lies beyond the limits of this investigation.

Within the bounds of our own experience, I know of no well authenticated events which can, in the strict sense of the word, be called miraculous. But there are innumerable cases, which seem to come under the description of special providences,—countless instances of accused innocence, or acquitted guilt, brought to light; of hair-breadth escapes from death, or from moral ruin, effected by a concurrence of circumstances so strange and incalculable, as seems to leave us no other alternative, than either to ascribe them to mere accident, which is contrary to all we know

of the processes of nature, or to special supernatural influence. This faith gains strength, inasmuch as these unlooked for occurrences are in accordance with what, from the common course of events and the constitution of human nature, we suppose to be the real tendency of God's government. But, on the other hand, the impartial observer and resolute searcher after truth cannot fail to meet with innumerable cases of an opposite character ; instances of innocence betrayed, guilt undiscovered, or saved from punishment, by circumstances as strange and wonderful as any that are accounted examples of special providence.

Now, it is not fair, however it may suit our religious prepossessions, to assert, that, out of twenty men on board a shipwrecked vessel, one has been providentially saved, without admitting, that the other nineteen, have been providentially drowned. For many wonderful conquests of truth and virtue, we find, perhaps, as many triumphs of falsehood and vice, brought about by an equally unaccountable connivance of circumstances. Now if we will not, by the side of a good Providence, admit an evil Providence, and consider them as alternately interfering in the common course of events, or suppose the universe governed by a despot's whims, or by the blind omnipotence of chance (a kind of despotism without a despot), what is the part of the honest inquirer, in this maze of contradictory events, calculated to incline him, now to faith and theism, and then to doubt and atheism ? Must he disregard the evident providential tendency of things in general, on account of certain events which are irreconcilable

with his ideas of a righteous government of the world; or must he resort to a forced construction of these events; or may he resort to his own ignorance to account for any apparent immoralities, while trusting in the sufficiency of his knowledge when it assures him of the moral tendency of all things? The bare statement of these various expedients, which have been and are so often made use of to bring about the wished for reconciliation between faith and doubt, is sufficient to convince every one, that neither of them can afford lasting satisfaction. Before we attempt to reconcile our impressions of things as they are, with our ideas of what they ought to be, we should submit our preconceived notions of the moral government of the world to a careful reëxamination; and while good faith compels us to admit the contradictory tendencies in the course of events, instead of giving way to intellectual despondency, we should try to gain a deeper foundation and a broader area for our systems of apologetic theology. In attending to the course of events, and endeavouring to catch, as it were, the simple air that runs through infinite variations, it often happens that we hear discordant sounds, merely because the intermediate notes, by which the discords are reconciled and resolved into the general harmony of nature, escape our imperfect hearing.

The fault in reasoning on this subject, which I wish to point out, consists, not in ascribing to certain events a providential character, but in contracted views of Providence, in consequence of which, cer-

tain events being selected as proofs of divine interposition, others of an opposite nature are made to appear as evidences of divine indifference, or of the interference of a hostile divinity. In the first place, when we judge of the providential character of an event in proportion to the extraordinary manner in which it takes place ; if the sudden change of the wind, which saves one ship from the rocks, while it drives another upon them, appears to us to have more of providence in it than any other instance of action and reaction in our atmosphere, we betray, only in a less striking manner, the same ignorance which makes the savage look upon eclipses as more momentous events than the everyday changes of night and day. It is thought by some a proof of piety to see in every event, corresponding with their view of the divine government, a special providence, and to rest satisfied with their ignorance with regard to occurrences of an opposite nature ; when in truth that divining faith is a matter of presumption, and this willingness to abide in ignorance is a mark of sinful intellectual apathy. I am aware that extraordinary incidents, wonderful changes in the common course of things, have been made use of, with signal success, to rouse the religious fears and hopes of men. Ominous events, indicative of divine displeasure, or pointing out the means of propitiation, have prompted men to the most heroic acts of self-sacrifice, and the most unnatural modes of self-torture. But, without weighing the comparative benefit and injury to the cause of religion, that have grown out of this species of divination, it is evident that the wonder-

ful appearance of uncommon events and phenomena, of judicial earthquakes, pestilences, comets, wars, and the like, is a very precarious foundation, being undermined continually by the progress of science.

There are other ways in which a contracted view of Providence leads to erroneous conclusions, and weakens the foundation, while it enlarges the compass, of faith. We are apt to look upon certain events, upon the success or failure of human pursuits, as final results, as ends, rather than means, in the course of discipline which is laid out for the whole of our existence.

This consideration leads me to the second class of means of religion which I have before specified. In order to judge rightly of alleged cases of special providence, we must have acquired just conceptions of the general providence of God, or of the natural fitness of things to carry into effect what, from his own nature and from the circumstances in which he is placed, appears to be the destination of man. The contemplation of all the various ways and means provided for the wants and aspirations of human nature, is the great theme, the principal lesson, which the Creator of all things has set to man in every part and age of the world, throughout the endless series of successive generations. To point out some of the most important provisions for the religious nature of man, is all I shall attempt in this place.

The universe, so far as our widest philosophic vision can discern, is a harmonious whole, in which each part is adapted to every other part, as well as to the

all-comprehensive system. Hence the mutual adaptation of human and of universal nature, of the constitution of man, and of the universe. Inexhaustible stores for the supply of all our physical, intellectual, moral, and religious wants are laid up in every part of creation. As a material being, man finds here on earth all that is necessary to call forth and employ all his active powers, and to gratify his senses. His intellect and his affections find, without and within himself, manifold treasures of truth, beauty, and love; moreover, as a religious being, he wants an ever-expanding sphere of existence and action, for the exercise of those powers which are themselves capable of indefinite progress. His intellect and his affections are not satisfied with the daily earnings of the senses. To meet the religious wants of his nature, he perceives, that in proportion as his mind and his heart are enlarging, more expansive regions of knowledge, and more enduring objects of love, present themselves; and his faith augurs from this promising experience of the present life, that a course of endless progress is laid out for his ever-increasing spiritual capacity and desire. But man is not only a material, intellectual, affectionate, and religious being, but a moral agent. He has a free will; he is capable of acting in conformity or in opposition to his own knowledge of right and wrong; and his conscience rewards or punishes, gladdens or distresses him, for his conduct, according to his knowledge of duty. This is the law of his being; and such is the mutual adaptation of outward and inward nature, that the moral law finds a

practical acknowledgment and an external sanction in the general tendency of things to render his condition in life conformable to that of his conscience. There are means provided for all his animal and spiritual capacities and wants. But as through the power of his will he is enabled, by meritorious exertion or culpable neglect, to increase or diminish his capacities as well as the means of satisfying his wants, the actual amount of happiness enjoyed or misery endured by each individual is generally conformed to the degree of his good or ill desert. It is a matter of common experience, that, in a natural state of society, the prosperity and the information of the individual are in keeping with his industry; the esteem, confidence, and love which he enjoys are graduated by his moral worth; the freedom and elevation of his infinite tendencies depend on the control of his earthly passions. And on the other hand, the neglect or abuse of those faculties that were given to man to exalt him in the scale of being, brings forth poverty, ignorance, disesteem, and irreligion. Such is the general course of human experience. It is true our harvest of prosperity, information, and respect is not always in exact proportion to the seed we have sown. Industry sometimes fails of its reward; faithful study results in error; love begets neglect and hate; and devotion turns into fanaticism. But so deeply are we convinced that these unexpected results are unnatural, that is, contrary to the natural providential fitness of things and events, that our faith in final retributive justice knows no stronger incentive than the experience of tempora-

ry injustice. Still more, the philosophy of human experience, which assures us that in the long run the condition of each individual will be adjusted to his deserts, the philosophy of human nature, convinces us that the full developement of our faculties, the establishment of our moral independence, requires not only a general conformation of our enjoyments to our efforts, but occasional trials of our faith, by unmerited success and undeserved failure. A constant return of evil for good, or good for evil, among men would counteract the belief in retributive justice. But to make the human character all that human nature is capable of being made, the disappointment as well as the accomplishment of our just expectations must be a part of our daily experience and discipline. If only the prophecy implied in the religious nature of man be true, there is not, among all the dark dispensations that haunt every path of our earthly experience, there is not one, which, even from our present knowledge of human nature, cannot be explained as bearing a part in the complicated scheme of discipline adapted to the endless progress of a moral being. This view of a general providence, grounded on the nature of things, and embracing every possible form and turn of experience, forbids all presumptuous attempts to ascribe to some events a special providential character which is denied to others. The believer in a general providence will not be tempted to see in the success or failure of human pursuits a proof of divine approbation or displeasure. But this view by no means excludes the belief in a special and immediate

divine agency, whether natural or preternatural, in the course of events. A work whose mechanism is so perfect as to leave to the artist, who conceived and framed it, nothing to do but to wind up the machine, is surely not the most exalted idea of the world and its author. The perfection of order does not consist in an absolute uniformity of operations, excluding all freedom and possibility of change. It is possible, if not highly probable, that the self-existent First Principle is acting, not only by general laws, or constant modes of operation, designed to bring about certain results, indirectly, by a complete coöperation of intermediate causes, but by immediate special agency. The perfection of the human character requires, that our existence in this world should be liable to the operation of natural laws. Many events are to be considered as the results of general laws, which are intended for innumerable beings besides man, who is generally too apt to think the world created and governed but for his sake. Many other events are the results of free actions of men. These, too, we must not ascribe to a special design of God, unless we deny the free agency and accountableness of man, and thereby divest him of all power, either of virtue or sin, and ascribe to God not only every good, but every bad action. God indeed suffers sins to be committed; because men would be incapable of virtue if they were not liable to temptation.

Our belief that God will give us, here or hereafter, the opportunity of accomplishing the end for which he made us, must rest not upon particular events in

nature and the life of man, but on the whole system of divine providence. This system, I have before observed, requires, for the free developement of the moral character of man, a state of trial and chance, in which many events may occur which cannot be looked upon as special acts of Providence. A belief which refers every event to the will of God, as its immediate cause, leads not only to superstitious, but also to immoral, conclusions.

PEACE AND WAR.*

AMONG the philanthropic enterprises of our time, one of the most interesting is that which has for its object the abolition of war, and the adoption of the peace principle, by nations and individuals, in the settlement of all differences and disputes of a public and private nature. The manner in which the cause of peace has been advocated by the societies expressly formed for its promotion, has led to the discussion of topics of the highest importance to the intercourse of nations, and the existence of every government. The question has been raised, whether war, defensive or offensive, be justifiable in any case; whether the taking of human life, and the resort to physical force, by nations or individuals, in self-defence, and for the redress of injuries, be not absolutely immoral and opposed to the principles of Christianity; and whether a Christian can conscientiously own allegiance to any government that claims the use of coercive measures for the execution of its laws. — It is with the view to a satisfactory settlement of these great questions, as

*This article is now printed from the original manuscript as far as it could be recovered. It first appeared in the "United States Magazine and Democratic Review," Vol. V. for 1839; but in a mutilated state, and with additions by the editor of that work.

connected with the present agitation of the cause of peace in our country, that we offer the following considerations.

The history of the Peace Societies in this country is remarkable, not so much on account of their increase in numbers and means, as because, short as it is, it exhibits the growth of principle, which, whether true or erroneous, is ever the most important part of human history. An anonymous pamphlet, bearing the title of "A Solemn Review of the Custom of War," published in Boston in the year 1814, and republished in England, called into existence the different societies which afterward united under the name of the American Peace Society. That pamphlet was the work of a New England country clergyman,* whose fame had hardly reached beyond the sound of the bell of his village church, until the periodical, of which he became the editor, endeared the name of the "Friend of Peace" to all who found in this enterprise a sphere of action suited to their benevolent desires. The "Friend of Peace" was followed by the "Calumet," and this by the "Advocate of Peace," which is at present the organ of the Peace Societies. Kindred societies have been formed in England, France, and Switzerland. Memorials for the institution of a Congress of nations, with a view to a peaceable adjustment of all international disputes, have been brought before one of the State Legislatures, and before Congress at its last, and again at its present session. The

* Noah Worcester. He died at Brighton, Mass., in 1837.

committee appointed for the consideration of this subject by the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1837, moved several resolutions, condemning "the resort to war to settle questions of national profit or honor"; and recommending "the institution of a Congress or Court of Nations." The first petition of the New York Peace Society, besought Congress to "adopt the principle of reference to a third power, of such international disputes as cannot be amicably adjusted by the parties themselves, as an invariable rule instead of an occasional one"; and further, that "in pursuance of this principle, a proposal be sent forth by this Government to those of other nations, that they would unite with it, in the establishment of a great international *board of arbitration*, or a *Congress of Nations*, to which to refer international disputes; and also for the purpose of digesting and preparing *a regular code of international law*, obligatory on such nations as may afterwards adopt it." This memorial was read, and laid upon the table, in consequence of a Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The peace movement has encountered less opposition, in this country and abroad, than perhaps any other cause of moral reform; and the inconsiderable degree of interest it has hitherto excited, may in part, at least, be traced to the nature of the principle itself, which, when stated in its most general form, meets with universal assent or acquiescence, but when set forth, with all its consequences, by uncompromising practical reasoners, finds but few minds willing to adopt it. It is allowed by all, that peace is, in general,

better than war; and that, for the redress of wrong, the use of moral power is generally preferable to physical force. But that coercion and war ought never to be resorted to, even in defence of life and liberty, — this is a corollary to the peace principle, which would require a radical change of sentiment to gain admission to the practical creed of individuals and nations.

This internal impediment to the progress of the peace cause, arising from the nature of the principle on which it rests, is sufficiently evident from the change which the constitution of the society has undergone in the fundamental article which defines its object, and from the recent attempt at a still more thorough reform, which led to the formation of the New England Non-Resistance Society.

The object of the American Peace Society, as stated in its original constitution, was the abolition of *offensive* war. Nothing was said with regard to the moral character of defensive war, because a difference of opinion was known to exist among the friends of peace on that subject, and because the abolition of all offensive or aggressive wars implied that of defensive warfare as a necessary consequence. But this prudential restraint, and calculation of consequences, did not satisfy those who had embraced the principle of peace as a divine precept that required explicit profession and strict obedience. They also argued, with much effect, that the term "defensive war" is, in practice at least, a vague title, which, in most cases, as recently in the wars of Napoleon, has been used

by each of the contending powers, to justify its having recourse to arms. Accordingly, at the ninth anniversary of the Society, in 1837, the constitution was amended so as to declare, that "*all war* is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel." This change was deprecated by those members of the society who approved of defensive war; and they thought themselves bound in conscience to dissolve their connexion. The official organ of the Society endeavoured to persuade them to remain united, although "the revised constitution had recognised for its basis, the contrariety of all war to the spirit of the Gospel." "Under such a constitution," it was said, "cannot *all* the friends of peace *consistently* unite? We do not propose this principle as a *pledge;* we do not enforce it as a *test;* we merely give it as a guaranty, that our influence, as a society, shall never go to countenance any form of war."* But this mode of reasoning, while it did not convince the conscientious believers in the justice of defensive war, failed, on the other hand, of satisfying those whose opposition to all war was only the consequence of a more radical principle. They reasoned in this way. If the government have no right to use and prepare means of defence against foreign aggressors, how can it be justified in proceeding forcibly against internal enemies, by threatening and inflicting punishments? And if a nation has no right to defend itself against foreign enemies, or to punish its invaders, no individual possesses that right in his

* "Advocate of Peace," No. 3, December, 1837, p. 107.

own cause." The Gospel precepts, "Do not kill," "Resist not evil," and "Render not evil for evil, but overcome evil with good," absolutely forbid the taking of human life, and discountenance the use of force against enemies in every case, and inculcate an implicit faith in moral means, in remonstrance and self-sacrificing endurance, as sufficient to protect the just from the unjust, and to convert enemies into friends. These sentiments, which had been cherished for some time by some of the most zealous advocates of the cause, though disavowed by the official organ of the Society, found a full expression in the Peace Convention, held in Boston on the 18th, 19th, and 20th of September last. This Convention issued in the formation of the New England Non-Resistance Society, which put forth a declaration of sentiments, and adopted a constitution distinct from that of the American Peace Society.

The second article of the new Society states its object in the following words.

"Article II. The members of this Society agree in opinion, that no man, or body of men, however constituted, and by whatever name called, have a right to take the life of any man as a penalty for transgression; that no one, who professes to have the spirit of Christ, can consistently sue a man at law for redress of injuries, or thrust any evil-doer into prison, or fill any office in which he would come under obligation to execute penal enactments, or take any part in the military service, or acknowledge allegiance to any human government, or justify any

man in fighting in defence of property, liberty, life, or religion; that he cannot engage in or countenance any plot or effort to revolutionize, or change, by physical violence, any government, however corrupt or oppressive; that he will obey the 'powers that be,' except in those cases in which they bid him violate his conscience, and then, rather than resist, he will meekly submit to the penalty of disobedience; and that, while he will cheerfully endure all things for Christ's sake, without cherishing even a desire to inflict injury upon his persecutors, yet he will be bold and uncompromising for God, in bearing his testimony against sin, in high places and in low places, until righteousness and peace shall reign in all the earth, and there shall be none to molest or make afraid."

Soon after the doings of this Convention were made public, the "Constituted Organs of the American Peace Society" published a "Disclaimer," in which they declared, that the Convention had been called by individuals acting on their own personal responsibility; that the Society did not hold themselves accountable for any of the doings or sentiments expressed by the Convention; that the sole object of the Society, as unalterably laid down in its constitution, was the "Peace of Nations"; and that the New England Non-Resistance Society could not be considered as one of the auxiliaries of the American Peace Society.

We have given this brief sketch of the progress of the peace cause in our country, partly because, as

we have already observed, we look upon the history of moral principle, however well or however ill understood, as the most important part of human history, and partly because it is a striking exhibition of the characteristic spirit and tendency of our time. Every institution, every law, every custom, every assertion, is subjected to the ordeal of an all-searching and uncompromising skepticism, which rejects every authority but that of reason; and discredits every testimony but that of facts. Neither the opinion of the world, neither origin, nor age, nor even present and past utility, can insure permanence to any form of faith or practice. The great question is, whether a thing be true and right in itself; every thing else is of secondary importance. It cannot be denied, that this spirit of free inquiry has not only its true, but its false prophets also, whose course is marked by a superficial, capricious, and derogatory desire of change. But even the sympathy and encouragement, which this thoughtless and reckless love of innovation occasionally meets with, may be traced to the solid advantages which the cause of truth and humanity has derived from this uncompromising search after right. Our own political existence, as a free people, is grounded upon an attempt of unprecedented boldness, in rejecting every historical and fictitious basis of government, and reducing it to first principles, even to the eternal principles of perfect justice. However inconsistent we may be, when judged by the law of liberty, as laid down in the Declaration of Independence, who would not prefer to be condemned by this, rather than be justified by a lower

standard? We do not share any of the conservative fears of many of our contemporaries, either for our religious or political principles. We see, in the skepticism of the age, a striving after a deeper foundation for the highest faith. Instead of crying it down as ultraism, radicalism, infidelity, or fanaticism, we honor it even in its aberrations. We are ready to treat with respect, and meet with no other weapons than straight-forward argument, any attack upon existing opinions and institutions, however just and beneficial we may think them, if our antagonists do but appeal to our reason, and not to our faith in the infallibility of the new doctrine, or our patience to bear supercilious dogmatisms.

Entertaining these views, we are not willing to join in the hue and cry, which has been raised in almost every newspaper we have met with, against the principles contained in the declaration of sentiments and the constitution of the New England Non-Resistance Society. Principles, which are essentially the same as those of the Society of Friends, have a right, at least, to be heard, and not to be condemned without the benefit of reason. It is true, they attack that which every human government considers as the indispensable condition of its existence. But it should never be forgotten, that the allegiance of republicans to their government rests, not so much on the fact of its existence, and its power to enforce obedience, as mainly on the conviction of its being founded in justice. There is great danger, in our country, lest the moral foundations of our institutions be over-

looked, partly on account of the unexampled prosperity to which they have given rise, and which now tempts us to forget the cause in the effects; and partly on account of our political inconsistencies, which, so far as they are suffered to exist, degrade our government to the level of those, which have no other support than brute force. It is on this account, that we welcome this peace controversy, and every other discussion which must induce our citizens to reflect upon the moral elements of our government.

The authors of the New England Non-Resistance Society have rendered an important service to the cause of peace, inasmuch as they have attempted to reduce it to first principles. The object of these associated efforts is the establishment of peace. What then is peace? According to the practical definition, contained in the Constitution of the American Peace Society, peace is the absence of war; and, therefore, the establishment of peace is identical with the abolition of war. And what is war? It is a state of discord between nations, in which each thinks itself authorized to use against the other any violent measures that may promote the object it contends for. Now if all war be sinful, being "contrary to the spirit of the Gospel," what is it that constitutes its sinfulness? Evidently the resort to violent measures, the taking of human life, the destruction of property, and the infliction of innumerable other evils. If, then, war be sinful in all cases, and the use of violence constitute the essence and essential immorality of war, the same principle must condemn the

same means in every other case. It makes it sinful in the individual to take the life of an enemy, or use physical force, even in self-defence ; and equally sinful in the government to inflict, not only capital punishments, but punishments of any kind, and to resort to coercive measures of any description. Hence the duty of every Christian, not only to abstain entirely from the use of force against human beings, (absolute non-resistance), but to refuse allegiance to any human government, inasmuch as being constituted to enforce its commands, it is founded in sin.

We do not see how any man, adopting the premises laid down by the American Peace Society, viz., that *all war* is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, can arrive at any other results than those maintained by the New England Non-Resistance Society. We have no fault to find, then, with the logic of the Non-Resistance Society. We will now examine its premises, to see, whether there be indeed no case, in which war, or, in general, the use of force against human beings, is consistent with the spirit of the Gospel and the principles of morality.

The Scriptures, both of the Old and the New Testament, have been referred to by both parties in this question. War and capital punishments are represented as divinely authorized and commanded in the Old Testament. The wars, which had for their object the conquest of Canaan, and the whole military organization of the Jews, are ascribed to the highest lawgiver. " Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed ; for in the image of God

made he man," — was the injunction given to Noah and his sons ; and the Jewish code, derived from the same source, enumerated several crimes, such as murder, manstealing, adultery, as worthy of death.

It is said, on the other side, that those passages of the Old Testament which sanction the taking of human life, either by war or capital punishment, are no longer applicable. For that the Israelites, with regard to the wars in which they were engaged, must be considered as mere instruments, executing the commandments of the Most High. As such, they were no more accountable for those acts, than pestilence and famine, which are also represented as angels and ministers ; and can, therefore, not be referred to as setting an example, and justifying any wars not undertaken by special divine commandment. With regard to all other wars, and also capital punishment, the Gospel is said to have abrogated them both, directly by precept, and indirectly by its spirit.

A direct abrogation of war and capital punishment is said to be contained in the commandment, "Do not kill," which is repeatedly enjoined in the New Testament, without any mention of the punishment which the law of Moses affixed to this crime. Thus expressed, without any exception, the precept "Do not kill," forbids capital punishment, and war, as well as murder. But if we examine the cases in which this precept is found in the New Testament, they hardly allow of so general an interpretation. In one case, Jesus is asked by a Jewish ruler what he should do to obtain salvation, and he answers, "Thou know-

est the commandments;" and then he enumerates several enactments of the Mosaic law, and among them, this, "Do not kill." In another case, the apostle James is reasoning against the delusion of those who thought, that, by keeping one of the precepts of the law, they could not be deemed *guilty of the law*, even if they transgressed another of its injunctions. The apostle refutes this sophistry by saying that he who gave one commandment gave all. "He that said, Do not commit adultery, said also, Do not kill. Now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, thou art become a transgressor of the Law." It is evident, that in these cases, the utterance of that precept of the Mosaic law, by Jesus and his apostles, had no other design than to urge its observance, as a part of that law, upon those who conscientiously thought themselves bound by it. But there is no indication of a design to promulgate that precept as a general rule, without exception, which, in the code from which it derived its authority, was limited by other precepts which required the death of the murderer. Another instance, referred to in proof of a direct abrogation of capital punishment, is the case of the adulteress, whom Jesus saved from the punishment decreed in the Mosaic law, by saying to those who were about to put her to death, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." And after they had all gone out, he said to the woman, "Hath no man condemned thee? Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more." This saying certainly shows that Jesus did not think that the crime,

great as it was, deserved the fearful punishment decreed by the law; and the justice of this enlightened judgment, which was so greatly in advance of the legislative wisdom of that age, has been acknowledged in all modern codes, and works of legislation. In none of these, though capital punishment is still retained in some cases, is adultery accounted to be one of these cases. It may be said, then, with good reason, that, with regard to this crime, the punishment decreed in the Mosaic law is abrogated by the Gospel; — but this does not prove the injustice of capital punishment in other cases, or of war, or of the taking of human life in self-defence by individuals.

There is a consideration of a general nature, which lessens the practical value of much of the controversial reasoning, founded on the Old Testament, with a view to settle the questions concerning peace and non-resistance. It is this. While the religious doctrine and principles of morality laid down in the Old Testament, as far as they are not modified by the New, are considered by Christians generally, as of equal authority, and in fact as essentially the same with the religion and morality of the Gospel, those regulations of the Jewish code, which formed properly the practical law of that people, are justly considered as originally designed for them, and binding only upon them. Although some principles of the Mosaic law have been adopted by other legislators, yet the code of no Christian nation acknowledges that of the Jews, as, of itself, constituting one of the authentic sources of practical law. This rule, which includes

penal enactments, and military regulations, as well as the law of private rights, contained in the Mosaic code, is founded on obvious principles of justice. For as the nature of man is diversified and progressive, and as every law, in order to be just and salutary, must be adapted to the character and condition of those for whom it is made, it follows, that a law or set of laws which were wise, divinely wise, as designed for one nation or generation, may be or become unsuitable and injurious under different circumstances. It is evident, also, that since the Jewish code itself cannot be considered as of universal application, the question whether any of its penal or military regulations have been abrogated by the New Testament, though interesting to the theologian, cannot be accounted as having a direct, general, and practical importance. Accordingly, if the controversy concerning War and Peace is to be settled by scriptural argument, it must be referred to the universal and eternal principles of social ethics, which are found in both Testaments, and more particularly in the Gospel.

The Christian scriptures are distinguished from all other works, claiming a divine origin, by their appeals to reason and conscience, — to the independent, impartial judgment of man. "Come let us reason together, saith the Lord." "Produce your cause, bring forth your strong reasons." "Are not my ways equal? are not your ways unequal?" "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither the father the iniquity of the son." "I will judge

you every one according to his ways." "Why, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?" "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." The great truths which reveal the destiny, and constitute the duty and accountability of man, are set forth, in the Gospel, not so much by especial tenets and precepts, as by general principles which the individual is required to carry out and to apply. The glory of Christianity as a system of morals does not consist so much in having proposed maxims which may be adapted to any existing circumstances, as in having laid down principles to which all circumstances may be and ought to be conformed.

What are the teachings of Scripture concerning war and the use of physical force? At the head of this doctrine stands the sublime prophecy concerning "the last days," that "people shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." The establishment of universal peace is connected with prophecies, with the advent of the Messiah, — the "rod out of the stem of Jesse," the Prince of Peace. And in the account of the annunciation of the birth of the Saviour to the shepherds of Judea, the anthem of the angels seemed to contain a confirmation of that prophecy, in the words, "Glory to God in the highest, and *on earth peace*, good will toward men."

When, and in what manner, this universal reign of peace is to be established on earth, this is a subject of controversy, depending on the interpretation of a

great number of passages, lying more properly within the province of theological investigation. In the Old Testament, the kingdom of the Messiah is generally represented as a temporal, as well as moral and spiritual reign, and the prevalence of peace in the world, as a consequence of the subjection of all nations, by physical, as well as moral, conquests, to that of the Jews. The Jews, to the present day, interpret these passages literally, and look forward to their restoration to the possession of the promised land, under a victorious leader. They entertained the same expectations when Jesus came forward, proclaiming his divine mission to fulfil the ancient prophecies. His life, his teaching, and his works, showed him possessed of all the moral and spiritual attributes of the Messiah; but as he would not allow himself to be made king, but declared, that his "kingdom was not of this world," but that he came to bear witness to the truth, the disappointment of those who expected a temporal deliverer and ruler, and who saw in his acknowledgment, as the true Messiah, the downfall of their ambitious hopes, stirred up the persecution that issued in his crucifixion. Those prophecies which announced the subjection of all the kingdoms of the world to that of the Messiah, are interpreted by Christians either figuratively, as portending the ultimate prevalence of that truth to which he came to bear witness; or literally, as referring to the second coming of Christ at the beginning of the Millennium. There is one point in this controversy on which all believers in the Old and the New Testament are

agreed. They all look forward to a time when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." But how is this reign of peace on earth to be brought about? It is said, men have it in their power to establish universal peace now and for ever, simply by abstaining from war. To bring about the peace of nations, nations have nothing to do but to will it. And further, if men will but respect the rights of their fellow-men, there is an end to all violence among men, and all government becomes unnecessary. But these observations, however true, do not furnish a solution of the main question, but only delay it. For the question remains, what motives, what inducements can be brought to bear upon the will of men and nations, to make them resolve to abstain from injustice and violence, and never to change this resolution.

Some say, that the only mode of proceeding allowed and enjoined by the Gospel for the permanent establishment of universal peace, is the principle of non-resistance. This rule of action, it is said, rests on direct divine sanction, paramount to human authority and philosophy; but may be justified also by reasoning from the nature of man, and the consequences of actions.

The argument from authority is based partly upon the example of Jesus Christ, and partly upon special precepts. Jesus, whom none of his persecutors and accusers was able to "convict of sin," of whom the judge himself who condemned him, declared, "I find no fault in him," was insulted, scourged, and cruci-

fied without offering any resistance, though it cost him, as he said, but a prayer, to obtain legions of angels for his rescue. This great example of non-resistance unto death, left by the master, is a law to all his true disciples. This lesson is also plainly and impressively taught by the conduct of Jesus when a band of armed men came at night to apprehend him. He not only delivered himself up to his pursuers, but rebuked the disciple who, in defence of his master, drew his sword and wounded the servant of the High Priest; "Put up again thy sword into its place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. The cup which my father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" The conduct of Jesus on this occasion, is looked upon as settling beyond dispute the question, whether a Christian be justified in using force even in self-defence against unjust aggression. This is the light in which that memorable event in the life of Jesus is viewed, and held up as an example, by Dymond in his justly celebrated "Inquiry into the Accordance of War with the Principles of Christianity."

But the conduct of Jesus on the night in which he was betrayed, seems to admit of, and indeed require, a very different interpretation. Those who came to apprehend Jesus were not a number of men unlawfully banded together against him as the object of their private resentment and hate. They were a band of armed men, and a captain, and officers from the chief priests and elders of the people, sent out to arrest Jesus. They were commissioned by the lawful authority, and performing the duty of their office.

And if Jesus had offered resistance, he would have committed an act which would not only be totally inconsistent with his own precepts and character, but wholly unjustifiable on the ground on which war and the use of force in self-defence are advocated by the intelligent opponents of the non-resistance theory. According to these, Jesus and his disciples would have been justified in defending themselves against a mob, or a band of robbers and assassins. But in delivering himself up to the lawful authority, and reproving Peter for resisting the officers engaged in performing their commission, he went no further than those, who believe that the use of force is justifiable only in defence of right against unlawful aggression. This view of the conduct of Jesus explains also another of his sayings, for which, on the non-resistance theory, it seems difficult to find a satisfactory explanation. On the night in which he was betrayed, before he left the city to go to the Mount of Olives, as he was preparing his disciples for the dreadful event that was at hand, he said to them, "He that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one. His disciples said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said unto them, It is enough." The life of Jesus had been threatened repeatedly, not by a regular trial before the competent tribunal, but by private violence. And the same danger awaited his followers in fulfilling the mission with which he sent them into the world. He advised his followers to be armed, as it was the custom of that time, to defend themselves against assassins, but not against officers of the law

acting within the bounds of their commission. It has been said, that, if this had been the object of the swords which they carried to the Mount of Olives, it seems strange, that Jesus should have said that two were enough. But this can appear strange only to those who are not aware, how much even one brave man, supported by the consciousness of a just cause, may accomplish, single-handed, against a host of ruffians. There is another occasion, in which Jesus is represented, in the Gospel, as having used physical force against a flagrant violation of the law, and where he was, in fact, acting on the offensive. It is related, that "Jesus went up to Jerusalem, and found in the temple those that sold oxen, and sheep, and doves, and the changers of money sitting; and when he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them all out of the temple, and the sheep, and the oxen," &c., or, as it is expressed in another narrative, "he cast out all them that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the money changers, and the seats of them that sold doves, and said to them, 'It is written, my house shall be called a house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.'" The interpretation, which some of the advocates of non-resistance have attempted, viz., that Jesus actually "drove out," or "cast out," only the animals, is plainly incompatible with the text. But the act of Jesus itself, being intended to vindicate the law of the temple against an abuse shamefully tolerated by its superintendents, was so totally exempt from blame, that even his enemies did not dare to dispute its

justice, although it so enraged the scribes and chief priests that they sought to destroy him. We are aware that it may be said, that Jesus acted by divine authority, and we, therefore, have no right to a similar exercise of power. But if this ground be admitted, it may be asked, what act did Jesus ever perform without divine authority. And if this be a reason for not considering his actions as models for our imitation, what becomes of the whole argument founded upon the conduct of Christ as an instructive and preceptive example ?

The result, thus to be derived from a fair reference of the peace question to the example of Christ, appears to be this, that, while his life generally is characterized by the most heroic adherence to the principle of non-resistance, there are some instances in which he seems to have sanctioned the resort to force. In advising his disciples to provide themselves with swords, he seems to express an approbation of the use of physical force for the purpose of self-defence against unjust aggression. By driving out of the temple those who sold and bought therein, contrary to law, but protected by the faithless connivance of the appointed guardians of the law, he seems to authorize the resort to force for the purpose of maintaining justice, if those, who are intrusted with its administration, prove recreant to their trust.

Among the precepts contained in the New Testament, there are several which are quoted as enjoining the duty of non-resistance. Jesus said to Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world ; if my kingdom

were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews." Now as it is the destination of the Gospel, that by it "the kingdoms of this world are to become kingdoms of Christ," it is argued, that, as far as the Christian religion prevails, there ought to be, and finally will be, no fighting. But what is the proof and test of the prevalence of the Christian religion? For a kingdom of this world to become a kingdom of Christ, it is surely not enough to make profession of Christianity. Otherwise the formation of the Holy Alliance would be sufficient evidence of the right of its members to the title they have assumed. But if Christianity reigns so far as its precepts are obeyed, and no further, the conclusion, that if its reign were universal there would be no fighting, is perfectly just. For wherever Christianity reigns in truth, the rights of men are held sacred. And all, who believe that the use of force is justifiable in certain cases, agree, that, against those by whom the rights of men are held sacred, the use of force is wholly unjustifiable. Wherever there is fighting, or force is resorted to instead of persuasion, it is a certain proof, that Christianity does not universally prevail. For even if the use of force has for its object the establishment of justice, the injustice that provokes the coercive measures proves, that the precepts of the Gospel are not obeyed. But this does not prove, that the resort to force, for the sole purpose of maintaining justice, is itself contrary to Gospel morality. The true import of the saying of Christ, that his

kingdom was not of this world, else would his servants fight, is explained by the whole nature of his doctrine. Jesus aimed, not only at a universal recognition of the rights of man; but his purpose was also to set before men motives that should induce them to use what was rightfully their own, not only so as not to infringe the equal liberty of their fellow-men, but with a view to improve and benefit them, as well as to perfect their own characters. Now it is evident, that self-improvement and universal benevolence, as they depend solely and entirely on the disposition, the motive, and the free will of the individual, are objects which in their very nature cannot be realized by force. So far, then, the promotion of Christianity excluded all force; and the words of Christ contained a most important lesson with regard to the spread of his religion; which lesson was, however, most signally disobeyed by his disciples, as soon as they had acquired temporal power, and used it for enlarging the Redeemer's kingdom by means of fire and sword. Still more. The establishment of universal justice was certainly within the great plan of reform contemplated by Christ. The duty to regard all men as brothers necessarily implied, though it might not at first be apprehended, the acknowledgment of the equal rights of all. Now the security of human rights is the only moral object that can be carried into effect by force. But even in order to raise and to employ the force that may be necessary for the protection of right, it is indispensable, that there should be a sufficient number of persons, in

every community, disposed and determined, of their own accord, to bring their collective power to bear upon this object. This sense of justice, or at least of the necessity of justice, without which the law is destitute even of the physical power to overcome lawless violence, cannot be *forced* upon men ; it can be created only by appeals to their rational and moral nature. Wherefore, even if it lay within the plan of Christ ultimately to establish a kingdom of this world, an external empire of righteousness, it must begin as a kingdom that was not of this world ; its foundation must be laid in the hearts of men. To establish "the kingdom within" by the power of "truth," this was the declared object of Christ ; and the very nature of this object required that "his disciples should not fight." We say, then, that even if it entered into the plan of Jesus, that the principles of righteousness which he taught should become the practical law of every land, and, if it should be necessary for this purpose, that they should be armed with physical power, yet the philosophy of his mission required, that they should *first* become the practical law of many hearts by the power of truth alone. But, aside from all philosophy, even if it had been desirable, that the great moral reform should have begun with the destruction of every principality and power which was in the way of the practical acknowledgment of the universal brotherhood of men ; even if it had been desirable first to create the form, expecting that the spirit would come to it as a matter of course, yet it needs but a superficial glance at the state of the world at the com-

mencement of our era to convince us, that this mode of establishing Christianity would have been impossible without a continuation of miracles, taking the work of reformation entirely out of the hands of men, and making them irresponsible tools, instead of accountable moral agents.

It should not be overlooked, also, that Jesus, in saying to Pilate that his servants would not fight that "he should not be delivered to the Jews," spoke of his own immediate disciples, those who were charged with no other mission than to "teach all nations." This saying did not prevent even his immediate disciples from teaching, that the use of force is necessary and right for the support of civil government; that the temporal "ruler is a minister of God for good," "a terror to the evil," "for he beareth not the sword in vain." In the same manner, missionaries are now sent into heathen lands to spread Christianity, not by fighting, but by teaching, and exemplifying it in their own conduct. But no missionary board has ever censured any of its emissaries for exhorting the government to uphold just laws by the coercive measures prescribed by the law.

In the same manner, when some one asked Jesus to speak to his brother, that he should divide the inheritance with him, Jesus said to him, "Man, who made me a judge, or a divider over you?" Would it be right to argue from the fact, that Christ declined the office of a judge, that no Christian ought to take upon himself this charge; or that the law of no Christian country should contain rules for the division of property?

It seems evident, then, that the declaration of Jesus, that his servants would not fight to prevent his being delivered to the Jews, because his kingdom was not of this world, does not imply a prohibition of the use of force for securing the rights of men against the encroachments of those who are not restrained by a sense of justice, although it does disclaim all resort to force for the purpose of inculcating the sentiments of justice, love, and piety, which constitute the "kingdom within." Indeed, these words, "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight!" might be construed as authorizing the employment of force for the purpose of converting the inward kingdom of righteousness into an external empire of justice, as soon as the moral sentiment is sufficiently strong in the community to justify an attempt at effecting a practical recognition of the rights of all.

Again, Jesus said, "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." This saying is supposed to discountenance all resort to force. These words were addressed to Peter, after his attack upon one of the servants sent out to apprehend Jesus, who reproved him for this act of violence. It should not be overlooked, that, in this passage, *two* swords are spoken of, — the sword which is taken under circumstances similar to those which induced Peter to use it, and the sword by which he, who takes and uses it under such circumstances, is to perish. Now we have already shown, that the officers and servants, who came to arrest Jesus to carry him to the judg-

ment-seat, were engaged in the execution of an act, authorized by law, and commanded by the competent authority. The attack of Peter, therefore, though prompted by a generous purpose, was an act of unjustifiable aggression. It was this act of violence which Jesus reproved; and he added the general remark, that every one, who, like Peter, *takes* the sword of the aggressor, shall perish by the sword of the defender of the law. Against him who takes the sword in defence of justice, the saying of Jesus contains no reproof, but, on the contrary, seems to authorize the preparation and use of means of defence against unlawful aggression. Some think, that this saying is not to be taken as a commandment, but simply as a prediction of the fate of the aggressor. But whether it be for the fulfilment of a prophecy, or of a commandment, it seems plain, that this saying of Jesus does not forbid, if it do not actually authorize, men to raise the sword of justice against the sword of oppression.

There are several commandments of a general character, which seem to exclude altogether the resort to force; such as, "Love your enemies." "See that none render evil for evil to any man"; but "Overcome evil with good." "And I say unto you, that ye resist not evil."

The first of these injunctions is a rule that suffers no exception.

Although all human passions, hatred, as well as love, are implanted for good; yet the sphere which the moral law assigns to love, is wider than that

which is allowed to hatred. It is right to love both virtue and the virtuous ; and it is right to hate vice, but wrong to hate the vicious. But the use of force, and even the taking of human life, are not necessarily connected with hatred, or incompatible with love. The parental hand, arresting that of the child which is raised against his brother, is moved by love for both ; the lawgiver who threatens punishment to the offender, and the magistrate who executes the law, are not impelled by hatred ; and the love of family, and of country, which prompts the patriot to protect them against the invader, by opposing force to force, may be free from all personal enmity. This truth appears plainly in the conduct of the victorious general, or naval commander, who employs his superior force to serve the defeated enemies, and render them every kindness compatible with safety, — when compared with that of the conquering tyrant, whose hatred is directed not only against the formidable antagonist, but against the defenceless captive. The natural impulse, and rational purpose of self-defence, and defence of others, from injustice, is, or may be, wholly exempt from any revengeful feeling. On the contrary, it may be blended with sincere and intense regret (the result of love), that the conduct of the aggressor makes it necessary to protect the innocent by opposing force to force.

The precept, not to render evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good, is but a different expression, or application, of the great commandment which bids us love even our enemies.

It condemns the barbarous principle of retaliation, which demands a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye. In all penal codes, founded on enlightened principles of corrective justice, punishments are ordained, not for the absurd and immoral purpose of inflicting evil, simply because evil has been inflicted, but with a view to the security of society, and the reformation of the offender. Such punishments, though they be physical, cannot be considered as moral evils; and thus they do not deserve to be classed with the various modes of rendering evil for evil, but rather with those of overcoming evil by good. And the same may be said of coercive measures, generally, as far as they are necessary as means of rightful self-defence.

"Resist not evil," is another precept breathing the same spirit that pervades the whole Gospel of the Prince of Peace. But it is evidently necessary that this commandment should be interpreted in conformity with other moral rules.

For if it be taken literally, it would lead us to give way to hunger and thirst, frost and heat, sickness, poverty, and every kind of physical and moral evil, that may be checked or averted by wise precaution and rightful interposition. The apostle Paul, when he "withstood Peter to the face," at Antioch, because of his "dissimulation," violated the precept "resist not evil," — if these words are to be understood in all their literal latitude. * Thus the precept,

* The words, "withstand" and "resist" are translations of the same word in the original.

"give to him that asketh thee," if carried out in every case to which it literally applies, would lead to absurdities and immoralities. It would lead us to give poison to the child that desires it as a dainty; money to the drunkard and prodigal; weapons to the man that is intent upon murder or suicide. It might induce a man to neglect to make provision for his family, and thus virtually contradict the saying of St. Paul, "If any man provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Passages of the same kind are numerous, in which a literal interpretation would lead to contradictions. Thus Jesus says, "every one that asketh receiveth: and he that seeketh findeth." Yet the apostle James says to the converts whom he addresses, "ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss."

It is evident that with regard to these, and similar passages, a mere literal exposition and application are not sufficient. They require sound reasoning, and regard to the nature, both of the rule, and of the cases to which it literally applies, in order to find out their true practical meaning. Now there are instances in which the application of that commandment, "resist not evil," is not doubtful, but its sublime, practical importance is obvious. The most remarkable of these cases is that for which it was specially designed by Christ himself. Christianity was to be spread and established in the world, not by supernatural power, but by such human means as its professors possessed. The exercise of the simple right to

"teach all nations," was sufficient for this purpose. They had no right to force their faith, however true, upon any one; but they had a right, an enforcible right, freely to communicate it to all who were disposed to receive it. The profession of their religion being a matter of right, it was left to their own discretion, either to forbear to exercise it, or to insist upon it; and in this case, either to oppose force to force, or to suffer martyrdom. It was by the force of arms that the Protestants, in most countries of Europe, established their right of worship. It was by martyrdom, that the early Christians showed forth the power of the Gospel; and by this unequivocal proof of the value which they attached to it, roused the attention of the world to its claims. This was, in fact, the only mode of proceeding, that was within the power of the first promoters of Christianity, and this fact is sufficient to account for the commandments of their master, "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." "Give to him that asketh thee," &c. Considering the circumstances, then, under which non-resistance was enjoined by Christ, there does not seem to be sufficient reason for applying this principle to the case in which men have it in their power to establish a state of things, in which crimes, as far as possible, shall be a source of suffering only to the criminal; in which he, who is not restrained by the mere consideration of the injustice of an act, shall find restraints adapted to his selfish propensity, in the advantages he forfeits, and the suffering he incurs;

a state of things, in which every one may profess and communicate his sentiments, as well as exercise every other right, without the continual danger, and moral necessity of martyrdom. The duty of non-resistance is thought to be specially incumbent in the relation of the subject to the government under which he lives, — in consequence of the apostolic precept, to "be subject to the powers that be." This commandment clearly enjoins the important duty of obeying the civil government, inasmuch as it deserves the name of a civil government. The apostle, himself, who urges this obligation, at the same time characterizes the "higher powers" to whom he says subjection is due. "Rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil." "Do that which is good and thou shalt have praise of the same; but if thou do that which is evil, be afraid." — But if the rulers of a country become a terror, not to evil works but to good, so that those who do that which is good have to be afraid; what attribute of government do they retain but the name, and the brute force for the safe perpetration of crime, which they are constituted to destroy? In this case, is not "resistance to tyrants obedience to God"? So certainly thought St. Peter, and the other apostles, when the rulers of the Jews "commanded them strictly" not to teach in the name of Jesus. "We ought to obey God rather than men," was the answer of those undaunted men, who were abhorred and persecuted as rebels, till, by the victorious progress of the truth for which they suffered, wisdom was justified of her children, and those

who had been held the enemies, were revered as the benefactors, of their race. There is a sense in which the *divine right of government* so often urged by tyrants, is founded in truth. Both the origin and the object of human governments are truly divine, inasmuch as they are the accredited agents and instruments of that attribute of divinity, without which all other moral perfections appear but as luxuries without the necessaries of morality. Inasmuch as they are the responsible organs of even-handed justice, governments are entitled to obedience by divine law; but if they pretend to irresponsible superiority to the law, they have nothing to distinguish them from individual malefactors, but what may result from the reasoning of political superstition, according to which "the shame diminishes as the crime increases."

The foregoing remarks lead to the conclusion, that the example of Jesus, and the passages of Scripture which we have quoted, do not establish the doctrine of absolute non-resistance, although they condemn the use of physical force against rightful authority, or for the promotion of truth, and generally enjoin a pacific, conciliatory spirit. This view agrees with certain other passages, which do not seem favorable to, although they be not wholly inconsistent with, the non-resistance theory. Thus, when the soldiers came to John the Baptist, asking him, "What shall we do?" he said to them, "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your wages." Among these injunctions, there is none that, either directly or indirectly, called upon the soldiers to give

up their profession. It has been said, to be sure, that this demand was implied in the words, "do violence to no man." But if these words really meant that they should not use force at all, even in performance of their military duty, they would be inconsistent with the other injunction, "be content with your wages." For this evidently implied a *right* to their wages, which they received for nothing else than the performance of their military duties. The prohibition clearly relates to acts of oppression, which would not be justified by their obligations as soldiers. The fact is, then, that the Baptist, in prescribing the duties of soldiers, does not demand of them to give up their profession; but, on the contrary, in commanding them to be content with the wages which they received for their military service, certainly did not object to their remaining soldiers, and in recognising their right to their wages, recognised also, the duties for the performance of which they received them. These circumstances do not favor a theory that supposes war, and the use of force in general, to be unjustifiable in all cases. We know also, that the man of whom Jesus said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel," was a soldier; and that Cornelius, the centurion whom Peter baptized, is described as a devout and just man.

The moral character of the Deity, which the New Testament sets before us as the supreme standard of human conduct, unites the attributes of forgiving mercy, and retributive corrective justice. On the one hand he is described as pardoning the son that was

lost; on the other, as destroying the husbandman who had insulted his servants and killed his son. The nature of the case determines the application of either of those fundamental, moral principles.

We will now examine the philosophy and practical fitness of this doctrine, as set forth by its most intelligent advocates. It is this. Man being endowed with a rational and moral nature, all men might and ought to be guided in their conduct by a sense of duty, and sentiment of kindness. All means, therefore, which, setting aside man's higher nature, are intended to force them to do right, are essentially wrong. Now, war and the use of force for settling difficulties among men will never be abolished, unless some men resolutely begin with taking the ground of never resorting to these means under any circumstances. If it be understood, that no force will be used even in defence of right, — if war, with all the preparations for war, as well as chains and prisons, be abolished, — much greater exertions will be made to induce men, by moral means, by education, public opinion, argument, and persuasion, to respect the rights of their fellow-men. Still suppose that, notwithstanding these moral efforts, there should be some men who are not restrained by the mere consideration of the injustice of an act. Even among these, few would be found mean enough to inflict injustice upon one who is resolved to bear it without resistance. In the rebellion towards the close of the last century, the lives of the Quakers were spared; and in the settlement of Pennsylvania, the

peace policy of its founder prevented all hostility on the part of the natives. Hence, the principle of non-resistance is generally the safest, as well as the best, course. But even if there be any human being so hardened and so mean as to inflict an injury upon an unresisting fellow-being, the voluntary martyrdom of the innocent is the highest glory attainable by man, as well as the surest way to establish the truth for which he suffers, and to effect even the conversion of his persecutors. It is thus, that Christianity has triumphed so far, and will triumph at last completely over all its enemies.

This mode of reasoning rests on two distinct grounds, — expediency and principle. The first of these relates to the personal safety of the individual who embraces the doctrine of non-resistance, and the probability of success in his pursuits. The other question concerns the morality of the two principles, of total abstinence from physical force, and a partial use of it.

With regard to the alleged safety of the practice of non-resistance, there can be no doubt, that distrust is very often the chief cause of danger, and faith the best security. The moral importance of the principle of faith in education is generally acknowledged; but it is the peculiar merit of the friends of peace to have brought forward many glorious instances of reckless crime disarmed by defenceless faith. They have shown, that, even when the character of a man is formed, and his habits are fixed, after he has thrown off all allegiance to virtue, and put on the whole ar-

mour of crime, still he is not proof against the arrows of kindness; he feels constrained to revere virtue in others, even when this reverence is necessarily coupled with self-contempt. But, on the other hand, the force of facts constrains us to admit, that, in many cases, the most devoted heroic faith has proved inadequate to overcome the determined wickedness or hopeless delusion of men. Thus, the early converts to Christianity, according to the testimony of the fathers of the church, generally refused to fight, on the ground that they were Christians. Yet they, as well as the author of their faith, were accounted as "sheep for the slaughter." It is, then, not consistent with facts, that the non-resistance faith is always a safe and expedient doctrine. Those, whose conduct is conformed to the belief that men are creatures of circumstances, are generally safe; but those, who act upon the principle that circumstances are, or ought to be, the creatures of men, who dare to have an opinion, a conscience of their own, whether the world be with or against them, they live a life of constant danger. In the height of success they must be prepared to hear the cries of Crucify! Crucify! even before the last echoes of Hosanna! have died away.

This question, whether one mode of conduct be less dangerous than another, — whether it be probable, that the man, who has struck one blow to destroy my life, and, having missed by accident, aims another, will forbear upon seeing my determination rather to die than to resist, or only upon finding me

both able and resolved to take his own life in case he should endanger mine, — this question depends on a calm and discriminating consideration of the circumstances of the case. The theory of implicit faith in man's better nature has been refuted by the whole history of martyrdom ; the opposite theory of distrust has been disproved by many instances of determined criminals, and even madmen, overcome by non-resistance, made irresistible to them by the power of faith and love. The safety of either of these antagonist principles cannot be determined by general rules, but the nature of the case must be the practical guide for individuals and nations. " What king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth, whether he be able, with ten thousand, to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand ? " But it is not only numbers, but natural advantages, and, above all, the encouraging and inspiring influence of a good cause, which are to be taken into account. It was by partly accommodating themselves to existing circumstances, and partly by forcing circumstances into the service of their determined will, that the ancient Greeks resisted the countless hosts of the great king, and that, in more recent times, the Netherlanders, the Provinces of North America, and the modern Greeks, established their independence.

With regard to the chances of war, a computation has recently been made, with a view to ascertain in how many wars, recorded in history, right has prevailed over wrong. It is supposed, that the number

of cases in which the good cause has been victorious, and of those in which it has been defeated, is about the same. The uselessness of war, as a remedy against injustice, has been inferred from that computation. But this conclusion does not seem to be borne out by the facts adduced. The fact, that justice does not always prevail in contest, only proves, that the goodness of the cause is not of itself sufficient to secure to its defenders the victory. The belief in an immediate interposition of Providence, which instituted ordeals, has long been given up as a superstition. Hence, he, who maintains the justice of resistance against oppression, agrees with the advocate of non-resistance in condemning any attempt at insurrection made without reasonable prospect of success, — unless the tyranny be so atrocious and degrading, that the most hopeless struggle is preferable to brutalizing submission.

But while it is true, on the one hand, that justice, without the means of carrying it into effect, without forecast, activity, and decision, does not insure success, it is equally true, that, of all the favorable auspices under which a man may go forth to mortal strife, there is none so propitious and sure as the consciousness of a good cause. We remember to have seen in Germany, in the hands of one of the bravest of the brave, who distinguished themselves in the war of German independence, in 1813, an old sword that bore this simple inscription:

"Ein gut Gewissen in Sachen
Einen beherzt und froh thut machen."

That is,

> "A conscience good in what we do
> Doth make one brave and cheerful too."

The cheerful courage inspired by the justice of the cause we contend for, differs essentially not only from that which seems to be the effect of a vigorous physical constitution, but from that also which springs from the intoxicating influence of ambition, or any other selfish passion. The courage of ambition has helped individuals to make themselves the masters of their fellow-men; the courage of conscience has stirred up nations to shake off the degrading habits of servitude, and reënact their abrogated humanity. A single instance, like that of the founders of the Swiss Confederacy, pleading their chartered rights as independent members of the German Empire, exhausting all their means of entreaty and protestation against the ambitious rapacity of the Dukes of Austria, despised by her warlike nobility, until at last, grasping the weapons of despair, they rose against their oppressors, and the shepherd's sling once more prevailed against the giant's coat of mail and helmet of brass,—this single instance of the only free community in monarchical Europe, formed and self-sustained by dint of resistance against tyranny, is sufficient to prove the expediency of war as a last resort of oppressed justice. This, and other examples of successful resistance, rise in importance, when we consider, that the history of man does not exhibit more than one instance of a people recovering any considerable portion of their natural rights by free concession.

Whether he, who vindicates the cause of right on the battle field, or he, who simply delivers his testimony to the truth, and seals it with his blood, be the greater hero, this is a question which has drawn forth different answers. The charm of military eminence, and its vast practical results, have, for a long time, so dazzled the imagination, and corrupted the judgment of men, that they have been disposed to overlook the object, in pursuit of which, and the steps whereby, a Cæsar and a Napoleon rose to greatness. The friends of peace have exposed this false judgment, and have shown, that military prowess may exist with, and may sometimes be traced to, moral cowardice. But the honest zeal to disabuse mankind of so dangerous a prejudice has carried some so far, as to deny the existence of military virtue. Some have denounced all military heroism, that of the deliverers as well as that of the enslavers of men, as "wholesale murder." To us the true characteristics of moral heroism seem to be these three; an honest conviction of duty, however correct, or however mistaken; an exalted effort of will; and the spirit of self-sacrifice. It is the possession of these qualities which makes us look upon a Washington as a moral, as well as a military, hero. What instance of unresisting martyrdom is there, that surpasses, in moral glory, the deed of Winkelried, who made a breach in the fearful wall of armed spearsmen, the prime of Austria's chivalry, that baffled the boldest attacks of the naked bravery of his countrymen, by grasping a large number of hostile lances, and thrusting them

firmly into his own bosom, so that they could not be withdrawn before the Swiss host rushed over his body into the midst of the invincible square doomed to become the mausoleum of Arnold Winkelried ?

When we compare this, and many other instances of warlike philanthropy, with the highest and purest examples of unresisting martyrdom, we feel unwilling to admit an invidious distinction, that would ascribe either to the one or the other a higher degree of merit or virtue. There seems to be something in the peculiar physical and moral constitution of benevolent individuals, or in the different influences under which their characters have been formed, that fits and disposes each one more especially either for active or for suffering philanthropy. There are individuals, we know, whose voice and strength failed them when called upon to make a public declaration of their sentiments by word or action, though all the terrors of this world could not force from them a denial of a single article of their creed ; and there are others who rejoice in a public, but shrink from a more private exhibition of fidelity to principle. The crown of martyrdom belongs to him who is ready both to act and to suffer, as the fulfilment of his moral mission may require the one or the other ; and humanity will own her votaries, and accept their sacrifice, and not allow those to go down to an unhonored grave who fall in her service, whether grasping the sword, or clasping the crucifix.

Still it may be said with good reason, that, although candid and enlightened men will judge the

character of individuals by the standard of their own professed principles, the fact, that there are conscientious soldiers, does not establish the morality of their profession. The taking of human life, and generally the use of force against beings who are fitted and destined to govern themselves by principles of justice and kindness, is inflicting evil, and therefore wrong, unless it be proved to be necessary to prevent greater evil. Punishment and war can be vindicated only on the ground on which the amputation of a limb, or the use of a dangerous medicine to save the life of the patient, is justifiable. What, then, is the principle of justice, if there be one, that authorizes and regulates the use of force ?

It is evident, that no human being can attain to that degree of perfection and happiness in this world, which his own nature points out as his destiny, unless he be free to use his faculties, and the various means of improvement and enjoyment which the Creator has placed within his reach. Every man, in virtue of his being a man, claims the widest sphere of independent existence and action which a human being can possess, consistently with the equal independence of every other. It is this equal sphere of freedom which we call his right. It includes personal and social rights, as well as rights of property. The duty to respect the rights of all, and the injustice of every infringement of them, are obvious. Hence the duty to vindicate the just claims of all from injustice, by adequate means, even if these means should be painful to the offender, provided they do not inflict upon

him any more evil than is necessary for the purpose of securing the rights of others, which he has violated. He, who knowingly violates the rights of others, shows, that so far he is governed, not by his moral, but by his animal, nature. He so far justifies those whom he has injured, in treating him on the supposition that argument and persuasion are less likely to keep him within the bounds of justice, than the application of physical evil sufficient to check his criminal propensity. For though a man cannot by force be made to respect the rights of others, he can by force be made to abstain from violating them. That supposition does not deny the possibility, however improbable, that a man, who has shown, by his act, that the mere consideration of its injustice is not sufficient to restrain him, may be converted by the unmerited forgiveness of the offended. This possibility is acknowledged and implied in the fact, that the use of force, in defence of right, is a matter of right, but not necessarily a duty. It is a duty, in general, to repress injustice by the gentlest means, if they be sufficient; by the severest, if they be necessary. But as there is no external absolute standard to determine the degree of lenity or severity to be applied in every case, it is right, on the one hand, that he, whose rights are violated, should have the right to forego any or every means of redress and defence, inasmuch as he has to bear the consequences of his forbearance. But, on the other hand, it would be wrong to deprive the injured person of those physical means which, from the nature of the offence,

are more likely to maintain or restore his rights, than the use of persuasion, the efficiency of which has been rendered improbable by the very act of the offender. And it is the duty of all who are interested in the maintenance of justice, to afford to every one, who is not willing to suffer injustice, that supply of physical force which, according to their deliberate judgment, is required to counteract the criminal motive evinced by the act. Even in the case of a person who is resolved rather to die than defend himself, the fact that he possesses in himself, or in the community, adequate means to repel force by force, does much to enhance the glory and moral power of his martyrdom. The general principle, then, which authorizes and regulates the use of physical force, may be thus stated. Coercion should be used so far, and only so far, as it is necessary to check the criminal propensity of those who are not restrained, by considerations of justice, from infringing the rights of others. This principle limits the use of force to the protection of the rights of all; and it is of the utmost consequence to hold fast the distinction between this and every other object, however desirable and laudable.

Thus it is highly important to individuals, and to society, that all superstition and bigotry should be eradicated, and that true religion should be planted everywhere. But we have no right to promote religion by force, either directly, by imprisonment and war, or by connecting with the profession of a certain creed any civil or political disabilities. The most thorough conviction, based on the clearest evidences, that *our* faith alone is true and conducive to the wel-

fare, temporal and eternal, of mankind, does not justify the use of any means but such as are included in the exercise of our common rights. My personal and social rights authorize me to use my own faculties for the purpose of enlightening and converting all who are disposed to hear me; and I have a right to use my property for erecting churches, and supporting preachers and missionaries. This is the extent of my rights of conscience, my religious liberty, which, as it allows to every one an equal range of religious action, every one has a right to defend and secure from encroachment.

The principle that regulates the use of force, as above stated, justifies its employment only so far as it is necessary and sufficient to overcome the criminal propensity that is not restrained by a sense of justice. The restriction of physical power to cases of necessity implies the duty of individuals and of society, before resorting to force, to use every means that may render that resort unnecessary. Hence the individual who is attacked by others, under circumstances in which he cannot apply to the constituted officers of the law, is bound first to remonstrate with the aggressor, then to threaten, and only when remonstrance and threatening prove fruitless, to employ force, — unless the conduct of the aggressor should be such as to leave him no time but for immediate resistance. In both cases he is justified in using such forcible measures as are sufficient, and no more than are necessary, for the security of his rights. For the same reason, where the aid of the law is available,

the individual must apply to its responsible administrators, instead of resorting to single-handed violence, or raising a mob. It is for the purpose of removing or diminishing the necessity of coercive measures, that laws are made, which are, or ought to be, nothing else than declarations of right, calculated by their justice to inspire respect and obedience. Courts of justice are established for a peaceable, impartial settlement of contested claims. To secure the compliance of those whom the respect for equal laws and impartial tribunals is not sufficient to restrain, punishments are threatened; and only when the fear of them is not sufficient to repress the criminal desire, the actual infliction is resorted to for effecting this purpose. The same principle applies to nations.

Both with regard to war and to punishments, the principle which authorizes force, only so far as it is necessary to secure invaded rights, forbids all useless violence and all cruelty. Hence the great importance of the difficult science of adapting the modes and degrees of punishments to the nature and degree of guilt evinced by the crime, for the purpose of securing the rights of all. The manner and the degree of punishment should answer both the immediate object of depriving the criminal of the power to do evil, and the more remote end of checking the criminal propensity, and reforming the character of the offender. It is when weighed in this scale, that capital punishments are found unjustifiable; for they are not absolutely necessary to secure society from a repetition of the same crime, and not calculated to reform the criminal; and

no human being can be so utterly depraved as to render all attempts at reformation hopeless. The barbarous maxim that blood should be shed merely because blood has been shed, is growing obsolete ; and the vindication of any punishment, on the ground of its serving as a terrifying example, is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as terror may be the effect of unjust, as well as of just punishments. The terrifying character of the punishment does not make it just ; otherwise the code of Draco would be the most perfect work of penal legislation. If we add to these considerations, which may be summed up in the simple maxim, not to give unnecessary pain, that of the uncertainty of all human evidence, so justly urged by the author of the Penal Code of Louisiana, in opposition to capital punishments, we shall be satisfied that the taking of human life, though it may be necessary as a last resort of individual or national self-defence, is unjustifiable as a *punishment*, which, in order to be just, must bear the character of corrective discipline.

The same reasoning applies to war, and all preparations for war. Every war, to be just, must possess these three attributes : it must have justice for its object ; it must be resorted to only when all peaceable means of redress prove of no avail ; and it must inflict no injury beyond what is necessary for the redress of wrong. Of the last of these requisites we have already spoken, as implied in the general principle, that the infliction of evil beyond what is necessary to repress the criminal propensity of the evil-doer, is crime. Even in war, the principle of peace

should be acted upon as far as possible. It should prevent the violation of the personal rights and private property of the inhabitants of a hostile country, as well as enjoin humanity towards prisoners.

With regard to the first of the abovementioned requisites of a just war, we have already remarked, that resort to arms for any purpose but the protection of human rights, is unjust; though authorized by the legitimate sovereign, it is a conspiracy for robbery and murder, whether it be undertaken to satisfy the ambition or gratify the whim of a despot, or to uphold the balance of power among nations, or to establish universal peace, or to promote the interests of the cross or the crescent.

But when the rights of man, on the safety of which the destinies of mankind on earth depend, are violated, though it be in the person of a single individual, or by the infringement of a single right, — that single individual becomes the representative of mankind, and this single-right is identified with universal justice. It is guarded by the armed providence of the law, and insured by the collected moral and physical power of the community. It is not the injury done, but the injustice of the act, which constitutes the right and the duty of war. Whether it be the Great King demanding "earth and water," or a mother country laying an unconstitutional impost upon tea, — the demand is wrong, and resistance right; and when all peaceable means of opposition are exhausted, war becomes a duty.

The justice of the war does not depend on its be-

ing either offensive, or defensive, — if these words relate merely to the fact, that one or the other of the contending parties was the first to commence actual hostilities. The question is simply who is the oppressor, and who the oppressed. He who disregards the rights of his fellow-man, virtually commences hostilities, and he whom he has wronged, is acting in a moral point of view on the defensive, though he should be the first to take the sword. Hence the assertion, that all offensive war is wrong, and defensive war alone is justifiable, is correct only when it is understood as relating, not to the mere fact of one having been the first or the last to take up arms, but to the aggression or defence of *right*.

But war, in order to be just, must not only have justice for its object, but it must not be resorted to until all peaceable means of redress have been tried in vain. This principle applies, as we have shown, to the use of physical force in general. The freer the government, the more manifold and powerful are the inducements to abstain from such violations of right, as make a resort to force necessary. The general information of the people respecting the rights and duties of all; the participation of all the citizens in the deliberation and enactment of the law; its promulgation in the manner best calculated to make it familiar to all; the institution of impartial, popular tribunals, to decide upon every case of contention arising under the law; the secure enjoyment of all the advantages which the law insures to every one who obeys it; the powerful influence of public opinion

strengthening the principles of honesty in individuals; and, where such principles are wanting, the fear of just punishments inflicted by the law; — all these are so many appeals to every individual to abstain from acts which must bring down upon him the sword of the law. And thus between nations, the more their mutual intercourse is unfettered and unrestricted, making each country interested in the welfare of every other by a constant interchange of productions, so much the stronger are the inducements to settle any existing differences by arbitration and compromise, rather than war. It is not until all appeals to self-interest and conscience, all attempts at an amicable adjustment of difficulties, have proved fruitless, that resort to the last means of redress may be justified.

How long and how far an injured nation may forbear, magnanimously enduring wrong rather than have recourse to the fearful remedy of war, and extend the hand of peace, before exchanging the olive branch for the sword, — is a question which must depend on the nature and circumstances of the case. Arbitration is one of the means of amicable adjustment resorted to, particularly of late, with signal success. There are indeed questions, such as involve independence and sovereignty, which no nation can leave to be decided by arbitration. But with regard to those which come under the head of "questions of national profit or honor," * there does not seem to be any good rea-

* Report of the Committee of the Massachusetts Legislature on the subject of Peace.

son for governments to refuse the decision of an umpire. It is, in most cases, not a due sense of the rights of property and national honor, but rather the reckless passion of aggrandizement, and the sensitiveness of the duellist, which make governments willing to lavish the blood and treasure of nations rather than compromise a doubtful pecuniary claim, or simply to explain what could be easily settled by frank and honorable explanation.

The efforts of the Peace Societies, therefore, for the purpose of inducing governments to adjust their disputes about matters of profit and honor by arbitration, are founded upon just principles, and deserving of universal sympathy and coöperation.

Another more permanent measure of universal pacification has been proposed by philanthropists, and recently brought before the Federal Legislature. It is a "Congress of Nations," consisting of delegates from all the states of the civilized world, for the purpose of composing a code of international law; and a "High Court," commissioned to decide all disputes between nations according to that law. These decisions, however, as well as the code, are to be invested with no other than an advisory power.

The establishment of a Congress and High Court of Nations is certainly a sublime conception; and we do not see any good reasons for considering it an impracticable scheme. But in order to make it a beneficent institution, the true object for which laws are made, and legislatures and courts of judicature are appointed, should not be lost sight of. Laws are

just and morally binding, only inasmuch as they are declarations of the rights of all. It is for the purpose of securing to each human being the greatest freedom consistent with equality, that laws are made, legislators, judges, and magistrates appointed. All governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed; and this power is delegated to them for no other purpose than to secure the inalienable rights with which the Creator has endowed all men; and whenever they assume any other power, it is one of the inalienable rights and duties of their constituents to take it from them. This is the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence; and to secure these blessings of liberty to themselves and their descendants, the Constitution of the United States was framed by the founders of this Republic. Whatever partial inconsistencies may be imputed to us in our attempts at carrying these principles into effect, still these are the principles which "We, the people of these United States," have acknowledged as just in themselves, and to the support of which we stand pledged before the political world.

Our Federal Government has, indeed, in its intercourse with foreign powers, been guided by the principle, that treaties for the protection of commerce and the private rights of the citizens of our own and other countries, may be formed with those who actually possess the sovereign power in any country,—so as to recognise only the fact, without acknowledging the justice of the title by which the power is held. In forming treaties with the Ottoman Porte, or with the

Autocrat of all the Russias, it is evident that we are not negotiating with those, who, according to our political creed, are the only rightful sovereigns of those countries ; we are not treating with the Turkish and Russian nations, but simply with those, whoever they be, who have the power to protect the private rights of our citizens in those parts of the world.

But it would be inconsistent with our political principles, as well as the most obvious facts, were our government to acknowledge an assembly composed almost entirely of delegates of the monarchs of Europe, as a "Congress and High Court of Nations." It is unreasonable to expect that in their decisions and regulations they would be guided by any other maxims than those which are maintained by their constituents, — that is, the maxims of the Holy Alliance. These considerations derive additional strength from the state of public opinion in Europe, in consequence of which, any war that should arise, from whatever cause, according to Canning's prediction, is likely to become a war of principle, — turning upon the very principle which forms the essential difference between this and the other governments of the world.

It is said, that this central legislature and tribunal are not to have any other than an advisory power, so that the efficacy of their regulations and decisions must rely entirely on their wisdom and equity. But as long as the greatest portion of their constituents hold a power not derived from the people, and therefore dependent on a large standing army, it may be easily foreseen, that if the party in whose favor the

High Court decides, have the requisite power, it will be employed for the execution of the sentence. Hence the circumstance, that the court possesses no armed force, does not remove the objections to such a central institution, consisting of delegates of so many absolute monarchs, together with those of one or two republics, — added, as it were, by way of exception, to strengthen the general rule.

These objections do not apply to the settlement of differences by arbitration, as it is easy in each instance to find some third power, which, with regard to the case in question, may be considered as disposed to decide with a degree of impartiality, which cannot be expected beforehand to belong to a central court, emanating from such heterogeneous elements. At the same time, it is unquestionably desirable that certain doubtful points of international law, with regard to which the opinions of some of the most celebrated writers on this subject disagree, and the decision of which is in no way affected by the essential difference in the political constitutions of different countries, might be settled by special treaties between those most interested in these questions.

A Congress and High Court of Nations must be considered as a truly cosmopolitan and philanthropic institution, if it be founded on a republican constituency. It is fitted to promote the highest interests of humanity, if its members are the responsible delegates and representatives of free communities, which consider all laws, both national and international, as binding upon themselves, only inasmuch as they are in-

tended to make known and secure to every human being the greatest possible liberty consistent with equality ; and recognise no power, whether legislative, or judicial, or executive, as rightfully constituted, but inasmuch as it is derived from and responsible to the people. The true way, then, to realize this sublime idea of a central board of international legislation and judicature, is to *republicanize the world.*

Let the principle of self-government be acknowledged as the only rightful form of government in every nation, and the chief source of all international discord is dried up. What national, nay, what selfish interest is there to be gratified by war and conquest, if it be understood that the conquered province is to govern itself, and to tax itself for the sole purpose of supporting its own government ? Inasmuch as the fundamental law of a state is truly republican, all its means and energies are directed not to its aggrandizement as a state, but to the protection of the rights of the individuals who compose it. If this were the condition of every state, it is evident, that the civil institutions, which are sufficient to secure the rights of the native, would protect, also, those of the foreigner in his intercourse with the native. For although it is not to be presumed, that men, being liable to err, and to be tempted by selfish motives, will ever cease to quarrel about their rights ; yet if these rights, as acknowledged by law, are essentially the same all over the world, and if the power of each state have no other object than to secure them, what

could induce the majority of any nation, in the enjoyment of the inestimable blessings of a free intercourse with all mankind, to go to war with another nation? Surely it is a true saying, expressive both of the main cause of war and the mode of removing it, that "war is a game which, if nations were wise, kings would not play at."

As soon, then, as the nations of the earth, or the greater portion of them, shall be sufficiently civilized and humanized, to recognise the protection of the individual rights of men as the only legitimate object of government, it will be safe and right for them to abolish war, and all preparations for war. It is thus, and thus alone, that the great prophecy can be fulfilled, that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

Rulers, who do not derive their power from, and do not hold themselves responsible to, the people, *cannot* disband their armies; and as long as there are such rulers, powerful enough to disturb the peace of those nations which are governed by principles opposed and dangerous to their political existence, it would be a suicidal measure in a free nation to lay down its weapons, trusting to the justice of armed despots. No true and intelligent friend of peace, no one who is able to distinguish between the peace founded on freedom, and the peace of universal despotism, can advise a free nation to wrest the sword from the hand of the Cherubim guarding the entrance to the Eden of Liberty.

We have endeavoured to investigate the subject of

peace and war, and the attempts of the Peace Societies in our country, impartially and thoroughly. We have found that war, and the use of force, are justifiable, so far as they are necessary for the security of the rights of all. We have shown, that, within these bounds, war, and the use of force are not contrary, but conformable to the spirit, the precepts, and the example, of the great Founder of our religion; but that Christianity aims at abolishing war by removing its causes. As we feel sure, that these views are entertained by a very large number of true friends of peace, we would suggest to the Peace Societies an alteration in their present constitution, with a view to secure the coöperation of those who now feel themselves excluded by the manner in which their object is stated. Instead of asserting, that "all war is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel," we should prefer a simple declaration of their purpose to carry into effect the object of Christianity, to establish "peace on earth and good will towards men," by inducing all men to respect the rights of all; and especially by urging upon nations the duty of settling any differences arising between them, by arbitration, or other peaceful means of obtaining justice.

But while we would use every means to spread the doctrine of peace over all the world, we would omit nothing that may fit this country to defend, most effectually, that liberty which is the only sure foundation of true peace. The founders of this republic were placed, in this respect, in a situation similar to that of the Founder of Christianity, who came to

establish "peace on earth"; but, at the same time, foreknowing the trials which his Gospel must pass through before its final success, declared, I came not "to send peace, but the sword." We do not wish for an increase of our standing army; we rejoice in the practical demonstration of the superior safety of self-government over the most finished political mechanism, which is implied in the fact, that the kingdom of Prussia, with a population about equal to our own, supports an army of two hundred and fifty thousand men, while we regularly employ but about eight thousand. But we wish the whole population of this country to be thoroughly instructed in the use of arms, and the great duty of defending its liberty to be deeply rooted in the mind and heart of every American. But while we would take heed to all things that "belong to our peace," we should not forget, that, of all its enemies, there is none so dangerous as practical inconsistency with our own declared republican faith.